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Joseph M Verska, etal. vs. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, eta!.

Joseph M Verska, Spine Institute Of Idaho vs. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Christian G Zimmerman,
Donald Fox
Date

Code

User

6/23/2009

NCOC

MCBIEHKJ

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Deborah Bail

COMP

MCBIEHKJ

Complaint Filed

Deborah Bail

SMFI

MCBIEHKJ

(3)Summons Filed

Deborah Bail

ANSW

CCAMESLC

Answer (White for SARMC and Fox)

Deborah Bail

ANSW

CCAMESLC

Answer (White for Zimmerman)

Deborah Bail

HRSC

DCTHERTL

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
10107/200903:30 PM)

Deborah Bail

NOTC

DCTHERTL

Notice of Status Conference

Deborah Bail

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Limited Admission of Robert G
Homchick

Deborah Bail

8/27/2009

NOTS

CCSIMMSM

Notice Of Service

Deborah Bail

8/31/2009

AFOS

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit Of Service 6/25/09

Deborah Bail

AFOS

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit Of Service 6/28/09

Deborah Bail

ACCP

MCBIEHKJ

Acceptance Of Service 6/30109

Deborah Bail

9/15/2009

ORDR

CCLUEDTC

Order Granting Limited Admission of Robert
Homchick

Deborah Bail

9/17/2009

NOTS

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Service

Deborah Bail

10/2/2009

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion for Limited Admission of Brad Fisher

Deborah Bail

10/5/2009

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service

Deborah Bail

10/8/2009

CONH

CCLUEDTC

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Deborah Bail
10107/200903:30 PM: Conference Held

ORDR

DCTHERTL

Order Granting Limited Admission of Brad Fisher Deborah Bail

HRSC

DCTHERTL

NOTC

DCTHERTL

10/13/2009

MOTN

CCDWONCP

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/01/2011 09:30 Deborah Bail
AM) 3-4 WEEKS
Deborah Bail
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing
Further Proceedings (2/1111 @ 9:30)
Deborah Bail
Motion to Disqualify Alternate Judge

10/14/2009

ORDR

DCTHERTL

Order Disqualifying Alternate Judge (McKee)

Deborah Bail

10/20/2009

NOTS

CCDELAAA

Notice Of Service

Deborah Bail

11/612009

NOTS

CCSIMMSM

Notice Of Service

Deborah Bail

11/24/2009

NOTC

CCNELSRF

Notice of Change of Firm Name

Deborah Bail

12/15/2009

NOTS

CCAMESLC

Notice Of Service

Deborah Bail

12/28/2009

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

MISC

CCWRIGRM

Deborah Bail
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of
Information Related to SARMCs Wrongful Denial
of Dr Verskas Reappointment
Deborah Bail
Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs Motion

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion

Deborah Bail

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiffs Motion to Exceed Page Limit on Their
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion

Deborah Bail

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (02/03/10 @ 2:30pm)

Deborah Bail

8/18/2009

8/19/2009

NOTH

Judge
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Date

Code

User

12/28/2009

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/03/201002:30 PM) Motion to Compel

1/8/2010

MOTN

CCLATICJ

Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint Deborah Bail
and Demand for Jury Trial

MEMO

CCLATICJ

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to
File First Amended Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial

NOHG

CCLATICJ

Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Leave to File First Deborah Bail
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
(02/10/10 @ 2 pm)

HRSC

CCLATICJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/10/201002:00
PM)

Deborah Bail

1/19/2010

STIP

CCMCLlU

Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order

Deborah Bail

1/20/2010

MOTN

CCLATICJ

Motion for Protective Order

Deborah Bail

OPPO

CCLATICJ

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel and Cross-Motions for (i) Protective
Order on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking
Privileged Peer Review Records

Deborah Bail

NOHG

CCLATICJ

Notice Of Hearing re Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Cross-Motions
for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii)
Order Striking Privileged Peer Review Records
(02/03/10 @ 2:30 pm)

Deborah Bail

1/27/2010

REPL

CCBOYIDR

Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and
Deborah Bail
Response to Cross-Motions for Protective Order
on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking Privileged
Peer Review Records

1/28/2010

ORDR

DCTHERTL

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Exceed Page Deborah Bail
Limit on their Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial
of Dr. Verska's Reappointment

2/112010

RPLY

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Reply in Support of Cross-Motions for Deborah Bail
Protective Order on Peer Review and Order
Striking Privileged Peer Review Records

2/3/2010

DCHH

CCLUEDTC

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Deborah Bail
02/03/201002:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Motion to Compel & Defendants'
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and
Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer
Review, and (ii) Order Striking Privileged Peer
Review Records
50

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs MOtion for
Leave to File First Amended Complaint

Deborah Bail

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Stephanie C Westermeier

Deborah

ORDR

DCTHERTL

Protective Order

Deborah Bail

2/5/2010

Judge
Deborah Bail

Deborah Bail
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Code

User

2/8/2010

REPL

CCLATICJ

Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

2/9/2010

MISC

DCTHERTL

2/10/2010

DCHH

CCLUEDTC

Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers in Support of
Deborah Bail
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Information Related to SARMC'S Wrongful Denial
of Dr. Verska's Reappointment
Document sealed
Hearing result for Motion held on 02/10/2010
Deborah Bail
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 50

NOTS

CCMASTLW

Notice Of Service

Deborah Bail

2/11/2010

ORDR

CCLUEDTC

Order Re: Motion To Compel/Protective Order

Deborah Bail

2/22/2010

MOTN

CCNELSRF

Plaintiffs Motion for Premissive Appeal

Deborah Bail

MEMO

CCNELSRF

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Premissive Appeal

Deborah Bail

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (03/17/10 @ 3:30pm)

Deborah Bail

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Deborah Bail

2/23/2010

Judge
Deborah Bail

03/17/201003:30 PM) Motion for Permissive

Appeal
2/25/2010

ORDR

DCTHERTL

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Deborah Bail
First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial

3/4/2010

AMEN

CCLATICJ

Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

Deborah Bail

3/10/2010

OPPO

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Permissive Appeal

Deborah Bail

3/15/2010

RPLY

DCTHERTL

Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Permissive Appeal

Deborah Bail

3/16/2010

ANSW

CCWRIGRM

Defendants St Alphonsus Reg Med Cntr and
Donald Fox MDs Answer to Amended Complaint

Deborah Bail

ANSW

CCWRIGRM

Defendant Christian G Zimmerman MDs Answer
to Amended Complaint

Deborah Bail

3/17/2010

DCHH

CCLUEDTC

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
Deborah Bail
District Court Hearing He/<
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Motion for Permissive Appeal 50

3/24/2010

ORDR

DCTHERTL

Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive
Appeal

Deborah Bail

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Plaintiffs Motion to Stay District Court
Proceedings During Processing of Motion for
Permissive Appeal

Deborah Bail

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion

Deborah Bail

NOTH

CCWRIGRM

Notice Of Hearing (05/12/10 @ 2:30pm)

Deborah

03/17/201003:30 PM:
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Date

Code

User

3/24/2010

HRSC

CCWRIGRM

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled

Deborah Bail

05/12/2010 02:30 PM) Motion to Stay District

Court Proceedings
4/5/2010

STIP

CCNELSRF

4/6/2010

HRVC

DCTHERTL

Stipulation to Stay District Court Proceedings
During Processing of Motion for Permissive
Appeal

Deborah Bail

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on

Deborah Bail

05/12/201002:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion

to Stay District Court Proceedings
ORDR

DCTHERTL

Order to Stay District Court Proceedings During
Processing of Motion for Permissive Appeal

Deborah Bail

STAT

DCTHERTL

STATUS CHANGED: inactive

Deborah Bail

6/4/2010

APSC

CCHOLMEE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Deborah Bail

6/18/2010

REQU

CCSWEECE

Defendant's Request For Add'i Records to be
Included in the Clerk's Record on Appeal and or
Transcript on Appeal

Deborah Bail
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ORlGtNAl
J.
Raymond D. Powers
ISB #2737; rdp(Cipowersthomson.eom

Portia L. Jenkins
ISB #7233; pljc?l.powersthomson.eom

POWERS THOMSON, P.c.
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Post Office Box 9756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 577-5100
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101
W:\17\17-002\Complaint.docx

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,

CV DC 0 11804
Case No. - - - - - - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX, M.D.,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE INSTITUTE OF
IDAHO, by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS THOMSON, P.C., and hereby
allege the following as and for claims against Defendants in the above-captioned litigation.
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JURISDICTION & PARTIES

1.

Plaintiff Joseph M. Verska, M.D. ("Dr. Verska")

IS

an Idaho resident and

orthopedic spine surgeon, licensed and practicing in the State ofIdaho.
2.

The Spine Institute of Idaho is a professional corporation conducting business in

the State ofIdaho.
3.

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") is a non-profit corporation

conducting business and providing medical services to the general public in the state of Idaho.
4.

Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing

medicine in the State ofIdaho. Dr. Zimmerman is a neurosurgeon whose specialty includes the
practice of spine surgery.
5.

Donald Fox, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing medicine in the

State ofIdaho. Dr. Fox's specialty is anesthesia.
6.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court under Idaho Code §5-404. The

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of this Court.
FACTS

7.

Dr. Verska created The Spine Institute of Idaho

In

April, 2001.

The Spine

Institute ofIdaho provides services to the general public that include surgical, rehabilitation and
radiographic services for spine related conditions.
8.

Dr. Verska applied for and was granted privileges at SARMC on January 22,

1996. Since that time and until July 1,2008, Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed at SARMC
on a regular basis, without lapse. Every time Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed, he was
presented by SARMC with a new set of Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans ("MSPP").
Dr. Verska and SARMC and its agents agreed to act and deal with one another in a consistent
fashion by virtue of the Bylaws and MSPP. By virtue of their respective conduct and actions,
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SARMC and Dr. Verska entered into a fiduciary relationship pursuant to SARMC's MSPP and
Bylaws as a result of Dr. Verska being granted renewed privileges and continuously practicing
medicine at SARMC.
9.

The actions and conduct of SARMC and Dr. Verska established duties and

responsibilities between SARMC and Dr. Verska wherein both parties held reasonable
expectations that each would act in good faith in fulfilling their respective responsibilities set
forth in the SARMC MSPP and Bylaws.
10.

In January of2004, SARMC initiated a review of Dr. Verska's practice.

11.

Commencing in 2004 and continuing thereafter, together SARMC, its agents,

employees and Board Members, Dr. Zimmerman and Dr. Fox conspired to damage Dr. Verska's
professional reputation and his ability to practice spine surgery in Boise, Idaho. This effort
continues on the date of the filing of this complaint.
12.

In 2004, SARMC approached Dr. Verska and asked him to provide on-call trauma

spine services at SARMC. Dr. Verska agreed in an effort to assist SARMC manage the loss of
trauma spine neurosurgeons created by the Hospital's dispute with the Neurosurgical Group.
13.

In March of 2005, the SARMC Medical Executive Committee ("MEC")

appointed an Ad Hoc committee to conduct a peer review of certain aspects of Dr. Verska's
practice. Dr. Verska cooperated in the peer review process.
14.

In January of2006, the Ad Hoc Committee presented its fmdings to the MEC and

made certain recommendations. Dr. Verska complied with the recommendations.
15.

In 2006, the Spine Medicine Institute ("SMI") was conceived and created by

SARMC. It was at the time and remains the vision ofSMI at SARMC to be the destination spine
care program for the Northwest. SMI offers multidisciplinary management of back and neck
pain, including medical evaluation, diagnostic imaging, pain management, physical therapy,

000009
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spine surgery, psychosocial care. SMI competes directly with the services offered by Dr. Verska
and the Spine Institute ofIdaho.
16.

Dr. Christian Zimmerman is held out by SARMC as a spine surgeon affiliated

with SMI. Dr. Zimmerman is an employee of SARMC. The physicians affiliated with SMI are
direct competitors of Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute ofldaho.
17.

Dr. Donald Fox was appointed Vice President and President Elect of the Medical

Statfin February of2005.
18.

In April of 2006, the SARMC Quality Care Committee modified the Ad Hoc

Committee's earlier recommendation and the review of Dr. Verska's practice continued.
19.

In January of 2007, the MEC voted to discontinue the ongoing peer review of

Dr. Verska. Nevertheless, the Board of Trustees of SARMC, without justification, directed the
MEC to continue its investigation of Dr. Verska.
20.

In October of 2007, the MEC, led by Dr. Fox as the President of the Medical

Staff, voted to commission another Ad Hoc Committee to conduct another peer review.
2l.

In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the MEC and

consisting of Dr. Michael McMartin, Dr. Gertjan Mulder and Dr. Timothy Floyd, recommended
another review of Dr. Verska's practice at SARMC. Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon who was and is
a direct competitor of Dr. Verska's. Dr. Floyd was and is affiliated with SMI. Dr. McMartin is a
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC.
Dr. McMartin's practice competes with services offered by the Spine Institute of Idaho.
Dr. Mulder is a former president ofthe medical staff at SARMC.
22.

SARMC, its Board, Dr. Fox and the MEC knew that Dr. McMartin and Dr. Floyd

had a conflict of interest acting as members of the Ad Hoc Committee conducting the peer

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR WRY TRIAL - 4
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review of Dr. Verksa. Nevertheless, SARMC, through its agents, selected them to be members
ofthe Committee conducting the peer review of Dr. Verska's care.
23.

In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee presented the MEC with its initial

recommendations, which were approved; Dr. Verska complied with the requests for infonnation
from the Committee and cooperated in its review of his practice.
24.

On December 6, 2007, through a letter from Dr. Fox, Dr. Verska was notified of

the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation and the continuing peer review as directed by the
SARMC Board of Trustees. Members of the Ad Hoc Committee considered the process a peer

-

review with no punitive or adverse consequences to Dr. Verska.
I
25.

From January through June of2008, Dr. Verska submitted additional materials to

the Ad Hoc Committee as it continued its peer review. During this same period oftime, Dr. Fox
breached confidentiality and disclosed privileged, confidential peer review information regarding
the review to physicians outside of the peer review process, including Dr. Zimmerman.
26.

Dr. Fox breached confidentiality by disclosing confidential information to

individuals outside of the process in violation of the Bylaws of SARMC and in breach of the
responsibilities and duties attached to the position of President of the Medical Staff This breach
of confidentiality damaged Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community.
27.

During the review process at SARMC, Dr. Zimmerman has disclosed confidential

information relative to Dr. Verska's practice to members of the medical community, employees
and staff members at SARMC, SARMC administrators, including Dr. Robert Polk and former
CEO, Sandra Bruce, health care insurers, pharmaceutical representatives and the general public
in an effort to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation, undermine Dr. Verska's medical

practice and increase income generated by SMI.

These representations and actions were
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intended to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community and further the
interests ofSMI.
28.

In June of 2008, the Ad Hoc Committee, consisting of Dr. Mulder, Dr. Floyd and

Dr. McMartin, made certain recommendations to the MEC.
29.

The recommendations set forth by the Ad Hoc Committee were intended by the

Committee to constitute collegial intervention and be non-punitive as provided under Chapter
VIII, Section 6 of the MSPP. Nowhere in the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation is there any
indication that they intended their recommendation be punitive resulting in Dr. Verska' s
privileges not being renewed at SARMC.
30.

On June 25, 2008, Dr. Fox with the approval of the SARMC Board of Trustees

presented information to the MEC regarding the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations.
Dr. Fox knowingly misrepresented and intentionally omitted presenting relevant information and
manipulated the recommendations and conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee in an eflort to
exclude Dr. Verska from medical staff membership at SARMC. Dr. Fox was successful in this
effort and the MEC voted to ignore key recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee resulting in
Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed on July 1, 2008.
3l.

On July 1, 2008, SARMC refused to renew Dr. Verska's privileges.

32.

On July 9, 2008, Dr. Verska requested a hearing before a Fair Hearing Panel

("FHP").
33.

Under the language of the MSPP, Dr. Verska was entitled to a formal hearing to

challenge an adverse action before his privileges could be adversely affected. SARMC failed to
comply with the MSPP and its own Bylaws in this regard in its decision to not renew
Dr. Verska's privileges on July 1, 2008, effectively removing Dr. Verska from the medical staff
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with no opportunity for Dr. Verska to have a hearing to review and challenge the basis for the
decision.
34.

The MSPP provided that a panel of three physicians be appointed to hear and take

evidence from both parties. Under Chapter XII, Section 17 Burden of Proof, Fair Hearing Plan,
the Hospital's MEC had the burden of initially presenting evidence in support of its
recommendation. The burden then shifted to the physician. The section goes on to state that
[T]he Hearing Panel will recommend against the Practitioner who
requested the hearing unless it finds that said Practitioner has
proved that the recommendation which prompted the hearing was
unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, or otherwise
unfounded.
35.

In 2008, Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC.

His

responsibilities as an employee of SARMC include recruitment of spine surgeons to SMI and
efforts to increase the volume of patients and income generated by SMI.
36.

In late September, 2008, SARMC adopted a position before the FHP regarding

Dr. Verska's competence and skill which misrepresented the conclusions and recommendations
reached by the Ad Hoc Committee in June 2008.

/37.

In

September of 2008,

SARMC

through

its

agents,

representatives, disclosed confidential information to -.§.t. Luke's Regional

employees
~

and

Center's

agents and officers regarding Dr. Verska's status at SARMC and the confidential process that
SARMC had engineered leading to Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed. The disclosure
violated the terms and conditions of the MSPP and Bylaws and misrepresented the facts and
circumstances regarding Dr. Verska's competence to practice and be a member of the medical
staff at SARMC.

The disclosure was intended to damage the professional reputation of

Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute ofIdaho.
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38.

Between October 28, 2008 and October 30, 2008, the FHP appointed by SARMC

heard evidence presented by SARMC and Dr. Verska on the issue of whether SARMC's
decision to now renew Dr. Verska's privileges was unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence,
or was otherwise unfounded. At the hearing both parties presented evidence, called witnesses,
cross-examined witnesses, and presented written closing statements to the panel members.
Dr. Verska presented evidence rebutting the position adopted and maintained by SARMC.
39.

In November of 2008, after considering the evidence and applying the burden of

proof outlined in the MSPP, the FHP found that SARMC's position that Dr. Verska was not
qualified to be on staff and the MEC decision to not renew Dr. Verska' s privileges were not
supported by the evidence, and were unfair and unreasonable. The FHP recommended that
Dr. Verska have his privileges at SARMC reinstated immediately.
40.

Thereafter, Dr. Fox misrepresented the FHP's conclusions and recOlmnendations

in a meeting with the MEC. On December 15, 2008, the MEC chose to ignore the FHP and
instead embraced the position first articulated in September, 2008 that Dr. Verska was not
competent and qualified to be on the SARMC medical staff
41.

The MEC did not seek the assistance or benefit of a spine surgeon to assist it in

analyzing the recommendation of the FHP. Instead it relied upon advice, misrepresentations and
intentional omissions of information provided by Dr. Fox. Dr. Fox in presenting the issues to the
MEC mischaracterized the Fair Hearing process, the findings of the FHP, and the responsibilities
ofSARMC and the MEC under the terms of the MSPP.
42.

Dr. Verska appealed the misinformed and arbitrary recommendation of the MEC.

The SARMC Board of Trustees, after hearing Dr. Verska's appeal, chose to ignore the FHP's
recommendation, the terms of the MSPP and affirmed the unsupportable, arbitrary MEC
directive that Dr. Verska was not qualified to be on its medical staff.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8

000014

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil Conspiracy

43.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
44.

SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman, as well as with other unnamed co-

conspirators, who include physicians and hospital staff employed by or who are agents of
SARMC and SMI, conspired with malice and intent to injure Plaintiffs' professional practice and
reputation and;
(a)

engaged in a pattern of conduct pursuant to which they improperly
removed Dr. Verska from the SARMC medical staff in bad faith, thus
preventing Dr. Verska from pursuing his livelihood and practicing his
specialty in the hospital;

(b)

fabricated and exaggerated claims against Dr. Verska regarding quality of
care issues, his surgical skill and competence, used discriminatory criteria
in quality of care determinations, and acted in secrecy to further their
personal and corporate interests rather than those of the patients of
SARMC;

(c)

subverted the mandated SARMC peer reVIew process and SARMC's
MSPP and Bylaws;

(d)

concealed the real anti-competitive motives for not renewing Dr. Verska's
medical staff privileges;

(e)

caused Dr. Verska's privileges not to be renewed by SARMC by
improperly influencing and manipUlating SARMC Medical Executive
Committee in bad faith; and
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(1)

fabricated additional allegations against Dr. Verska during the pendency
of and following the appeal process from his denial of medical staff
privileges at SARMC in an attempt to further alter the record and give
credibility to their arbitrary actions.

45.

Such conduct has harmed and will continue to harm in the future, consumers of

orthopedic neck and back care in Southwestern Idaho.
46.

The actions taken by Defendants SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman were

intended to damage Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho, Dr. Verska's reputation and
career, as well as financially cripple his professional practice.
47.

As a direct and proximate result of the reckless, wrongful acts of Defendants,

Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing

48.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
49.

SARMC failed to comply with its own Bylaws and MSPP when it did not inform

Dr. Verska that his staff privileges were being reviewed under the Corrective Action plan 0 f the
MSP P, thereby breaching its duty 0 f good faith and fair dealing with Dr. Verska.
50.

SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP and inappropriately manipulated the

MSPP for the purpose ofdepriving Dr. Verska ofthe ability to practice at SARMC.
51.

As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not

have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process.
52.

As a result ofSARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, SARMC unjustly and

without good cause refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges
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and required him to fulfill a one year spine fellowship effectively removing him from the
medical community for a period of one to two years, before it would even consider granting him
staff privileges.
53.

Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing when it refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges only
five days before his privileges were to lapse with no right to a hearing or due process.
54.

Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing by failing to discharge its responsibilities as outlined in the MSPP and as required by the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).
55.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants SARMC's and Dr. Fox's actions,

Plaintiffs have been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount
to be determined at trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent
Interference with Economic Advantage

56.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
57.

Dr. Verska has been a member of the Boise medical community for over fifteen

(15) years and has established a wide patient base throughout Southern Idaho and is affiliated
with a number of medical institutions in the community. Dr. Verska has invested substantial
sums of money to establish continuing treatment relationships with patients, members of the
medical community, colleagues, and institutions in the community.
58.

Defendants knew or should have known about the relationships established

between Dr. Verska, his patients, physicians, and other institutions in the medical community.
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59.

SARMC's refusal to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of staff privileges

at SARMC was an intentional attempt to harm and undermine Dr. Verska's professional practice.
SARMC inappropriate refusal to renew Dr. Verska's privileges amounts to dishonest, reckless,
improper, and unfair acts to affIrmatively damage Dr. Verska's reputation.
60.

The reckless interference by Defendants with Dr. Verska' s reputation and

business will permanently damage the business relationships between Dr. Verska, his patients
and those medical institutions in the community that he is affiliated with.
61.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' reckless actions, Plaintiffs have

been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount to be
detennined at trial.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Interference with Prospective
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations
62.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all ofthe allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
63.

Dr. Verska has continuing pro fessional and business relationships with other

physicians and medical institutions who pennit Dr. Verska to practice at their facilities.
64.

Defendants knew of these relationships between Dr. Verska and these institutions

and acted recklessly in their actions.
65.

Defendants intentionally and wrongfully intertered with these relationships and

business expectations by their bad faith actions outlined herein, and as a direct and proximate
result, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be detennined at trial.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se
66.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all ofthe allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 12
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67.
fabricating

Defendants have maliciously, willfully and intentionally defamed Plaintiffs by
instances of misconduct,

exaggerating and

misrepresenting

Dr.

Verska's

qualifications and abilities, and reporting such false and defamatory statements to members of
the Medical Staff at SARMC, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, members of the medical
community, health care insurers and state and federal regulatory authorities, including but not
limited to, the Idaho State Board of Medicine and the Idaho State Board of Phannacy, all in
furtherance of its attempt to damage Dr. Verska's reputation and exclude Dr. Verska from
competing in orthopedic spine care with SARMC, SMI, and Dr. Zimmerman.
68.

Defendants, by improperly refusing to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal

of staff privileges, and other defamatory conduct and statements set forth herein, knew that
Dr. Verska would be compelled to disclose the outcome and recommendations of the SARMC
committees in connection with applications for hospital medical staff privileges of other
institutions in Southern Idaho where he held privileges or could have applied for privileges,
malpractice insurance, membership in professional organizations, credentialing with health
insurers and related purposes.
69.

Dr. Verska, in fact, has been compelled to disclose the outcome of the SARMC

committee actions to malpractice insurers, licensing boards, state and federal regulatory
agencies, health insurers and other healthcare institutions, and will be compelled to make further
disclosures ofthis type for the remainder of his professional career.
70.

Defendants' reckless conduct and actions were performed with malice, ill will,

personal spite, with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity, and for the purpose of injuring Dr. Verska's professional reputation, the reputation of the
Spine Institute ofIdaho and preventing competition from Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of
Idaho.
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71.

By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have uttered and published false and

defamatory statements about Dr. Verska in writing and, upon information and belief, orally, with
respect to Dr. Verska's conduct, skill level, competence, employment, career, and qualifications
to practice medicine, and have compelled Dr. Verska to repeat Defendants' defamation to others
in connection with his professional career, with the intent of steering business away from
Dr. Verska and to SARMC and SMI thereby limiting competition.
72.

Such statements constitute defamation per se, libel per se and/or slander per se.

73.

Plaintiffs have had their business reputation damaged. Plaintiffs have been and

will continue to be damaged financially as a result of such defamatory statements, causing
damage in an amount to be proven at trial.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights

74.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
75.

SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP when it allowed a peer review process

to result in a denial ofprivileges without a hearing and due process.
76.

As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not

have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process, which is a denial of
his common law right to a fair procedure.
77.

The decision by SARMC to refuse to grant Dr. Verska's application to renew his

staff privileges without a hearing was without justification and not supported by any reasonable
ground and constitutes a violation Dr. Verska's COlmnon law right to a fair procedure and due
process.
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,

78.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have been

damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages
in an amount to be determined at trial.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Fiduciary Duties

79.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
80.

Dr. Verska trusted in and relied upon Defendant SARMC to follow the MSPP and

assure that proper policies and procedures were implemented, established, and adhered to both
by SARMC and those appointed by SARMC to serve on committees and in position of authority.
This relationship of trust and confidence between Dr. Verska and SARMC established fiduciary
duties on behalf ofSARMC to act in good faith and with due regard to Dr. Verska's interests.
81.

SARMC breached said fiduciary duties by, inter alia, inducing Dr. Zimmerman,

Dr. Fox and other unnamed parties, to conspire to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation
and wrongfully deny Dr. Verska's application for renewal of privileges. Defendants' conduct
was reckless in this regard.
82.

As a result ofthese breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs have been damaged and

will continue to be damaged in an amount to be proved at trial.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Due Process Rights

83.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
84.

SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights when they chose to ignore the

findings and recommendation of the three neutral, objective panel members comprising the FHP
and continued to rely on the unjustified, arbitrary decision ofthe MEC made in June of2008.
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85.

The FHP found that Dr. Verska had met his burden of proof as set forth in the

Bylaws and determined that the decision by the MEC was unfair. The FHP's recommendation
was based on substantial evidence and testimony by both parties. The FHP's recommendation to
reinstate Dr. Verska's privileges immediately was reasonable in light of the evidence presented.
By ignoring the FHP recommendation, SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights.
86.

The decision by the MEC and SARMC to repeatedly ignore the recommendations

of intemal committees and the FHP is patently unfair to Dr. Verska and vio lates his due process
rights.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendant SARMC's reckless actions,

87.

Plaintiffs have been damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be
compensated for those damages in an amount to be detennined at trial.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

88.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
89.

Defendants intentionally, willingly and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress

upon Dr. Verska by acting in bad faith and unjustly refusing to renew Dr. Verska's privileges at
SARMC.
90.

As a result of Defendants' reckless, extreme and outrageous conduct, Dr. Verska

has suffered, and continues to suffer, severe emotional distress, including physical manifestations
of that distress.
91.

Defendants' acts and/or omissions were intentional, reckless, willful, malicious,

and/or grossly negligent.
92.

As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts of SARMC, Plaintiffs have

been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
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TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Injunctive Relief

93.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
94.
medicine.

Dr. Verska has a right to earn a living and has done so through the practice of
He has been, and continues to be, greatly harmed due to his exclusion from the

medical staff 0 f SARMC.
95.

Based upon the improper refusal ofSARMC to renew Dr. Verska's privileges, Dr.

Verska seeks injunctive relief restoring his privileges and his ability to earn a living, to which he
is entitled, pending the final outcome ofthe present action.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiffs have been required to retain counsel to pursue this matter.

Plaintiffs have

retained the law firm of POWERS THOMSON, P.C., and have agreed to pay said attorneys a
reasonable fee. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred
in the prosecution of this matter pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and
Idaho Code §12-121, or other applicable law.
PRAYER

Plaintiffs' claims for damages exceed the jurisdiction amount of this Court and include,
but are not limited to loss of income due to Dr. Verska's inability to perionn surgery at SARMC,
damage to his reputation, interference with his past and present business and professional
relations.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the above-named Defendants
as follows:
1.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
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2.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
3.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
4.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
5.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
6.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Sixth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
7.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
8.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Eighth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
9.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Ninth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial; and
10.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Tenth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint to include a cause of action for
punitive damages, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury as to all issues so triable pursuant to Rule 38(b)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and will not stipUlate to a jury ofless than 12 jurors.
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DATED this ~_ day of June, 2009.

POWERS THOMSON, PC

BYRa£,;:~~~
Portia L. Jenkins - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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VERI FICA TION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
That he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled action
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the conte

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

d that he has read the foregoing
nd believes the same to be true.

RIQ

(VI-

day of June, 2009.

a0fMv14V;

Id _

Notary Public for Id~h~
L
Residing at
aY7 J
t:UIl O
Commission expires_~-1/,....a,,-,(p=+J--,-J-,,3,,--_ _ _ __

O1et,cL
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AUG 18 ?-Q09
J.

NAVARRO, CiQ(k
8yLAMES
OEPUTY

Robert B. White (ISB #4438)
J. Will Varin (lSB #6981)
Gi yens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
rbw@givenspursley.com
will varin@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

v.

No. CV OC 0911804

)

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT
CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D.

)

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX, M.D.,
Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)
)

---------------------------)
COMES NOW Defendant Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. ("Defendant"), by and through
his attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering
Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") on file herein, admits, denies,
and alleges as follows:

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D. - 1
641184
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES

1.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint, Defendant is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
2.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendant is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
3. Answering the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
4. Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint.
5. Answering the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sut11cient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
6.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint, although Defendant

believes the claims asserted against him are frivolous and are brought without basis in law or
fact, he does not challenge venue or jurisdiction.
FACTS

7.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendant is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
8.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendant is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D. - 2
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9.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Defendant is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
10. Answering the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
11. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Complaint.
12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that
SARMC offers multidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies that SARMC or
SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as expressly admitted or
denied, Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and therefore denies them
16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that
he is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other things, as a spine surgeon.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D. - 3
641184
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Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 16 of the
Complaint, and therefore denies them
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
18. Answering the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that
Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted, Defendant is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in
paragraph 21 of the Complaint, and therefore denies them.
22. Answering the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D. - 4
641184
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23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
25. Answering the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of Dr. Verska's peer
review process in January through June of2008 and therefore denies them. Defendant denies the
remaining allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint.
26. Answering the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
27. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Complaint.
28. Answering the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
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31. Answering the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
32. Answering the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
33. Answering the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
34. Answering the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and theretore denies them.
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that
he was offered employment by SARMC, and denies the remaining allegations therein.
36. Answering the allegations in paragraph 36 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them ..
37. Answering the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Complaint, Defendant denies the
allegations to the extent they are directed to him, and is otherwise without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, and therefore
denies them.
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38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
,

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
41. Answering the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil Conspiracy
43. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 42 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
44. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint, and each of its
subparagraphs (a)-( t).
45. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint.
46. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Complaint.
47. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
48. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 47 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
49. Answering the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
50. Answering the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
51. Answering the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
52. Answering the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
53. Answering the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
54. Answering the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
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55. Answering the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent
Interference with Economic Advantage

56. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 55 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
57. Answering the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore deny them.
58. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint.
59. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Complaint.
60. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Complaint.
61. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Interference with Prospective
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations

62. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 61 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
63. Answering the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore deny them.
64. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 64 of the Complaint.
65. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint.
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se
66. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 66 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
67. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Complaint.
68. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Complaint.
69. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Complaint.
70. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Complaint.
71. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 71 of the Complaint.
72. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Complaint.
73. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Complaint.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights
74. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 73 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
75. Answering the allegations in paragraph 75 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
76. Answering the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
77. Answering the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
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78. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Complaint.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Fiduciary Duties
79. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs I through 78 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
80. Answering the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
81. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint.
82. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Complaint.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Due Process Rights
83. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
84. Answering the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
85. Answering the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
86. Answering the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Complaint, Detendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
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87. Answering the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
88. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
89. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Complaint.
90. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 90 ofthe Complaint.
91. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 91 ofthe Complaint.
92. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 92 ofthe Complaint.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Injunctive Relief
93. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 92 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
94. Answering the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
95. Answering the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Complaint, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
96. Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 17-18 of the Complaint, Defendants
denies that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested.
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97. Any allegations in the Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise addressed above
are hereby denied.
98. Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendant reserves
the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims:
DEFENSES

99.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendant, fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant.
100.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendant, was

made without good cause, without any basis in law or fact, frivolously, unreasonably, and
without foundation.
10 1.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or

negligence.
102.

Defendant is not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs.

103.

Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, ifany, were privileged.

104.

Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, if any, were true.

105.

Plaintiffs have unclean hands.

106.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the

superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities.
107.

Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction

of other persons or entities over whom Defendant has no control and no responsibility. To the
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintifts' recovery, if any, must be proportionately
reduced and/or barred.
108.

Defendant reserves the right to assert additional defenses based upon further

investigation and discovery.
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PRAYER
Wherefore, Defendant prays for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:
1. For judgment in his favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint;
2. For a finding that the claims against Defendant were brought frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation;
3. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law,
including Idaho Code § 12-121 and other law; and
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendant hereby demands a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b).

DATED this 18th day of August, 2009.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

((, W{;j:,
Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 18th day of August 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy ofthe foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
_

Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 577-5101
_ Overnight Courier
1U.S. Mail

Raymond D. Powers
Powers Thomson, P.c.
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707

v

/) W, lh

1<-.

Robert B. White
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AUG, 8 2009
J. DAVID NAVARRO,
By LAMES
DePUTY

Robert B. White (ISB #4438)
J. Will Varin (ISB #6981)
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
rbw@givenspursley.com
willvarin@givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX, M.D.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0911804
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SAINT
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER AND DONALD FOX, M.D.

---------------------------)
COMES NOW Defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and Donald Fox,
M.D. ("Defendants"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
("Complaint") on file herein, admit, deny, and allege as follows:
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint, Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore deny them.
2.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore deny them.
3. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint.
4. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint.
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint.
6.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint, although Defendants

believe the claims asserted against them are brought without basis in law or fact, they do not
challenge venue or jurisdiction.
FACTS
7.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore deny them.
8.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendant is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore denies them.
9.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that

Dr. Verska was granted certain privileges at SARMC on or about January 22, 1996, that he had
certain privileges after that time until July 1, 2008, and that his privileges were governed by
certain Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans. Defendants deny that SARMC and Dr.
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER AND DONALD
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Verska had a tiduciary relationship. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
remaining allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them.
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Complaint.
11. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Complaint.
12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
SARMC asked Dr. Verska to provide certain on-call trauma services.

Except as expressly

admitted, Detendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, and therefore deny
them.
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
in 2005, the Medical Executive Committee (the "MEC") appointed a committee to review certain
aspects of Dr. Verska's practice.

Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining
allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them.
14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
III

January 2006, the committee reported certain findings to the MEC and made certain

recommendations.

Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or

intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in
paragraph 14 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them.
15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
the SARMC offers multidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies that the.
SARMC or SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as expressly
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admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and therefore
deny them
16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
Dr. Zimmerman is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other things, as a
spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations

ill

paragraph 16 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
Dr. Fox was elected as President Elect of the MEC in February 2005, and denies the remaining
allegations.
18. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Complaint.
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
the MEC voted to discontinue the review of Dr. Verska's practice and that the SARMC Board of
Trustees elected to continue the investigation. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants deny
the remaining allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint.
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
MEC elected to commission a committee to review certain aspects of Dr. Verska's practice.
Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 20 of the
Complaint, and therefore deny them.
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that a
committee comprised of Dr.

McMartin, Dr. Floyd and Dr. Mulder made certain

ANSWER OF DEFEND~~TS SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER AND DONALD
FOX,M.D.-4
641188

000045

recommendations, that Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon, that Dr. Floyd has been a participant in
meetings and other activities of the Spine Medicine Institute, that Dr. McMartin is a
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC, and that
Dr. Mulder is a former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC. Except as expressly admitted,
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint.
22. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 22 ofthe Complaint.
23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
the committee presented initial recommendations to the MEC. Except as expressly admitted or
denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint, and therefore deny
them.
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
Dr. Verska received a letter from Dr. Fox on or about December 6, 2007. Except as expressly
admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint, and therefore deny
them.
25. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint.
26. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint.
27. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Complaint.
28. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Complaint.
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Complaint, Defendants are without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore deny them.
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30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
Dr. Fox met with the MEC on or about June 25, 2008, and deny the remaining allegations.
31. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Complaint.
32. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 32 ofthe Complaint.
33. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Complaint.
34. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 34 ofthe Complaint.
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC in 2008, and deny the remaining
allegations therein.
36. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 36 ofthe Complaint.
37. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Complaint.
38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that a
hearing took place between October 28 and 30, 2008, and denies that Dr. Verska presented
evidence rebutting SARMC's position. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
remaining allegations in paragraph 38 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them ..
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
the panel made recommendations that differed from those of SARMC, and deny the remaining
allegations.
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
the MEC disagreed with the recommendations of the panel, and deny the remaining allegations.
41. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Complaint.
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42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that
Dr. Verska appealed to the Board of Trustees and that the appeal was rejected.

Expect as

admitted, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 42 ofthe Complaint.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil Conspiracy
43. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 42 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
44. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint, and each of its
subparagraphs (a)-(f).
45. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint.
46. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 46 ofthe Complaint.
47. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
48. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 47 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
49. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint.
50. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Complaint.
51. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Complaint.
52. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Complaint.
53. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint.
54. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint.
55. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent
Interference with Economic Advantage
56. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 55 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
57. Answering the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Complaint, Defendants are without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and therefore deny them.
58. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint.
59. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Complaint.
60. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Complaint.
61. Detendants deny the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Interference with Prospective
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations
62. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 61 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
63. Answering the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint, Detendants are without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and theretore deny them.
64. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 64 of the Complaint.
65. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint.

00 4 9
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se
66. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 66 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
67. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Complaint.
68. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Complaint.
69. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Complaint.
70. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Complaint.
71. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 71 of the Complaint.
72. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Complaint.
73. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Complaint.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights
74. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 73 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
75. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 75 ofthe Complaint.
76. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 76 ofthe Complaint.
77. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Complaint.
78. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Complaint.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Fiduciary Duties
79. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 78 of the Complaint
as if set forth fully herein.
80. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint.
81. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint.
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82. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Complaint.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Due Process Rights
83. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Complaint as
if set forth fully herein.
84. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Complaint.
85. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint.
86. Detendants deny the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Complaint.
87. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Complaint.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
88. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Complaint as
if set torth fully herein.
89. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Complaint.
90. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint.
91. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Complaint.
92. Detendants deny the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Complaint.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Injunctive Relief
93. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 92 of the Complaint
as if set forth fully herein.
94. Answering the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Complaint, Detendants are without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations,
and there tore denies them.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SAmT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER AND DONALD
FOX, M.D. -10
641188

000051

95. Answering the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the Dr.
Verska is entitled to the requested relief, and deny any other allegations contained therein.
96. Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 17-18 of the Complaint, Defendants
deny that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested.
97. Any allegations in the Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise addressed above
are hereby denied.
98. Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendants reserve
the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims:

DEFENSES
99.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendants, fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants.
100.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendants, was

made without good cause, and without any basis in law or fact.
101.

Defendants are immune from the claims asserted by plaintiff under federal and

state law. Specifically, and without limitation, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986,42 U.S.c. §11101, et. seq., and Idaho Code §§ 39-1392c, provide Defendants with
immunity from the claims asserted by plaintiff in this action.
102.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or

negligence.
103.

Defendants are not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs.

104.

Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were privileged.

105.

Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were true.

106.

Detendants' conduct is privileged under both state and federal law.

107.

Plaintiffs have unclean hands.
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108.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the

superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities.
109.

Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction

of other persons or entities over whom Defendants have no control and no responsibility. To the
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintiffs' recovery, if any, must be proportionately
reduced and/or barred.
110.

Defendants reserve the right to assert additional defenses based upon further

investigation and discovery.
PRAYER
Wherefore, Defendants pray for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:
1. For judgment in their favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint;

2. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law,
including Idaho Code § 12-121; and
3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendants hereby demand a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b).
DATED this 18th day of August, 2009.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
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I hereby certify that on this 18 day of August, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
_

Raymond D. Powers
Powers Thomson, P.C.
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707

Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 577-5101
Overnight Courier
V U.S. Mail

v
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Robert B. White
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Raymond D. Powers
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstoiman.com

Portia L. Rauer
ISB #7233; plr@powersrolman.com

POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Post Office Box 9756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 577-5100
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,

Case No. CV OC 0911804

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
INFORMATION RELATED TO
SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF
DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT

Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and the SPINE INSTITUTE OF
IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC,
and, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully move this Court for
an order compelling production of information relevant to S1. Alphonsus Regional Medical

'\
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Center's (SARMC) wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's reappointment to the SARMC medical staff
and overruling the peer review privilege and immunity objections asserted by SARMC.
Specifically, Dr. Verska moves this Court for an order that 1) the peer review privilege in Idaho
Code Section 39-1392b is inapplicable, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section 39-1392c is
inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC, absent exceptional circumstances, from raising peer review
privilege and immunity objections in further discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to produce the
information Dr. Verska has requested in his interrogatory nos. 1, 3-7, 10-24, requests for
production nos. 1,2,4,5,7-54, and request for admissions nos. 2-4, 14-16,26-30,32-62,64-110
to which SARMC has objected, but has not fully responded asserting peer review privilege and
immunity objections.
This motion is supported by the memorandum and affidavit filed contemporaneously
herewith.
DATED

thi~~ay of December, 2009.
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC

By~~K___
Raymond D. Powers - Of the Firm
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the.2 day of December, 2009, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF

INFORMATION RELATED TO SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF DR. VERSKA'S
REAPPOINTMENT, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Robert B. White
J. Will Varin
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise,ID 83701-2720
Fax: 388-1300
Attorneys for Defendants
Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Fax: (206) 757-7700
Attorneys for Defendants

-V

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

-V

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Ray
Portia L. Rauer
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Raymond D. Powers
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstoiman.com

Portia L. Rauer
ISB #7233; plr@powerstoiman.com

POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Post Office Box 9756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 577 -51 00
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,

Case No. CV OC 0911804
APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
INFORMATION RELATED TO
SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF
DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT

Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE INSTITUTE OF
IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and
submit this appendix in support of their motion to compel production of information surrounding
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's (SARMC) wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's
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reappointment to the SARMC medical staff. This appendix contains definitions of key terms
specific to the issues in this case, a timeline of events, and an overview of the pertinent Bylaws
and Medical Staff Policy and Plans.

This appendix has been provided to give the Court

additional context for the background information and argument set forth in plaintiffs'
memorandum in support of their motion to compel. The information that follows is not intended
to be comprehensive, but is provided only to give a brief explanation to assist the Court. l
A.

DEFINITIONS - Generally.
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•

•

•
•
•

SARMC Bylaws - govern the relationship between the hospital and members of
the medical staff.
SARMC Medical Staff Policy and Plans - govern the process related to medical
staff discipline and are part of the SARMC's Bylaws.
Privileges - permission by a health care facility to a physician to provide medical
care service at said facility for a certain length of time. Grant of privileges results
in appointment to the medical staff.
Reappointment - physicians must apply for reappointment to the medical staff
within a certain time of their privileges expiring.
Medical Executive Committee (MEC) - organizational body to represent and act
on behalf of the physicians on the medical staff.
Peer Review - an activity carried out by active medical staff that fundamentally
involves a review of physician specific data regarding performance, competency,
and overall quality with regard to patient care.
Corrective Action Plan - an investigation of a physician which could result in an
adverse recommendation affecting a physician's privileges.
External Review - provided for under the Peer Review chapter and allows for an
external review of medical care related to certain patients to be conducted by an
outside reviewer.
Intensified Review - provided for under the Peer Review chapter and provides
for a more detailed review to be conducted when trended data or a trigger so
indicates.
Greeley Company - a company that conducts external reviews of medical care
based on information provided to it by the hospital who requested the review.
Ad hoc committee - a committee appointed by the MEC if peers within a
department cannot do an unbiased review.
2005 ad hoc committee - committee of four physicians (Drs. Mulder, Bishop,
MacDonald, and Knochel) appointed in 2005 to review Dr. Verska's medical

I See the attached exhibits to the Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers, filed simultaneously herewith, for copies of
pertinent documents identified herein.
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•

•

•

•
•

B.

care. Committee concluded there was no clear indication that Dr. Verska's
privileges should be restricted.
2005 Greeley Company Report - report by Greeley Company that was
commissioned in 2005 to assist the 2005 ad hoc committee, finding that Dr.
Verska was a fine practitioner, providing quality care to his patients.
Quality Care and Professional Practice Committee - oversees the maintenance
of physician quality information and provides information to medical staff
department chairs at the time of reappointment; reviews individual cases for
identification of physician or system opportunities for improvement.
2007 ad hoc committee - committee of three physicians (Drs. McMartin, Floyd,
and Mulder) appointed in October of 2007 to conduct a second review of Dr.
Verska.
Fair Hearing - practitioner is entitled to a formal hearing whenever a
recommendation adverse to him has been made by the MEC or Board.
Fair Hearing Panel - panel appointed by MEC to take evidence and hear
testimony at practitioner's formal hearing and to recommend a course of action to
those acting for the hospital.

TlMELINE - Generally.
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

•
•

•

May of 1995 - Dr. Verska was licensed to practice medicine in Idaho and applied
for privilege at SARMC.
January of 1996 - SARMC approved Dr. Verska's appointment for provisional
staff membership.
January of 1998 - SARMC advanced Dr. Verska to active medical staff
membership.
April of 2001 - Dr. Verska formed "Spine Institute of Idaho" to provide
comprehensive spine care.
February of 2004 - SARMC solicited Dr. Verska to provide on call trauma spine
service.
January of 2005 - SARMC began to develop the concept for an organization that
would compete for patients with Dr. Verska and named it "Spine Medicine
Institute of Idaho."
January of 2005 - SARMC appointed an ad hoc committee to review Dr.
Verska's medical care; the review included cases going back to January 2004. An
external review by the Greeley Company was also commissioned.
October of 2005 - The Greeley Company reported that Dr. Verska was a "fine
practitioner, providing quality care to his patients."
January of 2006 - the ad hoc committee reported to the MEC that there was "no
clear indication" that Dr. Verska's privileges should be restricted; the ad hoc
committee's review is completed, without adverse consequence to Dr. Verska.
April of 2006 - The Quality Care and Professional Practice Committee requested
that another external review of Dr. Verska's care be undertaken by the Greeley
Company and began an intensified peer review of Dr. Verska related to patients
over the age of 50.

INFORMAT~rO 0060

APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
RELATED TO SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT - 3

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

•

•
•
•
•

•
•

June of 2006 - SARMC's "Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho" began accepting
patients at SARMC and was advertised to the public.
January of 2007 - The MEC voted unanimously to discontinue the intensified
peer review of Dr. Verska.
February of 2007 - Dr. McMartin sent Dr. Verska a letter notifying him that the
MEC voted to discontinue the intensified peer review.
February of 2007 - Dr. Fox elected as president of the MEC.
July of 2007 - Sandra Bruce sent Dr. Verska a letter verifying that the internal
peer review had been successfully completed.
August of 2007 - the Greeley Company commissioned in April of 2006 reported
that in the 11 cases it reviewed, Dr. Verska's care was within the standard of care.
Aug/Sept/Oct of 2007 - The Board of Trustees inexplicably voted to again
pursue "review" of Dr. Verska.
October of 2007 - The MEC voted to commission a second ad hoc committee to
review Dr. Verska.
November of 2007 - The second ad hoc committee was charged with the
responsibility of reviewing the Greeley Company report from August and
reviewing Dr. Verska's current cases.
December of 2007 - Dr. Fox wrote Dr. Verska a letter informing him that he
would be the subject of an intensified peer review that was to begin immediately.
June 23, 2008 - The second ad hoc committee concluded its review and
recommended that Dr. Verska be offered two non-punitive options that would not
affect Dr. Verska's privileges.
June 25, 2008 - Dr. Fox misrepresented the recommendation of the second ad
hoc committee to the MEC.
June 25, 2008 - Dr. Fox wrote CEO Sandra Bruce informing her that the MEC
voted to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff unless Dr. Verska
agreed to complete a one-year spine fellowship.
June 25, 2008 - Sandra Bruce wrote Dr. Verska informing him that unless he
agreed to complete a one-year spine fellowship, his privileges would not be
renewed. She also informed him that if he exercised his right to a fair hearing his
privileges would not be renewed, effective July 1, 2008.
June 27,2008 - Dr. Verska received the letter from Sandra Bruce which was the
first time he knew his privileges were in jeopardy.
July 1, 2008 - Dr. Verska is not reappointed to the SARMC medical staff.
July 9, 2008 - Dr. Verska exercised his right to a fair hearing.
September 30, 2008 - SARMC enlarged its position against Dr. Verska to
include new, unsupported claims that he was not qualified to be a member of the
medical staff, that he did not demonstrate excellent judgment, that he did not
demonstrate the ability to safely and competently exercise his privileges, and that
he did not demonstrate any insight into the danger he was presenting to his
patients.
September of 2008 - Dr. Zimmerman is hired as an employee of SARMC.
October of 2008 - A fair hearing panel was appointed by the MEC. It took
evidence and heard testimony from Dr. Verska's spine surgeon colleagues that he
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•

•

•

•

C.

was an excellent surgeon, competent to safely perform surgery, and met the
requirements for membership to the medical staff.
November of 2008 - The Fair Hearing Panel recommended in favor of Dr.
Verska, finding that the spine fellowship requirement was unfair, and
recommended that Dr. Verska's privileges be reinstated immediately.
December of 2008 - Dr. Fox misrepresented the findings of the Fair Hearing
Panel to the MEC and again enlarged its position against Dr. Verska to include
that he engaged in risky behaviors. The MEC again ignored the recommendation
of the second ad hoc committee, ignored the recommendation of the Fair Hearing
Panel, and upheld its own original decision to not reappoint Dr. Verska to the
medical staff.
February of 2009 - The SARMC Appellate Review Panel also ignored the
recommendations of the second ad hoc committee and Fair Hearing Panel and
voted to uphold the original decision of the MEC.
March of 2009 - The Board of Trustees also ignored the recommendations of the
second ad hoc committee and the Fair Hearing Panel and voted to uphold the
original decision of the MEC.

SARMC'S BYLAWS AND THE MEDICAL STAFF POLICY AND PLANS.
The Bylaws and MSPP of SARMC outline and govern the process and activities to be

followed when making the decision to deny a physician's reappointment to the medical staff. 2
Interestingly, SARMC would not admit that it is governed by its own Bylaws and Medical Staff
Policy and Plans. 3 Dr. Verska maintains that the review of his medical care conducted by the
2007 ad hoc committee was a new review; SARMC contends otherwise. To fully appreciate the
divergence of opinions and to understand the interplay between a peer review procedure and a
corrective action plan, an overview of the SARMC Bylaws and MSPP is necessary.
Article I, Section 7.A.4. of the Bylaws sets forth that each member of the medical staff
must abide by the Bylaws and Medical Staff Policy and Plans. Section 8.G. of Article I of the
Bylaws also sets forth that any practitioner has a right to a hearing/appeal pursuant to the
Medical Staff's Fair Hearing Plan in the event that an action or recommendation involves denial

2 Article I of the Bylaws and Chapters VIII, XI, and XII are attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Raymond D.
Powers.
3 Response to Request for Admission NO.9.
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or revocation of Medical Staff appointment.

SARMC wrongfully denied Dr. Verska's

reappointment, effective July 1,2008, without a prior hearing.
The peer review process is described in Chapter VIII of the MSPP of SARMC Bylaws.

1.

Peer Review.

According to Chapter VIII, Performance and Peer Review Policy, Section 1 of the MSPP,
the intent of the peer review policy, "is to create a non-punitive peer review process in which
individual medical errors do not always lead to corrective action."
Punitive actions, impacting a physician's privileges, are not contemplated under the peer
review process. Peer review fundamentally involves a review of physician specific data relative
to patient care to review outcomes in relation to expectations for the purpose of assuring patient
safety and quality of patient care by a review of medical staff performance.
When conducting a peer review, SARMC is to respect an individual practitioner's
expectations of confidentiality and fair treatment. Ch. VIII, Sec. 2.A., MSPP. External peer
reviews from outside reviewers are contemplated when it is determined that circumstances exist
requiring such external review as set forth in Chapter VIII, Section 2.E. of the MSPP. The peer
review mechanism identifies individual practitioner performance, which may require in-depth
inquiry by peers or by an ad hoc panel appointed by the MEC. Ch. VIII, Sec. 4.B., MSPP.
Section 5 of Chapter VIII outlines the data collection process, data analysis, as well as other
processes associated with conducting a peer review including the potential actions resulting from
the peer review. Those potential actions include policy changes to improve system processes,
educating the physician in a documented manner, or an "intensified peer review" may occur.
The 2007 ad hoc committee conducted an "intensified peer review" of Dr. Verska, as found only
in this section of the MSPP.
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Under Chapter VIII, Section 6 of the MSPP, an intensified review process is described as
follows:
An intensified review is done by the department, department chair or other
appropriate committee, when trended data or a trigger, as described previously,
has made it necessary. This process will be completed as rapidly as possible, but
not longer than 30 days from identification of the problem without permission of
the MEC. The review of the practitioner may include:
Triggered Review
• A review of all cases identified by the specific
indicator which triggered the review;
B.
Random Sampling
• Review of a random sample of cases for a 24
month period;
C.
Prospective Review • Review of all the practitioner's cases for the next
6 to 12 months; or
D.
Other Reviews
• Any other review as defined by the MEC and the
department chair.

A.

At the conclusion of the intensified review, the findings and recommendations are
reported to the department chair and at the next MEC meeting for action. This
may include but not be limited to, collegial intervention, education, or referral of
the matter to the appropriate body for carrying out the corrective action policy and
plan. A written report from the MEC will be sent to the practitioner within 14
days of the meeting.
Once the intensified peer review has been completed, the chapter mandates that a written
report, containing the findings and recommendations, is to be provided to the MEC for it to
consider. According to Chapter VIII, the findings and recommendations "may include, but are
not limited to, collegial intervention, education, or referral of the matter to the appropriate

body for carrying out the corrective action policy and plan." (Emphasis added.) Under
Chapter VIII, a written report of the recommendation, resulting from the intensified peer review,
must be sent to the practitioner within 14 days of the report being presented to the MEC. This is
the only provision where reference is made to notifying the affected practitioner and the only
avenue under which the affected practitioner would be made aware that corrective action was
being recommended.
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The key in this dispute being that if it was concluded that corrective action was
appropriate, Dr. Verska was entitled to a written report informing him of this decision within 14
days of such a decision being reached; Dr. Verska received no such notification.

2.

Corrective Action.

According to Chapter XI, Corrective Action Plan, Section 1 of the MSPP, a written
request for an investigation under the Corrective Action chapter must be sent to the MEC
whenever there is cause to question a practitioner's clinical competence, regardless of who calls
a particular physician's competence into question. The written request to the MEC must make
specific reference to the activity or conduct giving rise to the request. The written request for the
corrective action plan can be made by the president of the medical staff, the chair of a
department, the chair of the credentials committee, a majority of the credentials committee or
MEC, the chair of any other committee, a majority of a committee, the chair of the board, or the
chief executive officer, as set forth in Chapter XI, Section 1. The Chief Executive Officer of the
SARMC is to be notified in writing of all requests for investigation under the Corrective Action
Plan. Ch. XI, Sec. l.B., MSPP. The MEC has the discretion to appoint a three-person ad hoc
committee to conduct the investigation. Ch. XI, Sec. 1.C.2.d., MSPP. To date, Dr. Verska is
unaware that any such written request to the MEC exists.
Once the investigation is complete, the MEC determines whether corrective action is
warranted. Ch. XI, Sec. 2., MSPP. If corrective action is warranted as determined by the MEC,
it may, among other options, recommend a decrease, restriction or modification of clinical
privileges; recommend revocation of appointment; or take such other actions or make such other
recommendations, as it deems appropriate. Ch. XI, Sec. 2.B.5, 7., and 8., MSPP. Section 3 of
Chapter XI provides that any recommendation that decreases, restricts, or modifies a physician's
clinical privileges, or acts as a revocation of the physician's medical staff appointment is
APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF INFORMA
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considered an adverse recommendation. Such recommendation will be forwarded to the Chief
Executive Officer who will notify the affected physician. The Chief Executive Officer is to then
hold the recommendation until after the individual has exercised his right to a fair hearing. Ch.
XI, Sec. 3., MSPP.

The import of this requirement is to give the affected physician the

opportunity to challenge the recommendation that adversely affected his privileges before the
recommendation goes into effect, as set forth in Article I of the Bylaws, so that the affected
physician will not be unnecessarily damaged and his reputation tarnished by having his
privileges affected. Here, SARMC wrongfully "restricted" or "revoked" Dr. Verska's privileges
when it denied his reappointment and did so long before he was afforded a fair hearing, as
described below. Sandra Bruce refused to hold the MEC's adverse recommendation and, in fact,
notified Dr. Verska that if he chose to exercise his right to a fair hearing, without question, he
would no longer have privileges at SARMC.
If patient care or safety in the hospital are an issue, the President of the MEC, department
chairs, the chair of the credentials committee, the chair of the physician professional practice
committee, the Chief Executive Officer, or the Chair of the Board of Trustees has the authority,
as vested in Chapter XI, Section 6 of the MSPP, to suspend any and all clinical privileges of a
physician. The President of the MEC also has the authority to suspend a physician during the
pendency of the investigation for the protection of hospital patients; the suspension is considered
administrative in nature.

Ch. XI, Sec. 5, MSPP.

SARMC did not suspend Dr. Verska's

privileges while the 2007 ad hoc committee was reviewing his care, which leads to the logical
conclusion that since patient care and safety were not threatened, denial of Dr. Verska's
privileges was unwarranted.
The Corrective Action Plan chapter is silent with regard to external reviews and
intensified reviews.
APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF INFORMA
RELATED TO SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT - 9

TIW 0 0 6 6

3.

Fair Hearing Plan.

As set forth in Article I of the Bylaws and reiterated below, in the event an action or
recommendation results in the denial of medical staff appointment the affected practitioner is
entitled to a fair hearing. Under the scheme set forth in paragraph 2 above and Chapter XI of
the MSPP, the CEO is required to hold an adverse recommendation and the terms of that
recommendation until the fair hearing requirements are met. According to Chapter XII, Fair
Hearing Plan, Section 1, of the MSPP, denial or revocation of medical staff reappointment is a
ground for the right to a fair hearing.

Denial of reappointment is deemed an adverse

recommendation or an adverse action as such terms are used in Chapter XII and Chapter XI of
the MSPP. Ch. XII, Sec. I.B., MSPP. The purpose of the hearing is to recommend a course of
action for the hospital. Ch. XII, Sec. I.e., MSPP. The hearing panel is to be composed of not
less than three members. Ch. XII, Sec. 4., MSPP.
The MEC has the initial burden of proof to come forward with evidence in support of its
recommendation.

Thereafter the burden will shift to the physician to come forward with

evidence in support of his appeal. Significantly, the Fair Hearing Plan places a heavy burden of
proof upon the affected physician.

"The hearing panel will recommend against the

physician unless it finds that the physician has proved that the recommendation was
unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, or otherwise unfounded." Ch. XII, Sec. 17.,
MSPP. Once Dr. Verska finally received a fair hearing, the Fair Hearing Panel recommended,
inter alia, that his privileges should be reinstated immediately.

Upon a final recommendation adverse to him, the physician may request appellate
review. Ch. XII, Sec. 20, MSPP. After the conclusion of the proceedings before an appellate
review panel, the Board will render a final decision in writing. Ch. XII, Sec. 20.E., MSPP.
Dr. Verska exhausted the administrative appeal process in the case at bar.
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CONCLUSION
Dr. Verska has provided background information and argument to support his motion to
compel production of information related to SARMC's wrongful denial of his reappointment in
the memorandum and affidavit filed simultaneously herewith.
DATED this

;;~ay of December, 2009.
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC

By

J?;P~

;:;:
Raym~nd D. PZ.ers - Of the Firm
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thd ~ day of December, 2009, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO

COMPEL PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO SARMC'S WRONGFUL
DENIAL OF DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
Robert B. White
J. Will Varin
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise,ID 83701-2720
Fax: 388-1300
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Fax: (206) 757-7700
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,

Case No. CV OC 0911804
MffiMORANDUMINSUPPORTOF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF
INFORMATION RELATED TO
SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF
DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMffiNT

Defendants.

COMffi NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and the SPINE INSTITUTE OF

IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys ofrecord, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and
submit this memorandum in support of their motion to compel production of information
relevant to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's (SARMC) wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's
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reappointment to the SARMC medical staff and overruling the peer reVIew privilege and
immunity objections asserted by SARMC.
I.
INTRODUCTION

Dr. Verska brought this action against defendants as the result of SARMC's wrongful
denial of his reappointment to the medical staff, effective July 1,2008. Dr. Verska alleges that
defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox acted in bad faith during the review process and activities they
initiated against Dr. Verska, and in the decisions to deny his reappointment. The goal of this
process was to eliminate him from the practice of spine surgery at SARMC. The process and the
decisions made ultimately led to the denial of Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff.
SARMC's Bylaws and Medical Staff Policy and Plans (MSPP) govern the activities and set forth
the procedures that SARMC should have followed when SARMC and Dr. Fox set out to deny
Dr. Verska' s reappointment.
Dr. Verska propounded discovery to SARMC seeking information related to the
processes, activities, and decisions that ultimately led to the denial of his reappointment. Dr.
Verska plans to depose those individuals who have relevant knowledge about the wrongful
denial of his reappointment.
SARMC has asserted a broad objection to Dr. Verska's discovery requests! that relate in
any way to information surrounding the process, activities, or decisions to deny Dr. Verska's
reappointment. SARMC asserts that the discovery requested is either protected by immunity
under Idaho Code Section 39-1392c or is confidential and privileged under Idaho Code Section
39-1392b. Out of 110 requests for admission propounded by Dr. Verska, SARMC has objected

I Dr. Verska anticipates that SARMC will also object to his deposing many of the necessary witnesses who have
relevant information, the information shared, and the basis for the decision to deny renewal of Dr. Verska's
privile.ges. Dr. Vers~~ seeks a ruling from the Court which will provide guidance on the issues that can betiPffl1iFf9\
about In these deposltlons.
U UUU

70

to 88 of the requests stating "SARMC objects to Request No. _

to the extent it seeks

information protected by the peer review privilege;" SARMC did attempt to respond to all of the
requests for admission. 2 With regard to the 24 interrogatories propounded by Dr. Verska,
SARMC objected to two of them on the grounds that the "Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of
law for reasons including the immunity provided under Idaho Code § 39-1392c, the Healthcare
Quality Improvement Act, and the release language contained in the Medical Staff Bylaws,
Policy and Plans. ..

.,,3

SARMC objected to 19 of the interrogatories on the ground that the

information is protected by the peer review privilege; it made no attempt to respond to the
interrogatories to which it objected.

Of the 54 requests for production, SARMC objected

claiming peer review privilege on 52 of them and did not produce any documents.
Idaho Code Sections 39-1392b and 39-1392c do not apply to the issues framed by this
case. The type of information requested is not the type of information that arises from patient
care activities within a hospital.

Dr. Verska's allegations are not related to any particular

medical malpractice action, do not revolve around the care of one particular patient, and have not
been brought against particular individuals who served on any review committees. The type of
information requested is no different than the type of information requested in a wrongful
termination case. Just as an employer's personnel file, thought processes, and decisions related
to an employee's termination are discoverable by an aggrieved employee, so should SARMC's
"personnel" file on Dr. Verska be discoverable, as well as the thought processes and decisions
related to Dr. Verska's "termination" from the medical staff. Therefore, "peer review privilege"
and immunity are inapplicable here.

2 Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Response to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Admission
to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, attached as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers filed in
support hereof. This document, as well as the additional documents that follow, are all exhibits to Mr. Powers'
affidavit.
3 Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Response to Plaintiffs' First
Amendl}
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.

dl) 1171

Dr. Verska moves this Court for an order that 1) the peer review privilege in Idaho Code
Section 39-1392b is inapplicable, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section 39-1392c is
inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC, absent exceptional circumstances, from raising peer review
privilege and immunity objections in further discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to produce the
information Dr. Verska has requested in his interrogatory nos. 1, 3-7, 10-24, requests for
production nos. 1,2,4,5, 7-54, and request for admissions nos. 2-4, 14-16,26-30,32-62,64-110
to which SARMC has objected, but has not fully responded asserting peer review privilege and
immunity objections.
II.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

SARMC, through its Board of Trustees, administrators, representatives, and agents,
including Dr. Fox, wrongfully denied Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff, claiming
its decision had merit and was the result of a corrective action plan investigation conducted by an
ad hoc committee appointed in 2007. However, SARMC's position is without merit because the
ad hoc committee did not function as if conducting a corrective action plan investigation and did
not recommend in any way that Dr. Verska's privileges be revoked or denied.

SARMC's

position is also unsupportable because it did not follow its own Bylaws and its MSPP throughout
the process that ultimately led to the decision to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment and its
decision was inconsistent with the Bylaws and MSPP. The limited information available to Dr.
Verska demonstrates that the ad hoc committee was conducting a non-punitive peer review of
Dr. Verska, which should not have resulted in Dr. Verska losing his privileges. Moreover, the
decision to deny Dr. Verska reappointment is contrary to the findings of several committees, two
external reviews, and a fair hearing panel, all of which recommended in favor of Dr. Verska.
The background that follows provides additional detail to support Dr. Verska's argument that the
peer review statutes do not apply to the issues in this case.
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An appendix in support of Dr. Verska's motion has been filed separately and contains
definitions, a timeline, and an overview of the pertinent Bylaws and MSPP sections to give the
Court context for the following background information, should such context be necessary.
The following background information is provided to illustrate the importance of
overruling SARMC's peer review privilege and immunity objections. Dr. Verska cannot know
all of the facts to support his case at this time because SARMC has objected to his discovery
requests; therefore, not all of the alleged facts and background information provided in this
section can be linked to specific supporting documentary or testimonial evidence at this time.
Dr. Verska believes he can prove the allegations he has asserted but he needs the right to conduct
meaningful discovery.

A.

DR. VERSKA'S STATE LICENSURE AND HIS HISTORY OF CONTINUOUS
PRIVILEGES AT SARMC DEMONSTRATES THAT HE IS QUALIFIED FOR
MEDICAL STAFF MEMBERSHIP.
Dr. Verska was first appointed to the medical staff at SARMC in 1996. From that time

forward, SARMC had continuously reappointed Dr. Verska to its medical staff. In fact, SARMC
continued to reappoint Dr. Verska as an active member in the Department of Orthopedics with
Orthopedic and Spine Surgery cores and Fluoroscopy privileges until SARMC wrongfully
denied his reappointment effective July 1,2008. For Dr. Verska to have been reappointed to the
medical staff, it necessarily follows that SARMC found that he met the minimum qualifications
for medical staff membership and met the standard of care in the community.
Dr. Verska had

timel~

submitted his application for reappointment in April of 2008, as

required, because his privileges were up for renewal on July 1,2008.

B.

THE FORMATION OF SARMC'S "SPINE MEDICINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO"
COINCIDED WITH THE INITIATION OF THE PROCESS THAT LED TO DR.
VERSKA'S LOSS OF PRIVILEGES.
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In April of 2001, Dr. Verska formed the "Spine Institute of Idaho," which was created to
provide patients with comprehensive spine care, including diagnostic and treatment services for
back pain and spinal disorders. In January of 2005, SARMC appointed an ad hoc committee
(2005 ad hoc committee) to conduct a review of Dr. Verska that was allegedly triggered by one
specific case. Curiously, the review included the triggering case, plus review of other cervical
spine trauma cases attended by Dr. Verska that dated back to January of 2004. SARMC never
notified Dr. Verska that its review was anything more than a peer review.
During this same time frame, SARMC was developing the concept for an entity
ultimately designated as the "Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho," which would provide the same
spine services as Dr. Verska's "Spine Institute of Idaho." In 2005, SARMC knew that Dr.
Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho would directly compete for the same patients and provide
the same spine services to be offered by SARMC's newly conceived Spine Medicine Institute of
Idaho, which opened for business in 2006.
SARMC commissioned the Greeley Company on June 13, 2005, to conduct an
independent, external review of the cervical spine trauma cases reviewed by the 2005 ad hoc
committee and report on the adequacy of Dr. Verska's care and treatment.

The Greeley

Company reported on October 4, 2005 (2005 Greeley Report) that Dr. Verska was a "fine
practitioner, providing quality care to his patients. His clinical judgment and technical skills are
sound, resulting in good outcomes for his patients.,,4 Consistent with the 2005 Greeley Report,
the 2005 ad hoc committee reported to the MEC in January of 2006 that there was "no clear
indication that there should be a restriction on [Dr. Verska's] clinical activity.,,5 SARMC admits
that the 2005 ad hoc committee investigation was completed and did not result in an adverse

4

5

Greeley Report dated October 4,2005.
2005 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated October 24, 2005.
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recommendation against Dr. Verska. 6 Any further review of Dr. Verska would necessarily
require SARMC to begin the process anew.

In April of 2006, however, the Quality Care and Professional Practice Committee
(QCPPC) "modified the MEC's recommendation" by adding a chart review for Dr. Verska's
inpatients 50 years and older. 7 At the same time, unsatisfied with the 2005 ad hoc committee's
finding and the 2005 Greeley Report, SARMC again commissioned the Greeley Company to
review Dr. Verska's elective cases covering a three month period (second Greeley review).8
SARMC admits that in January of 2007, before receiving the result of the second Greeley
review, the MEC voted unanimously to discontinue the intensified peer review of Dr. Verska,
which had commenced at the request of the QCPPC in April of 2006. 9 Dr. McMartin, thenPresident of the MEC, notified Dr. Verska of the MEC vote through a letter dated February 12,
2007. JO Dr. McMartin informed Dr. Verska that the MEC "unanimous 1y voted to discontinue
your intensified peer review" as soon as those cases have been reviewed and confirmed as
meeting the standard of care.
Sandra Bruce, then CEO of SARMC, wrote Dr. Verska on July 9, 2007 and stated that
the "internal peer review has been successfully completed and I believe you have been notified
of such. When the external peer review results are received, the medical staff leadership will
review those with you and determine if there are any opportunities for improvement." II
Consistent with Dr. McMartin and Ms. Bruce's letters, Dr. Verska believed that the internal
intensified peer review had been completed and, if the second Greeley Report, commissioned in

Defendants' Response to Request for Admission No. 30.
2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008.
8 Id. The report of the Greeley Company related to the 2006 request for external review was sent to SARMC in
August of 2007.
9 Defendants' Response to Request for Admission No. 34; Answer of Defendants, pg. 4, IJl 19 on file herein.
10 Letter from Dr. McMartin to Dr. Verska, dated February 12,2007.
IILetter from Sandra Bruce to Dr. Verska, dated July 9, 2007; "opportunities for improvement'O'aft ~~75"
contemplated in the Chapter VIII, Peer Review Performance, of the MSPP.
UUU
6
7
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2006, came back with a finding that he had not breached the standard of care; the process of
determining opportunities for improvement could be considered completed.
On August 27, 2007, some 17 months after the request, the Greeley Company issued its
report relative to the second external review it was asked to conduct. The report (2007 Greeley
Report) concluded that Dr. Verska's care in the cases reviewed was "within the standard of
care," which implicitly confirmed the MEC's earlier decision to discontinue any review of Dr.
Verska. 12 The finding of the Greeley Company in August of 2007 should have brought the
matter to a close, as promised by Dr. McMartin and Ms. Bruce. It was reasonable for Dr. Verska
to have assumed in the fall of 2007 that since he had heard nothing from SARMC or the MEC
about opportunities for improvement, he was no longer under any kind of review by SARMC.
Such was not the case, however.
C.

THE MEC IGNORED THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS
FAVORABLE TO DR. VERSKA AND IN AN ARBITRARY, UNSUPPORTED
MANNER SUBJECTED DR. VERSKA TO FURTHER REVIEW.
Despite all of the recommendations and findings favorable to Dr. Verska, SARMC's

Board of Trustees, nonetheless, elected to place Dr. Verska under peer review investigation. 13
On October 29, 2007, the MEC, led by its President Dr. Fox and under the direction of the Board
of Trustees, commissioned a second ad hoc committee to again review Dr. Verska. There was
no objective support through the previous investigatory process for this action and there was no
foundation for it under the hospital's own MSPP.

Because SARMC has not provided an

explanation for such an arbitrary decision, this decision needs to be explored in discovery.
It was not until he received a letter from Dr. Fox, dated December 6, 2007, that Dr.
Verska became aware that he had been under review by a new second ad hoc committee (2007

p

- 2007 Greeley Company Report.
Answer of Defendant, pg. 4, 'II 19.
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ad hoc committee or second ad hoc committee). Dr. Verska had been led to believe that he was
no longer the subject of review based on the letters he received from the MEC and Sandra Bruce.
According Dr. Fox's letter, the second ad hoc committee had already met and formulated
recommendations. Much to his surprise, the letter informed Dr. Verska that the 2007 ad hoc
committee had formulated a two-part recommendation consisting of 1) an intensified peer review
that was to begin immediately, and 2) a recommendation that Dr. Verska provide certain
information to the ad hoc committee. 14 SARMC admits that Dr. Fox did not inform Dr. Verska
that he was being investigated under the "Corrective Action Plan" section of the MSpp. 15
Instead, Dr. Fox stated in his letter that the MEC "had voted to commission an Ad Hoc
Committee to review, among other documentation, the August 27, 2007, Greeley report which
examined and evaluated procedures you have performed at Saint Alphonsus." (Emphasis
added.)16 According to SARMC's own Bylaws and MSPP, an "intensified peer review" is only
contemplated in the peer review chapter.
Dr. Verska reasonably believed that any subsequent review or investigation was a
completely new peer review.

Any subsequent unfavorable recommendation would be non-

punitive as set forth in the SARMC Bylaws and would result in opportunities for improvement.
He had no reason to believe he was now in a corrective action process in December of 2007.
Confused by the process as it was playing out, Dr. Verska wrote Dr. McMartin, chairman
of the ad hoc committee, on February 24, 2008, asking for clarification on several matters. 17
Specifically, Dr. Verska wanted to know "the end point to this intensified peer review" and
asked for the "rationale for another intensified peer review process" in light of the fact that the
Greeley reports found no breach of the standard of care and that no problems were raised in the

Letter from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska, dated December 6,2007.
Response to Request for Admission No. 48.
16 Letter from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska, dated December 6, 2007.
17 Letter from Dr. Verska to Dr. McMartin, dated February 24,2008.
14
15
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first intensified peer review process. 18 It was Dr. Verska's letter that prompted Dr. Fox to write
Dr. Verska on March 14,2008. In his letter, Dr. Fox used the word "review," or phrases such as
"peer review," "peer review process," or "review process" no less than a dozen times throughout
the letter. 19 For the first time, however, some five months into the process, a vague reference is
made to Chapter XI of the MSPP. While the letter does state that the 2007 ad hoc committee
was commissioned under "Chapter XI, Section 1.C.2.D. of the Medical Staff Bylaws," which
happens to be the Corrective Action Plan, SARMC admits that the letter does not include the
phrases "corrective action" or "corrective action plan.,,2o Dr. McMartin wrote Dr. Verska two
letters in May of 2008 and SARMC admits that neither of those letters included the phrases
"corrective action" or corrective action plan.,,21 In fact, the letters repeatedly refer to the process
as a review and note it is an intensified peer review.
Dr. Verska acknowledges now that Chapter XI is related to corrective action. However,
given his prior experiences with the same process at SARMC, the peer review references in Dr.
Fox's letters, the failure of Dr. McMartin to mention corrective action, as well as the behavior of
the ad hoc committee, there was no reason for Dr. Verska to be concerned in the spring of 2008
that the ad hoc activities were part of a corrective action plan and not a peer review. Dr. Verska
did not appreciate that the reference to Chapter XI in Dr. Fox's March letter would be used by
SARMC to manipulate an adverse recommendation out of the process. Dr. Verska did not
believe the ad hoc committee was proceeding under corrective action and that his privileges were
in jeopardy.
Dr. Verska met with the 2007 ad hoc committee on June 5, 2008, as he had done on a
previous occasion.

The minutes from the June 5, 2008, meeting state that "Dr. McMartin

Letter from Dr. Verska to Dr. McMartin, dated February 24, 2008.
Letter from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska, dated March 14,2008.
20 Response to Request for Admission No. 49.
21 Responses to Request for Admissions nos. 52 and 53.
18

19
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reminded [Dr. Verska] that the Ad Hoc Committee had been appointed by the Medical Executive
Committee (MEC) to investigate concerns that had been raised ....,,22 Dr. Verska was not
"reminded" that he was under a corrective action plan. The minutes also state that "the Ad Hoc
Committee had reviewed the cases that had been reviewed earlier by the Greeley Company," and
that "Dr. McMartin referred Dr. [Verska] to the Intensified Review that Dr. McMartin had
completed."

(Emphasis added.)

These minutes further demonstrate that the 2007 ad hoc

committee did not function as if carrying out the corrective action plan.
If, in fact, SARMC had initiated a corrective action plan, SARMC's own Bylaws and
MSPP require a paper trail, including: a notice sent to Dr. Verska that an intensified peer review
had been completed with a referral for corrective action; a written request sent to the MEC that a
corrective action plan be initiated; and written notification of the request for a corrective action
plan sent to the CEO of the hospital. Dr. Verska did not receive any such notice, as he should
have under the MSPP. More importantly, Dr. Verska should be allowed to explore the existence
of any such documentation within SARMC's internal documents. SARMC takes the position
that the 2007 ad hoc committee was initially commissioned in October of 2008 under Chapter
XI, Corrective Action Plan, and to ensure patient safety during the pendency of the review, the
MEC imposed an intensified peer review. 23 This position is inconsistent with the process as
outlined in the MSPP and it is inconsistent with the words and actions of the 2007 ad hoc
committee. These inconsistencies must be explored through meaningful discovery in order for
Dr. Verska to prove the allegations he has made.

D.

22

23

THE 2007 AD HOC COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED OFFERING DR. VERSKA
TWO NON-PUNITIVE OPTIONS; THE MEC CHOSE TO IGNORE THE
RECOMMENDATION AND WRONGFULLY DENIED DR. VERSKA'S
REAPPOINTMENT WITHOUT A PRIOR HEARING.

Meeting Notes for Ad Hoc Committee Commissioned to Investigate Dr. Verska, dated June 5, 2008.
Response to Request for Admission No. 47.
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The 2007 ad hoc committee's intensified peer review of Dr. Verska came to an end in
June of 2008 when it prepared a written report outlining its findings and recommendations. The
written report does not refer to "corrective action" or "corrective action plan." The June 2008
report of the 2007 ad hoc committee uses the word "review" repeatedly throughout.

For

example, the 2007 ad hoc committee states in its report that it was "charged with the
responsibility of reviewing an external peer review provided by the Greeley Company;" the
committee was also "asked to address this Greeley review in the context of the prior reviews;"
the Committee met to review the circumstances of Dr. [Verska];" a "review of Dr. [Verska's]
credentials file;" "after reviewing the materials available to the Committee ... a more thorough

review of Dr. [Verska's] current practice [is required];" "the Committee determined that they
needed more time to review the extensive materials provided by Dr. [Verska],,24 (Emphasis
added.)
On page four of the 2007 ad hoc committee report, the committee notes what Dr. Verska
has learned "as a result of the input he has received through this intensified peer review process."
The 2007 ad hoc committee also concluded that Dr. Verska cooperated with the committee
during the "intensified peer review which the MEC approved on November 15, 2007." Such
references are further proof that the committee itself did not believe it was conducting a
corrective action investigation. (Emphasis added.)
Further evidence that the 2007 ad hoc committee was conducting a peer review is the
committee's recommendation. The 2007 ad hoc committee recommended offering Dr. Verska
two options:

25

1) that Dr. Verska successfully complete a six to twelve month advanced complex

spine fellowship or 2) that Dr. Verska be shadowed by a proctor during his surgeries and second

24
25

2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008, pgs. I and 2.
2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008.
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assist three different spine surgeons at SARMC. 26

The 2007 ad hoc committee did not

recommend revoking Dr. Verska's privileges or denying Dr. Verska's reappointment, nor was it
their intent to do so.
The members of the 2007 ad hoc committee have testified under oath that they believed
they were engaged in a non-punitive peer review process.27

SARMC admits that the

recommendations of the 2007 ad hoc committee were not punitive. 28

This non-punitive

recommendation of a proctorship or fellowship is consistent with the language from the peer
review chapter wherein "at the conclusion of the intensified review" the recommendation may
include "collegial intervention" or "education." Ch. VIII, Sec. 6, MSPP.
Remarkably, Dr. Verska was not made aware of the options recommended by the 2007 ad
hoc committee. Dr. Fox made the arbitrary, unilateral decision not to seek input from Dr. Verska
and unilaterally determined that the recommended option of a proctorship was not, in fact, an
option. Dr. Fox misrepresented the 2007 ad hoc committee's findings and recommendations to
the MEC and withheld critical information from them that would have been important in their
decision on reappointment.
Dr. Fox wrote to Sandra Bruce on June 25, 2008, informing her that the MEC had met to
consider two separate, but related matters, concerning Dr. Verska. 29 Dr. Fox stated that the 2007
ad hoc committee had conducted an extensive review of Dr. Verska's practice and determined
that "he should be required to engage in a comprehensive proctoring process or, alternatively,

2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008.
before the Fair Hearing Panel of Dr. Mulder, 282-83: 25-6; Dr. Floyd, 226-27: 18-1; and Dr. McMartin,
77: 7-10, 82-83: 21-7, 83-84: 20-1, 85: 5-13. Copy of hearing transcript excerpts attached to Affidavit of Raymond
D. Powers.
28 Response to Request for Admission No. 67
29 Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008.
26

27 Testimony
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complete a 12-month spine fellowship." He went on to report that the Credentials Committee

recommended that Dr. Verska be reappointed subject to the recommendations the Ad Hoc
Committee made for restrictions on Dr. Verska's practice. 31 As was becoming the MEC's habit
under Dr. Fox's direction, however, it disregarded the favorable 2007 ad hoc committee's
recommendation, as well as the favorable Credentials Committee's recommendation. Going
against those recommendations, the MEC, arbitrarily and without support, voted to only
reappoint Dr. Verska if, and only if, he agreed to take a leave of absence to complete a one-year
spine fellowship program, with the leave of absence to become effective after June 30, 200S.32
This was the first formal decision interpreting the 2007 ad hoc committee's review as requiring a
restriction on Dr. Verska's privileges and it came without any opportunity for Dr. Verska to
present his position, which goes against all notions of fairness and due process as contemplated
under the Bylaws. How these unilateral, arbitrary decisions were made can only be discovered
by Dr. Verska through access to SARMC's internal documents and the testimony under oath of
those involved in the decisions.
Sandra Bruce notified Dr. Verska of the MEC's arbitrary decision by way of her letter to
him dated June 25, 200S, which Dr. Verska did not receive until Friday, June 27, 200S?3 Ms.
Bruce informed Dr. Verska that his reappointment was conditioned upon his agreement to take a
leave of absence to complete a one-year spine fellowship and that after June 30, 200S; his
privileges at SARMC would lapse. No other options were offered to Dr. Verska. She also
acknowledged that the decision of the MEC was an adverse recommendation that entitled him to

Because Dr. Verska's privileges were up for renewal, the Credentials Committee had presumably been reviewing
his credentialing information to make its recommendation.
31 Dr. Verska's application for reappointment was pending approval at this same time.
32 Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008.
33 Letter from Sandra Bruce to Dr. Verska, dated June 25, 2008.
30
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a fair hearing under the SARMC Bylaws. 34 She went on to inform him that if he chose to
exercise his right to a fair hearing, then during the pendency of the hearing he would not have a
current appointment to the medical staff.
Dr. Verska was shocked to learn that not only had the latest review resulted in an adverse
recommendation, but he was faced with the immediate loss of his privileges at SARMC. He was
also shocked to learn of the additional, arbitrary punishment that if he chose to exercise his right
to a fair hearing, he definitely would not have any privileges.

None of these decisions is

consistent with the terms of the MSPP. Dr. Verska should be allowed to discover how these
decisions could be made in such an inconsistent fashion.
Any choice made by Dr. Verska in response to Ms. Bruce's letter would result in
SARMC's desired outcome - he would not have privileges at SARMC, which would eliminate
him from practice at the hospital thereby eliminating his ability to compete for spine surgery
patients with SARMC's Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho, led by defendant Zimmerman. Dr.
Fox readily acknowledged that it would likely take longer than a year for Dr. Verska to enroll in
and complete a spine fellowship program, the result of which being that Dr. Verska would not be
eligible for privileges again at SARMC until sometime well after June 30, 2009. 35 Furthermore,
SARMC would not guarantee that Dr. Verska's privileges would be renewed upon successful
completion of a spine fellowship program. 36
Dr. Verska did not agree with the MEC's decision and did not agree to the unreasonable
burden of the spine fellowship requirement. Instead, Dr. Verska exercised his right to a fair
hearing on July 9,2008, as provided in SARMC's Bylaws; a hearing date was set for October 28,
2008. Ms. Bruce did not, however, hold the MEC's recommendation until after Dr. Verska's

34
35
36

Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008.
Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008.
Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008.
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hearing as required under Chapter XI, Section 3, of the MSPP. Therefore, Dr. Verska was
without privileges at SARMC, without a prior hearing, as of July 1, 2008.
E.

CONSISTENT WITH ITS PATTERN OF ARBITRARY DECISIONS TOWARD
DR. VERSKA, SARMC ENLARGED ITS REASONS FOR CONCERN
INVOLVING DR. VERSKA.
On September 30, 2008, in a letter from its counsel to Dr. Verska's counsel, SARMC

boldly "enlarged" its reasons for concern involving Dr. Verska. Specifically, Patrick Miller,
counsel for SARMC, stated that the position of the MEC against Dr. Verska at the hearing to be
held on October 28, 2008, would be that Dr. Verska "does not meet the minimum qualifications
for Medical Staff membership," and that Dr. Verska "has not demonstrated that he possess[es]
excellent judgment and has not demonstrated the ability to safely and competently exercise the
clinical privileges requested.,,37 Mr. Miller also stated that Dr. Verska "did not demonstrate any
insight into the danger he was presenting to patients." Neither Dr. Fox nor SARMC made these
accusations known to Dr. Verska prior to the September 30, 2008, letter.
These new claims were only asserted a month before Dr. Verska' s fair hearing and some
three months after the 2007 ad hoc committee had adjourned. From the face of the September
30, 2008, letter, it appears that SARMC reached these conclusions independently, without
deferring to any qualified peer review committee, spine surgeon, or other qualified committee.
Dr. Verska must be allowed to discover whether any basis existed for this expanded conclusion
other than eliminating him from the ability to compete against SARMC's Spine Medicine
Institute of Idaho, led by defendant Zimmerman, who became an employee of SARMC in
September of 2008.

F.

37

THE FAIR HEARING PANEL FINDS THAT THE FELLOWSHIP
REQUIREMENT IS UNFAIR AND RECOMMENDS THAT DR. VERSKA'S
PRIVILEGES BE REINSTATED IMMEDIATELY.

Patrick Miller letter to Raymond D. Powers, dated September 30, 2008.
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Because Dr. Verska exercised his right to a fair hearing, SARMC appointed three
physicians of its choosing to comprise the Fair Hearing Pane1.

38

Beginning on October 28, 2008,

the Fair Hearing Panel took evidence and heard sworn testimony from SARMC and Dr. Verska.
Noteworthy is the sworn testimony of several of Dr. Verska's spine surgeon colleagues who
testified as to Dr. Verska's excellent surgical skills and judgment. Dr. Timothy Floyd, who was
one of the three members on the 2007 ad hoc committee and an orthopedic spine surgeon like Dr.
Verska, gave testimony that supported Dr. Verska. Dr. Floyd was a witness called by the MEC
and testified that Dr. Verska is competent to safely perform surgery, meets the minimum staff
requirements, and is "an excellent surgeon."

Three other Boise spine surgeons, Drs. Paul

Montalbano, Sam Jorgenson and Timothy Doerr, presented similar testimony - that Dr. Verska
meets minimum staff requirements and possesses the skill and provides the care of a competent,
qualified spine surgeon, qualified to be a member of the medical staff at SARMC.
Not surprisingly, the Fair Hearing Panel recommended in favor of Dr. Verska, believing
he is a competent and qualified spine surgeon deserving of privileges at SARMC. Included in its
recommendation was that Dr. Verska's privileges at SARMC be reinstated immediately.39 After
considering the evidence and applying the burden of proof as required under the MSPP, the Fair
Hearing Panel was not persuaded that Dr. Verska failed to meet the minimum standards required
to be on the medical staff. According to the panel, the 2007 ad hoc committee appropriately
offered non-punitive options to achieve resolution of the matter. The panel also found that the
MEC's requirement of a fellowship was unfair to Dr. Verska. It is apparent that the Fair Hearing
Panel found that the MEC's decision to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment was not supported by

38 Drs.
39

Mark Clawson, Austin Cushman and Roy Ellsworth were appointed to the Fair Hearing Panel.
Fair Hearing Panel recommendation dated November _, 2008. The recommendation was not dated

byQ!}OJi)
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the evidence, was unfair, and was unreasonable. Remarkably, Dr. Verska met and exceeded the
heavy burden of proof placed upon him by the language of Chapter XII, Sec. 17, of the MSPP.
G.

DR. FOX MISREPRESENTED THE CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE FAIR HEARING PANEL TO THE MEC.
Upon receipt of the Fair Hearing Panel's conclusions and recommendation in support of

Dr. Verska, Dr. Fox called a special meeting of the MEC to vote on the panel's
recommendation. 4o

Dr. Fox again misrepresented the process and misrepresented the Fair

Hearing Panel's conclusions and recommendation to the MEC. He intentionally omitted key
pieces of information critical to the panel's analyses. 41 For example, the minutes of the special
meeting held December 9,2008, do not reflect that Dr. Fox reported the testimony of Drs. Floyd,
Jorgenson, Montalbano, and Doerr that Dr. Verska was an excellent surgeon and practiced within
the standard of care. The minutes reflect that Dr. Fox falsely reported to the MEC that the
hearing panel's report states that the "timing of the MEC's fellowship recommendation relative
to the end of [Dr. Verska's] appointment was not unfair." Dr. Fox erroneously reported to the
MEC that Dr. Verska had been notified in writing that he was under the Bylaws' Corrective
Action Plan. The minutes of the special meeting also make reference to Dr. Fox's comment that
Dr. Verska engages in "risky behavior." There is no evidence in the record, however, that any
committee, external review, or panel ever concluded that Dr. Verska engaged in "risky
behavior." Dr. Fox omitted all of the evidence favorable to Dr. Verska that supported the panel's
decision and he created or manipulated facts to suggest to the MEC that the Fair Hearing Panel
report should be ignored.
The MEC relied upon Dr. Fox's misrepresentations, manipulations and erroneous
information and reached a manipulated decision to uphold its own fonner decision to deny Dr.

40
41

Minutes of the special MEC meeting, dated December 9,2008.
Minutes of the special MEC meeting, dated December 9,2008.
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Verska's reappointment, thereby choosing to ignore the objective reasoning of the Fair Hearing
Panel.

H.

THE APPELLATE REVIEW PANEL AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES ALSO
IGNORED THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE FAIR
HEARING PANEL.
The SARMC Appellate Review Panel, appointed by SARMC, also chose to ignore the

recommendations of the two prior ad hoc committees and the conclusions and recommendation
of the Fair Hearing Panel and voted to uphold the MEC's decision. Ultimately, the Board of
Trustees, as expected, rubber stamped the flawed process, chose to protect its own, and voted in
favor of upholding the MEC's decision to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment. Interestingly, it was
the Board of Trustees who inexplicably sought to continue Dr. Verska's peer review in the fall of
2007.
Dr. Verska is left with only the civil justice system to address the wrongs against him.
He must have the opportunity to explore the decisions and the bases for those decisions to expose
defendants' bad faith and wrongful conduct. If SARMC's objections are not overruled, SARMC
will never be required to justify its decisions, which equates to a finding of absolute iImnunity.
If Dr. Verska is not allowed to discover these materials and information, the Court will, in effect,
be giving SARMC license to do whatever it wants, to whomever it wants, and in the manner it
wants. Giving such sweeping power to SARMC is unsupportable.
There are strong arguments supporting production of the information to which SARMC
has objected. The Idaho Supreme Court decision in Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 214
P.3d 631 (2009) supports Dr. Verska's position that there is no peer review protection for a
hospital's credentialinglreappointment decisions. Other jurisdictions have recognized the limited
nature of the peer review statutes and have carved out an exception for this very type of situation.
Failure to recognize the discovery of information in the present situation would create absolute
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immunity, allowing hospitals to act without any accountability whatsoever. Further support of
Dr. Verska's position is that Congress declined to create a medical peer review privilege in
creating the Health Care Quality Improvement Act. Finally, public policy demands that Dr.
Verska be allowed to discover information related to proceedings, which are about him, that
adversely affect his privileges.
III.
ARGUMENT

SARMC has objected to Dr. Verska's discovery requests related to materials and
information that concern the process carried out against Dr. Verska. The bases for defendants'
objections are in Idaho's peer review statutes, specifically Idaho Code Sections 39-1392b and
39-1392c. Reliance on these statutes is misplaced under the circumstances of this case. In fact,
Idaho law supports this Court finding that the peer review privilege and immunity statutes are
inapplicable, allowing for the discovery of information related to the credentialinglreappointment
activities and decisions concerning Dr. Verska.
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PEER REVIEW STATUTES SHOWS THAT
THE STATUTES ARE TO PROTECT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS FROM
PARTIES SEEKING TO USE PEER REVIEW INFORMATION TO PROVE
LIABILITY INMEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS.

The general policy behind Idaho's peer review statutes, Idaho Code Section 39-1392 et

seq., demonstrates why the statutes are inapplicable in this case. The policy provides guidance
as to when the peer review statutes should be appropriately applied - and when they should not.
Idaho's peer review statutes are designed to "encourage research, discipline and medical study
by certain health care organizations for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality,
enforcing and improving the standards of medical practice in the state of Idaho." Idaho Code §
39-1392. The legislative history of the statutes paints a clear picture of the intended application
of the peer review protections. The intended breadth of the peer review statutes, and the peer
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review privilege specifically, is evidenced in the statement of purpose from the original 1973
legislation:
It is essential to the preservation of optimum medical care that the medical profession

within Idaho be free to review patient care and to constantly enforce and improve the
standards of medical practice within the state. Such intraprofessional action and review
is inhibited and discouraged by present law, however, because of the lack of privilege
for any proceedings or records which may be developed and the threat that such

materials may be obtained by third parties, perhaps misinterpreted and used in
litigation, against the practitioner.
This bill would impose a confidential and privileged status upon certain reports, records
and other materials developed by in-hospital medical staff committees, medical society
committees and other approved entities concerned with research, discipline and medical
study. It would also encourage the free exchange of information in such proceedings
by granting civil immunity to persons providing information or opinions to such review
and study committees. Access to and court room use of individual patients' records

would not be affected.
House B il1136 Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note (1973 Legislative Session) (Emphasis added).
The original legislation specifically contemplated the need to encourage the exchange of
information for continued improvement in patient care. The legislature made a specific effort to
note that patient care was the primary focus for enacting this legislation. The legislation further
contemplates the protections specifically applying to "persons providing information or
opinions."
The purpose in establishing the peer review privilege is to protect a physician and others
participating in a review process from liability in a malpractice action. This is confirmed first by
the statement that a third party could use the peer review information inappropriately in
litigation, i.e., "perhaps misinterpreted and used in litigation, against the practitioner." Id.
A peer review is a "collection, interpretation and analysis of data by a health care

organization for the purpose of bettering the system of delivery of health care or to improve
the provision of health care or to otherwise reduce patient morbidity and mortality and
improve the quality of patient care." Idaho Code § 39-1392a(11) (emphasis added). The
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mandate is for improvement to medical systems and patient care.

The type of infonnation

protected from discovery and referenced by the peer review statutes relates to the care of
patients, and the activities that revolve around said activities. The statute is not a means by
which a hospital can foreclose a physician from challenging inappropriate and wrongful
credentialinglreappointment activities. Had the legislature intended otherwise, it would have
explicitly drafted the statute to provide for such protections. See Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho
645,214 P.3d 631, 635 (2009).
In 1997, the Idaho Legislature revisited Idaho Code Section 39-1392 et seq., amending

certain portions of the act. See Senate Bill No. 1115. On February 11, 1997, the Senate Health
and Welfare Committee discussed the bill and its purpose. hlcluded in the committee minutes is
a handout summarizing the purpose of the bill. Recognizing the importance of quality assurance
processes in continued improvement of health care, the proposed amendments were intended to
further clarify who was protected under the act and how quality assurance processes are
important to the process:

This information is intended to help physicians improve, but could also be used to
discredit a physician in a malpractice suit. Unless the information collected on
physicians and the opinions they render about their peers is protected from discovery,
physicians will refuse to participate in quality assurance programs. Without quality
assurance programs, health care quality will suffer.
ld. (Emphasis added). The act is designed to protect physicians and those who render opinions

about their peers' work from actions brought by third parties-patients. See Murphy, 105 Idaho
at 183-84,667 P.2d at 862-63. Secondarily, it is designed to elicit continued participation in the
peer review process in order to improve patient and medical care by "encourag[ing] a free
exchange of medical information that will ultimately benefit the public in the form of improved
medical care." Murphy v. Wood, 105 Idaho 180, 184,667 P.2d 859,863 (Ct. App. 1983).
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Dr. Verska's case against these defendants is not a medical malpractice action where a
patient is seeking peer review information to prove negligence by the hospital or Dr. Verska.
There is no third party patient attempting to prove hislher case using internal peer review
records. This case is not about Dr. Verska's disagreement with an assessment of his patients'
care or patient safety. This action is akin to a wrongful termination claim. In essence, Dr.
Verska has alleged that, inter alia, SARMC has unlawfully terminated his staff privileges with
the hospital thereby precluding him from practicing at SARMC. Were this a traditional wrongful
termination claim, few records would be privileged, if any, and Dr. Verska would be entitled to
discover those records and materials related to his termination and depose individuals who may
have relevant knowledge.
When comparing this action to the language and policy of the peer review statutes,
discovery in this case is not impacted by the peer review statutes and should not be limited. Dr.
Verska should be permitted to discover information that exposes defendants' bad faith
motivations and wrongful conduct, which includes discovery of the underlying reasons for the
inconsistencies in SARMC and Dr. Fox's decisions.
B.

THE FACTUAL RECORD IN THIS MATTER CAN ONLY BE DEVELOPED IF
THE MATERIALS, WITNESSES, AND INFORMATION RELATED TO DR.
VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT ARE DISCOVERABLE.
Neither this Court nor Dr. Verska can know all the facts surrounding SARMC and Dr.

Fox's involvement, motives, communications, and conduct in this matter without production of
the materials, witnesses, and information related to SARMC's examination of Dr. Verska. The
requested information concerns the wrongful actions taken against Dr. Verska in denying his
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reappointment, actions which are not part of the traditional peer reVIew process.

42

Hence,

Idaho's peer review statutes are not applicable here.
The list of discoverable information below illustrates that the requested infolmation is
much different than "peer review" and speaks directly to the decisions made by SARMCdecisions that are beyond the scope of peer review.

Production of the following types of

information must be allowed in order for Dr. Verska to fairly question SARMC's wrongful
reappointment decision:
•
•

•

Information related to his initial appointment and subsequent reappointments to
the medical staff at SARMC.
Information related to the 2005 review, the thought processes of those individuals
who had any involvement with the review, and information related to the decision
making and the fact gathering associated with the 2005.
o
Information related to the Greeley Company conducting an external
review, including discovery of the reactions and responses of those people
who reviewed the 2005 Greeley Report.
o
Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of
Trustees' involvement in the process during this time period.
Information related to the decision in April of 2006 made by the Quality Care and
Professional Practice Committee to change the recommendation of the MEC and
commission yet another external review by the Greeley Company.
o
Information related to the Greeley Company doing another external
review in 2006, including discovery of the reactions and responses of
those who reviewed the 2007 Greeley Report.
o
Information related to the MEC's unanimous vote in January of 2007 to
discontinue Dr. Verska's intensified peer review.
o
Information related to Sandra Bruce's involvement since she was the CEO
of SARMC during the time in question and authored several letters to Dr.
Verska.
o
Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of
Trustees' involvement in the process during this time period.

Confidentiality concerns can be addressed through protective orders. Moreover, patient confidentiality should not
be an issue since any time a patient's case required mention in the underlying hospital proceeding that patient W)!.S
assigned a number to protect confidentiality at that level.
U
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•

•

•

•

•
•

Information related to the review of Dr. Verska that began in the fall of 2007 and
culminated with the Board of Trustees upholding the MEC's original decision to
deny Dr. Verska's reappointment.
o
Information related to the determination that Dr. Verska would again be
under review or the determination that a new review would begin,
including information relative to the Board of Trustees' involvement.
o
Information related to the thought processes of those individuals who had
any involvement with determining that the 2007 review was necessary and
the information related to the decision making and the fact gathering
associated with the review that began in October of 2007.
•
Information to be included, for example: discovery of the specific
chapter of the MSPP that the 2007 ad hoc committee was
commissioned under, the motion before the MEC when it voted to
further review Dr. Verska, the thought processes of the MEC
members, Dr. Fox, 2007 ad hoc committee members, Sandra
Bruce, the Board of Trustee members, the credentialing committee,
hospital administrators and staff, and those involved in the
department of orthopedics.
Information related to the MEC and Dr. Fox and the decision making processes
involved in changing the 2007 ad hoc committee's recommendation from two
non-punitive options to a single, adverse action.
Information related to SARMC's enlargement of its position against Dr. Verska in
September of 2008 to include assertions that Dr. Verska did not meet the
minimum qualifications, that he did not possess excellent judgment or ability to
safely and competently exercise his privileges, and that he did not have insight to
the danger he was presenting to patients.
o
Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of
Trustees' involvement during this time period.
Information related to the MEC and Dr. Fox and the decision making and thought
processes involved in disregarding the findings and recommendations of the Fair
Hearing Panel.
o
Information related to the December 2008 MEC special meeting wherein
Dr. Fox further enlarged SARMC's position against Dr. Verska to include
that he engaged in risky behaviors.
o
Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of
Trustees' involvement during this time period.
Information related to the appellate review panel and its decision to uphold the
MEC's original recommendation.
Information related to how SARMC and Dr. Fox interpreted, executed and
093
enforced the Bylaws and MSPP that governed the proceedings as to Dr.
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The above list is not intended to be comprehensive; it represents the type of information that
should be discoverable.
The requested information transcends the peer review process and the explicit purpose of
the peer review statutes.

It does not implicate particular patients or other physicians.

Accordingly, Dr. Verska requests that this Court find that the requested discovery is not subject
to the peer review statutes and overrule SARMC's discovery objections.
C.

IDAHO AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE RECOGNIZED THE LIMITED
NATURE OF PEER REVIEW STATUTES.

Reappointment decisions do not enjoy the protection of Idaho's peer review statutes.
Courts in Idaho, as well as other jurisdictions, permit the discovery of information and materials
from a credentialinglreappointment challenge.
In Harrison v. Binnion, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that the credentialing
decisions 43 of a hospital did not enjoy immunity under Idaho's peer review statutes. 147 Idaho
645, 214 P.3d 631 (2009). Harrison arises out of a medical malpractice action. During the
course of the litigation, Harrison sought to amend his complaint to include a negligent
credentialing claim against SARMC for granting privileges to one of the treating physicians.
The district court held that a credentialing claim was barred by Idaho's peer review statutes,
Idaho Code Section 39-1392 et seq., thereby denying the amendment to the complaint. !d. at
658,214 P.3d at 634. The district court reasoned that if a health care organization has immunity
for using information and opinions when making a credentialing decision, it must likewise have

43 The fact that Harrison involved a credentialing decision and the present case deals with a reappointment is a
distinction without a difference. Specifically, the MSPP discusses the credentials file in Chapter VII. The
credentials file is described as follows: "[t]he Credentials File will contain information and documentation pertinent
to the Medical Staff application, appointment, reappointment, and formal corrective action concerning each
Member." MSPP, Ch. VII, Sec. 2. Accordingly, reappointment and the associated materials are circumscribed in
the credentialing process. A credentialing decision would include those decisions made during the reappointment
process, as here. Furthermore, the June 25, 2008 letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce references involvement ofAhh
Credentialing Committee.
UU
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· immunity for the actual credentialing decision made. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with
the district court and found that "[t]here is nothing in the wording of the statute that purports to
grant immunity to a health care organization for making a credentialing decision." Id. at 649,
214 P.3d at 635. The court further clarified that the purpose of the peer review privilege was to
shield a person who contributes information or opinions during a peer review activity from
"subsequent lawsuit[s] alleging claims such as slander, defamation, tortuous interference with
contract or prospective advantage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. The court
concluded, "[h]olding that Idaho Code § 39-1392c grants immunity for credentialing decisions
would be an expansion of that statute beyond its wording. The district court therefore erred
in holding that the statute granted such immunity." !d. (emphasis added). The court recognized
the underlying public policy of the peer review statutes was to protect those who participated in
providing information in traditional peer review activities from civil liability. The Harrison
court's holding recognized that the traditional peer review activities relating to patient and
medical care are specifically protected, while simultaneously recognizing that credentialing
activities did not enjoy the same protection.

A hospital's interpretation and decision on

information gathered during credentialing activities is not shielded.
Discovery of underlying credentialinglreappointment information

III

a credentialing

decision is confirmed by the Harrison court's analogy that often two experts arrive at conflicting
opinions after considering the same information. Id. at 649, 214 P.3d at 635. To analyze the
opinion of the expert-or as here, a health care organization-the underlying information used to
arrive at said opinion is necessary.

By declaring that the hospital was not immune for its

credentialing decision, the court unmistakably confirmed that where a challenge to a
credentialing decision is made, the challenger must have an opportunity to discover the
information that was provided to any committee and affected any committee decisions.

If
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Section

39-1392b

were

viewed

as

an

absolute

bar

to

the

discovery

of

all

credentialinglreappointment information, including a physician discovering his own records that
resulted in a loss of staff privileges, the limited grant of immunity under Section 39-1392c would
be rendered superfluous. See Dahl v. PSF Industries, Inc., 127 Idaho 232, 899 P.2d 445 (1995)
(stating that courts should construe a statute to avoid surplusage or superfluous language). For a
court to address an immunity claim under Section 39-1392c, the underlying information must be
made available. Had the district court believed that the credentialing records were privileged,
further inquiry into the credentialing claim would have been barred. To hold otherwise would
render the immunity section of Idaho Code Section 39-1392c meaningless.
To further support its holding, the Harrison court pointed to the actual statutory
language-or lack thereof-granting immunity in credentialing decisions. Specifically, the court
stated that to read immunity into credentialing decisions would be an impermissible expansion of
the statute. The same justification can be applied to the language of Idaho Code Section 39As with the immunity section, the privilege section likewise does not discuss

1392b.

credentialing or reappointment activities. The same rationale employed by the Harrison court in
denying immunity to the hospital for credentialing decisions should likewise be applied by this
Court in overruling SARMC's discovery objections.
It is important to note that Dr. Verska has not named as a defendant any individual who

served on any ad hoc committee or hearing panel. The only individual named who was actually
involved with the process is Dr. Fox as President of the Medical Staff. Unlike an individual who
served on or supplied peer review information to a committee, Dr. Fox is a named party because
of his role in manipulating the information gathered in the process by committees and individuals
that led

to

the wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff. Dr. Verska

alleges that Dr. Fox was a facilitator and agent of SARMC's plan to wrongfully deny Dr.
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Verska's staff privileges. Admittedly, Harrison identifies who is likely to be shielded against
liability for any credentialing decisions: "[a] person who provides such information or opinions
need not fear a subsequent lawsuit alleging claims such as slander, defamation, tortuous
interference with contract or prospective economic advantage, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress." Id. at 645,214 P.3d at 635. As explained above, however, the language in
Harrison regarding who enjoys protection in a credentialing decision is irrelevant in this case.

Dr. Verska is challenging SARMC's wrongful denial of his reappointment, not an
adverse finding regarding his patient or medical care. Such a challenge necessarily warrants a
finding that the peer review statutes are inapplicable in this case. The Harrison court recognized
that a health care organization cannot enjoy absolute immunity in credentialing matters. Just as
in Harrison, to fairly question a reappointment decision, Dr. Verska must be given access to the
information that led to the decision that resulted in his staff privileges not being renewed.
Harrison is mandatory Idaho case law that requires this Court to overrule SARMC's immunity

objections.

The underlying rationale for the holding in Harrison also supports this Court

overruling SARMC's peer review privilege objections.
The Idaho federal district trial court relied upon underlying credentialing/reappointment
information in considering a motion for summary judgment in a very similar type of case to the
case at bar.

In Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, the trial court relied on

credentialinglreappointment materials, including letters, committee minutes, and hearing
transcripts, in determining whether to grant defendant's summary judgment motion. No. CIV
98-0439-S-EJL (D. Idaho March 14,2005) (Order Granting Summary Judgment).44 Dr. Laurino
challenged Syringa General Hospital's decision to terminate his privileges. Dr. Laurino alleged

Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, No. CIV 98-0439-S-EIL (D. Idaho March 14, 2005) (OrderrVHqtjl)!\
Summary judgment) attached to the Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers.
U V UV
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breach of contract, violation of due process, bad faith, tortuous interference with prospective
economic advantage and/or tortuous interference with contract, defamation, emotional distress,
and antitrust violations. [d. at pg. 3. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment. In
reaching his decision, Judge Lodge, in footnote 2 on page 6 of the order, references letters and
board minutes. On page 9, Judge Lodge refers to the transcript of Dr. Laurino's hearing; on page
10 he states that he has "reviewed the transcript and entire record in this matter."
Judge

Lodge's

reliance

on

information

available

only

from

the

credentialinglreappointment process is evidence that disclosure of credentialinglreappointment
information is vital in cases where physicians are challenging the loss of medical staff privileges.
In Memorial Hospital For McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981), a
physician brought both federal and state antitrust actions challenging the actions of a competing
group of physicians who allegedly conspired against him in an effort to exclude him from
providing competing medical services. The physician alleged that the physicians improperly
used the organizational structure of the hospital to exclude him from the staff thereby destroying
his practice. The physician claimed that the disciplinary proceedings against him were a sham
and intended only as a means of implementing a restraint on trade. On that issue, the physician
sought discovery regarding defendant's treatment of other doctors in comparable disciplinary
·
45
procee dmgs.

The defendants refused to produce the records claiming that such records were privileged
under the state's peer review privilege statute. The Court of Appeals recognized that "because
evidentiary privileges operate to exclude relevant evidence and thereby block the judicial factfinding function, they are not favored and, where recognized, must be narrowly construed." [d.

Based upon the language of the Illinois peer review statute, the physician had full access to his own peer review
records. Rather, at issue was whether the physician was entitled to discover peer review records of other JlN~~iciaM9.8
not involved in the lawsuit.
UU U
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at 1061 (citing

u.s.

v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). Despite the policy behind the peer

review privilege, the court noted that the instant case was signijkantly different than a medical
malpractice action. The court noted:

To recognize hospital review or disciplinary proceedings as privileged in the context
of a malpractice action will generally have little impact upon the plaintiff's ability to
prove a meritorious claim. For the crucial issue in that type of case is not what
occurred at the review proceeding, but whether the defendant was in fact negligent in
his care and treatment of the plaintiff. ... More importantly, the exclusion of that
information will not prevent the plaintiff from otherwise establishing a valid claim.
The same cannot be said, however, in a case such as this where the plaintiff's claim
arises out of the disciplinary proceedings themselves and not some event or
occurrence that exists independently of those proceedings. In this case, for example,
Dr. Tambone has alleged that the defendants have used the Hospital committee
apparatus discriminatorily to deny him staff privileges at the Hospital in furtherance of
an unlawful restraint of trade. To prove this allegation, Dr. Tambone must present
evidence that other physicians with comparable or worse records than his were not
denied staff privileges. Such evidence, if it exists, would likely be found in the
Hospital's records of disciplinary proceedings against other doctors. To deny Dr.
Tambone access to this information may very well prevent him from bringing this
action altogether.
Id. at 1062-63. The court went on to deny the privilege and allow the doctor discovery of other

physician's peer reviews, concluding that to grant the defendants privilege would in effect "grant
such committees, their members and participants absolute immunity from prosecution for all
statements made and actions taken in the context of such proceedings." Id. at 1063 (emphasis
added).
Shadur poignantly addressed a physician's inability to challenge improperly conducted

credentialing/reappointment

activities

without

the

aid

of

discovery

of

the

credentialing/reappointment records. The Shadur court recognized the significant distinction
between a credentialing/reappointment case and a medical malpractice case.

Specifically, it

recognized that a plaintiff patient can still prevail in a medical malpractice action without any
credentialing/reappointment

materials;

whereas

a

plaintiff physician

challenging

the

000099
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credentialing/reappointment process has no case at all without the ability to discover and review
the underlying credentialing/reappointment materials.
The underlying rationale in the above cases supports Dr. Verska's position that the peer
review statutes are not applicable. The "confidential" nature of the information should not be
used to protect from discovery evidence of a process that lacks credibility. Nor should the label
given to the process govern the analysis of discoverability; the substance of the information is
the critical issue here. SARMC has improperly used the organizational structure of the hospital
to exclude Dr. Verska from the medical staff, thereby damaging his reputation and practice.
As the Shadur court explained, Dr. Verska would be left with no remedy whatsoever
against SARMC and Dr. Fox without access to the underlying information that led to the
defendants' wrongful actions. Therefore, this Court must find that the peer review statutes are
not applicable and compel SARMC to respond to Dr. Verska's discovery requests.

D.

PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THE DISCOVERY OF RECORDS WHERE A
PHYSICIAN IS CHALLENGING A PROCESS THAT LACKS CREDIBILITY.
Denying a physician access to his own records and relevant witnesses to support a claim

against an overbearing hospital creates absolute immunity, making the hospital untouchable. In
order

to

avoid

this

credentialing/reappointment

very

situation,

information

public

where

a

policy

demands

physician

IS

disclosure
challenging

of
that

credentialing/reappointment decision.

1. Hospitals And Staff Members Would Have Absolute Immunity In This Type Of
Situation If Discovery Of CredentialinglReappointment Information Is Not
Allowed.
The public policy behind enacting the privilege contradicts the practical effect of
extending the privilege to include a physician challenging hospital disciplinary proceedings. If
the privilege is extended under these circumstances, it necessarily gives health care organizations
and its member's absolute immunity, even for grievous and wrongful actions. In Shatyo

&100
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court recognized this when it stated, "[t]o recogmze hospital disciplinary proceedings as
privileged, regardless of the purpose for which disclosure is sought, would in effect grant such
committees, their members and participants absolute immunity from prosecution for all
statements made and actions taken in the context of such proceedings." Shadur, 664 F.2d at
1063 (emphasis added). Unlike a medical malpractice action where a patient is still able to
prosecute its case despite any peer review records, in a lawsuit such as this, application of the
privilege acts as a complete bar to all cases, regardless of any egregious or wrongful conduct by
the hospital or committee members. Even if the peer review statutes are applicable, they do not
grant absolute immunity, especially in a case where a physician is challenging the reappointment
process. To hold that the privilege and immunity may be invoked by SARMC under these
circumstances will allow any hospital, physician, or committee member to improperly act against
another physician without accountability or repercussion. Simply put, the interests of justice are
not served by such a finding nor should the Court condone such an absolute immunity where
none is contemplated.

2. Seventeen States Have Statutory Allowances For Physician Challenges To
Decisions Affecting Staff Privileges.
Seventeen states have sought to address the problem created when a physician is
challenging a hospital's decision affecting staff privileges by qualifying confidentiality and nondiscoverability statutes.

These states have generally made an allowance in their "non-

discoverability" statutes by permitting a physician to obtain access to materials when challenging
the curtailment, suspension, termination or denial of staff privileges. In those states, contesting a
revocation or curtailment of staff privileges by the accused physician places a much heavier
burden on the committee to perform a fair and honest review of a physician's perfonnance. The
following states have adopted such an allowance: Alaska (Alaska Stat. 18.23.030), Arizona
(Ariz. Rev. Stat. 32-1451), California (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 809.2), Colorado

(Co1660101
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Stat. 12-36.5-104(1O)(b)(I-IV», Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-17b(d», Hawaii (Haw. Rev.
Stat. 663-1.7), Illinois (225 Ill. Compo Stat. 60/5), Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-4915(4)(c»,

Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 311.377), Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13:3715.3),
Mississippi (Miss. Code. Ann. 41-63-9(2», Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.035), New
Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 317-A:17), Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. 441.055 and 41.675),
Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws 23-17-25), South Dakota (S.D. Cod. Laws 36-4-26.1),
Washington (Wash. Rev. Code 70.41.200).
While Idaho has not specifically adopted any such allowance, the fact that many other
states

have

recognized

the

inherent

problem

with

denying

a

physician

his

credentialinglreappointment records is persuasive evidence that the purpose of the privilege is to
shield from liability persons supplying information in medical malpractice cases. The privilege
and immunity protections are inapplicable and should not be used to deny a physician
challenging the reappointment process from discovering his own information.

3. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act Does Not Recognize A Peer Review
Privilege, Which Is Consistent With Federal Courts General Disfavor of
Privileges.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42

V.S.C.A. § 11101 et seq. ("HCQIA"), which was inspired by the congressional finding that
"[t]here is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians
engaging in effective professional peer review." 42 V.S.C.A. § 11101(5). Consideration of
HCQIA is important to the instant motion given that in SARMC's Bylaws it defers to HCQIA if
there are inconsistencies between its Bylaws and any HCQIA requirements. The federal Act and
congressional intent underlying the Act should not be lightly cast aside since SARMC and Dr.
Fox have invoked HCQIA as an affirmative defense. While the purpose of this motion is not to
provide a discussion on the requirements and proof required under HCQIA, it is important to
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understand that for defendants to invoke HCQIA as an affinnative defense requires reliance upon
the very information they seek to prevent from disclosure to prove the HCQIA elements.
HCQIA provides qualified immunity from suit to ofticials who conduct professional
review activities that meet the standards outlined in the statute. Yet Congress, in providing

protection for those involved in the professional review activity, did not establish a privilege to
documents and information created in that process. In analyzing HCQIA, the Teasdale court
declared that the legislature:
[N]ot only considered the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the peer
review process, but took the action it believed would best balance protecting
confidentiality with other important interests. Congress spoke loudly with its silence in
not including a privilege against discovery of peer review materials in the HCQIA.
Teasdale v. Marin General Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also In re:
Administrative Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D.

Mass. 2005) (finding that although state law recognized medical peer review privilege, Congress
chose not to include medical peer review privilege in HCQIA since HCQIA already provided for
qualified immunity from suit for those participating in peer reviews and where documents would
have been subject to protective order); Syposs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301 (W.O.N.Y.

1999) (finding that neither reason nor experience justified extending to peer review records a
privilege against disclosure where Congress declined to create such a privilege in connection
with enactment ofHCQIA).
Congress was mindful of the relevant competing interests, even though it declined to
create a privilege for medical peer review materials in HCQIA. The findings set forth in section
11101 (5) demonstrate Congress' appreciation for the need to provide incentive and protection for
physicians engaging in professional review activities. Id. at § 11101. The Supreme Court's
position is that trial courts should be "especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area
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where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not
provided the privilege itself." University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
Congress' determination that a medical peer review privilege is unnecessary is further
confirmation that Idaho's peer review privilege should be rendered inapplicable in this case and
disclosure allowed. This conclusion is further supported by the many states that have adopted
allowances for the discovery of credentialinglreappointment information, the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Harrison regarding credentialing decisions, and the Idaho federal court's
reliance on the similar records in Laurino.
While not binding on Idaho courts, it is significant that federal courts have continually
disfavored any evidentiary privilege, recognizing only a handful of applicable privileges under
the federal rules. Evidentiary privileges remain disfavored and should not be lightly created.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, (1974). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned
that privileges "contravene the fundamental principle that the public '" has a right to every man's
evidence."

Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, (1990) (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted). There is a presumption against privileges that may only be overcome
when it would achieve a "public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50,
100 (1980). This is a high standard, and "only the most compelling candidates will overcome the
law's weighty dependence on the availability of relevant evidence." Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d
57,67 (3rd Cir. 2000).
In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, (1990), the Supreme Court held
that neither federal common law nor the First Amendment warranted the recognition of a
privilege for the peer review materials of a university.

It cautioned that courts should be

"especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has
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considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself." Id. at
189 (emphasis added). The EEOC subpoenaed the tenure review files of a woman denied tenure
and five male faculty members who allegedly were beneficiaries of the disparate treatment. In
rejecting the University's privilege claim, the court noted that testimonial privileges are
exceptions to the principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence" and are to be
construed strictly." Id. The court pointed to Congress' failure to create a privilege for peer
review documents in extending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to educational
institutions. Id. at 189-92.
Holding true to the sentiment expressed by the Supreme Court, Dr. Verska should have a
right to SARMC's evidence, especially in light of the fact that Congress refused to create an
identical privilege when it created the Health Care Quality Immunity Act.

IV.
CONCLUSION
The search for the truth begins with the production of all the relevant information
surrounding the decision denying Dr. Verska's reappointment. If Dr. Verska is denied access to
the very information that would expose defendants' bad faith and wrong-doing against him, the
search for the truth never begins. The defendants are then free to manipulate and control the
information related to the process, activities and decisions surrounding that process to protect
against Dr. Verska's challenges.
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the peer review statutes are not applicable to this
case. Therefore, plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court order that 1) the peer review
privilege in Idaho Code Section 39-1392b is inapplicable, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section
39-1392c is inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC, absent exceptional circumstances, from raising
peer review privilege and immunity objections in further discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to
produce the information Dr. Verska has requested in his interrogatory nos. 1,3-7, 1O-24,ert':}&.fO
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for production nos. 1,2,4,5,7-54, and request tor admissions nos. 2-4, 14-16,26-30,32-62,64110 to which SARMC has objected, but has not fully responded asserting peer review privilege
and immunity objections.
DATED this

£

day of December, 2009.
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC

By

EJHi?~

Raymond D. Powers - Of the Firm
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE SPINE
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN,
M.D.; and DONALD FOX, M.D.,

No. CV OC 0911804

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
COMPEL AND CROSSMOTIONS FOR (i)
PROTECTIVE ORDER ON
PEER REVIEW, and (ii) ORDER
STRIKING PRIVILEGED PEER
REVIEW RECORDS

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Joseph Verska, M.D. and the Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho filed a
Motion to Compel information related to the processes, activities, and decisions of
Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's peer review of Dr. Verska.
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Plaintiffs contend this information is necessary to support their challenges to Defendant
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Centers' peer review of Dr. Verska and ancillary claims
against Defendants Dr. Donald Fox and Christian Zimmerman.

Defendants oppose

Plaintitrs' Motion to Compel and further seek a Protective Order regarding the peer review
materials as well as an order striking peer review records submitted by Plaintiffs in support
of their motion to compel. Defendants seek to obtain and enforce the protections afforded
by Idaho's peer review and immunity statutes.

This memorandum is submitted in

opposition to Plaintiffs' motion and in support of Defendants' motions.

Although

prompted by the exchange of initial discovery in the case, both parties seek a ruling by the
Court establishing the extent of the peer review and immunity protection governing the
claims and defenses raised, and which will provide guidance throughout the balance of this
litigation.
In their Motion to Compel Plaintiffs ask the Court to rule that Idaho's peer review
privilege and immunity statutes only apply to malpractice actions. Plaintiffs concede they
are demanding "information related to the processes, activities, and decisions that
ultimately led to the denial of [Dr. Verska's] reappointment" to Saint Alphonsus' medical
staff, and state it is their intention to "depose those individuals who have relevant
knowledge." (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of
Infonnation Related to SARMC'S Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment
("Plaintiff's Memorandum") at 2.) According to Plaintiffs, '''peer review privilege' and
immunity are inapplicable here," and "Idaho Code Sections 39-1392b and 39-1392c do not
apply to the issues framed by this case." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 3.)
In so doing, Plaintiffs also request the Court create a new "exception" to the
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protections afforded to peer review activity, which is contrary to both the unambiguous
language crafted by the Idaho legislature and the sound public policy underlying the
statute. The Idaho peer review statute clearly outlines the scope of peer review activities,
the privileged nature of peer review information, and the very limited exceptions to the
privilege which are not applicable in this matter:
•

"Peer review" includes "[ c ]redentialing, privileging or affiliating
of health care providers as members of, or providers for, a health
care organization," and any "[p]rofessional review action, meaning
an action ... of a health care organization which is taken or made
in the conduct of peer review ... " Idaho Code § 39-1392a(l1)(a),
(c). It is patently false to claim the peer review statutes do not
apply to "this type of case"; this is precisely the sort of matter for

which peer review protection was enacted.
•

"[A]ll peer review records shall be confidential and privileged, and
shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or discovery
proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony thereto
be admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court .
. . for any purpose whatsoever." Idaho Code § 39-1392b. The

discovery propounded by Plaintiffs, and their demand for
depositions related to the peer review process, are expressly
prohibited.
•

The Idaho legislature made specific exceptions to the peer review
privilege for patient care records and allowed the use of certain
peer review information in personal injury cases in a code section
titled "LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE AND
CONFIDENTIALITY." Idaho Code § 39-1392e.
The new

"exception" that Plaintiffs ask this Court to create is not among
the exceptions enacted by the legislature. In asking this Court to
create such an exception Plaintiffs seek to have the Court
grossly deviate from the judiciary's proper role in enforcing
unambiguous statutory law.
In sum, Idaho's peer review laws clearly do apply to Dr. Verska's challenges to the
peer review process at Saint Alphonsus in this litigation.

His contention that the peer

review laws are inapplicable and/or that the Court should carve out a new exception are
without merit.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel should be denied in its
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entirety, and by way of cross-motion, Defendants further request (i) a protective order
providing the privilege established by Section 39-1392b must be honored and observed
during the remainder of this case, including any depositions conducted by the parties, and
(ii) an order striking the peer review records Plaintiffs have attempted to offer in support of
their Motion to Compel.

II.

OVERVIEW OF CASE AND BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Idaho legislature mandates that every hospital conduct peer review activities,
including causing its medical statf to organize in-hospital committees which shall review
the professional practices of members of the hospital's medical staff for the purpose of
reducing morbidity and mortality, and for the improvement of the care of the hospital's
patients. Idaho Code § 39-1392f. Peer review is also a condition of participation in the
Medicare program. 42 C.F.R. 482.21. The policy behind these legislative mandates is to
encourage research, discipline, and medical study by health care organizations, and to
enforce and improve the standard of medical practice in Idaho. See Idaho Code § 39-1392.
Participation by independent physicians on the medical staffs at Idaho hospitals in
reviewing their peers and colleagues' professional practice, including at Saint Alphonsus, is
largely a voluntary activity. Participation in these critical organized peer review activities
may require many hours of uncompensated time outside of the physicians' professional
clinical practice to carefully and candidly review matters, exercising their best professional
judgment under the circumstances to ensure clinical quality is being protected and served
through their critical review.

To facilitate the legislative mandate and accomplish the

objectives of the law, including this candid participation by physicians, Idaho has
established a peer review privilege and immunity from liability for peer review activity.
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Idaho Code §§ 39-1392b and 39-1392c.
Saint Alphonsus is a 381-bed, Boise-based medical center subject to the abovereferenced mandates of the Idaho legislature regarding peer review activities. It serves the
communities and citizens of Southwest Idaho, Eastern Oregon, and Northern Nevada. Dr.
Verska is a spine surgeon who practices medicine in Boise, primarily through an entity
known as the Spine Institute of Idaho ("SII"), which represents to the public that it is "a
comprehensive spine care facility offering a full range of diagnostic and treatment services
for

back

pam

and

spinal

AboutUs/ComprehensiveCare.aspx.

disorders."

See

http://www.spineidaho.com/

Dr. Verska at one time possessed Medical Staff

membership and certain clinical privileges at Saint Alphonsus, Saint Luke's Regional
Medical Center, and Treasure Valley Hospital.

He no longer has Medical Staff

membership or privileges at Saint Alphonsus or Saint Luke's.1 In Plaintiffs' Memorandum
Dr. Verska suggests he and SII are the victims of a "conspiracy" to destroy Dr. Verska's
practice. The allegations are unfounded and are not even logical; for example, Dr. Fox is
an anesthesiologist engaged exclusively at Saint Alphonsus who would actually benefit
financially from Dr. Verska and other surgeons performing more surgeries at Saint
Alphonsus, because he would have more patients for whom to care.
Pursuant to its statutory obligation to conduct peer review and consistent with its
medical staff bylaws, Saint Alphonsus commenced a focused peer review of Dr. Verska's
practice in 2004. (Complaint,

~

10.) This peer review process was thorough, exhaustive,

and consistent with the Medical Staff Bylaws. It required countless hours of the voluntary
Medical Staff leadership and appointed committees to review voluminous medical

I Although his partner at SIl, Dr. Jorgenson, appears as a provider on St. Luke's website, Dr. Verska does
not.
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infonnation concerning his competence to provide care. Dr. Verska was afforded every
opportunity provided in the Bylaws to participate and challenge the recommended actions
of the Medical Staff in this process.
While there is a long history of events relevant to the evaluation of Dr. Verska's
clinical competence and practice, Defendants will necessarily focus on Saint Alphonsus'
peer review process itself.

Saint Alphonsus does not wish to waive the peer review

privilege and in order too avoid any suggestion that the peer review privilege has been
waived by Defendants, Defendants will confine their description of the process to matters
alleged by Dr. Verska in his Complaint, Motion to Compel, and Plaintiffs' Memorandum.
Specifically, the

Saint Alphonsus

Medical

Executive

Committee (the

commissioned a committee to review certain issues in 2005, (Complaint,

~

"MEC")

10), and in

2006, the MEC accepted certain recommendations but requested a further chart review.
(PlaintitTs' Memorandum at 6-7.)

Based on additional infonnation received, the Saint

Alphonsus Board of Trustees requested further review, and a second ad hoc committee was
appointed. (Complaint,

~~

19-20; Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 8.) This committee made

certain recommendations to the MEC in June 2008, (Complaint,
recommendations were modified by the MEC. (Complaint,

~

~

28); those

30; Plaintiffs' Memorandum

at 13-14.) As was his right, Dr. Verska demanded a hearing. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at
15.) The hearing panel's recommendations were presented to the MEC, which considered
them and made a recommendation. (Complaint,

~

40.) Dr. Verska once again sought

review of the MEC's decision.
The Saint Alphonsus Appellate Review Panel and, ultimately, its Board of
Trustees, reviewed the matter and affirmed the decision of the MEC. (Complaint

~

42;
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Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 19.) The reasons for this decision are set forth in detail in Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Board of Trustees Decision in the Matter of Physician
958 ("Board Decision"V

At the conclusion of the peer review process, Saint Alphonsus

conditioned Dr. Verska's privileges at Saint Alphonsus on successful completion of a oneyear spine fellowship program. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 14.) Dr. Verska did not seek
a fellowship, but instead brought this action against Saint Alphonsus, Dr. Fox (the former
chair of the MEC), and another surgeon, Dr. Zimmerman.
Faced with a dearth of evidence that the participants in the peer review decisions
did anything other than exercise his or her best professional judgment, Plaintiffs served
discovery requests on Saint Alphonsus, including interrogatories, requests for production,
and requests for admissions, seeking detailed information about the peer review process.
Candidly, Plaintiffs' effectively admit they cannot prove their case without the requested
privileged peer review materials.

(PlaintitTs' Memorandum at 19.)

Saint Alphonsus

objected to the discovery on the grounds that peer review proceedings are privileged under
Section 39-1392b, and that the participants are immune for actions taken in the process
pursuant to Section 39-1392c.

Plaintiffs move to compel production of the requested

information, asking the Court to rule that Idaho's peer review statutes do not apply to this
litigation.
III.
A.

ARGUMENT

Peer Review Records and Activity Are Privileged and Confidential
Under Idaho Law.

The language in the peer review statutes is plain and unambiguous.

Plaintiffs

2 The Board Decision provides a comprehensive explanation of the findings of the peer review process,
which Dr. Verska has omitted from his submission to this Court. Consistent with its position on the parties'
pending motions, Defendants have not provided the Board Decision to Court to protect the privilege and
confidentiality nature of its contents.
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attempt to avoid discussing the plain meamng of the statutes in favor of selective
arguments concerning the alleged "intent" and "legislative history" of the peer review
provisions. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 20-23.) Plaintiffs argue the purpose of the peer
review privilege is not to promote full and candid credentialing processes to improve the
quality of care provided to the public, but is instead solely to protect practitioners from
"liability in a malpractice action."

(Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 21 Y

Dr. Verska's

argument that he is entitled to peer review materials while an injured patient is not is not
only contrary to the plain statutory language, but reveals Dr. Verska's view that the law
holds a physician's financial interest as more important than those of an individual who is
seeking compensation for malpractice. Such is not the case.
Plaintiffs' arguments do not help their cause: "If [a] statue is not ambiguous, th[e]
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." McLean v. Maverick

Country Stores, Inc., 135 P.3d 756,759 (Idaho 2006); see also Murphy v. Wood, 667 P.2d
859 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). While it is, of course, true that peer review privilege and
immunity apply to certain third-party claims, by law, peer review materials are not
discoverable or admissible in "any action of any kind in any court ... for any purpose
whatsoever," Idaho Code § 39-1392b, save for the narrow statutory exceptions in Section
39-1392e. Plaintiffs' attempt to dilute this protection is baseless. Even the sources cited in
Plaintiffs' Memorandum state that the privilege is designed to "encourage the free
exchange of information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to persons
providing information or opinions to such review and study committees."

H.B. 136,

Statement of Purpose, 1973 Leg., Sess. (Idaho 1973) (quoted at page 21 of Plaintiffs'

Plaintiff appears to ignore the express exception for personal injury claims found in Idaho Code § 39J392e).

3
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Memorandum); Murphy, 667 P.2d at 863 (purpose is to improve care by encouraging a
free flow of information) (quoted at page 22 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum). Indeed, a full
reading of the legislative history of Title 39 confirms that the purpose of protecting peer
review processes is to foster an effective process which will improve the quality of care,
not simply to protect practitioners from liability as Plaintiffs myopically argue. E.g., 2004
S. Health & Welfare Comm. Minutes, S.B. 1320, 57th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2004)
(,'Records used in peer review are confidential and privileged and generally are not subject
to subpoena or discovery. This confidentiality allows open and honest communication
which is critical for the peer review process to work.").
In enacting and implementing a broad peer review privilege, Idaho is promoting the
same public policy considerations that are well recognized by courts and commentators,
including the policy goal of promoting candor and willing participation by qualified, busy
physicians in the often uncomfortable, time-consuming, and voluntary process of
evaluating a peer, for the overall good of reducing morbidity and mortality and improving
the quality of care to the community. See, e.g., Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d
11, 18 (Mass. 2007) ("We have recognized that the intent of these confidentiality
provisions is '[t]o "promote candor and confidentiality" in the peer review process ... and to
"foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider's peers" , " (citation
omitted); Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So. 2d 373, 383 (Miss. 1998) (explaining peer
review privilege statutes provide the confidentiality necessary "to pelmit quality assurance
control and review of activities in a hospital"); Coburn v. Seda, 677 P.2d 173, 178 (Wash.
1984) (explaining peer review privilege statutes "prohibit discovery of records on the
theory that external access to committee investigations stifles candor and inhibits
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constructive criticism thought necessary to effective quality review"); Donnell v. HCA

Health Servs., 28 P.3d 420, 432 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining purpose of state peer
review immunity statute is to "encourage hospitals to actively engage in peer review of
staff physicians" (quoting Lemuz v. Fieser, 933 P.2d 134,144 (Kan. 1997)); see generally
Ronald G. Spaeth, Kelley C. Pickering, & Shannon M. Web, Quality Assurance &

Hospital Structure: How the Physician-Hospital Relationship Ajjects Quality Measures 12
ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 240-43 (2003); Susan O. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis,

Confidentiality & Privilege of Peer Review Information: More Imagined than Real 7 J.L.

& HEALTH 169, 169-76 (1992-1993) ("The fear of becoming embroiled in lawsuits as a
result of candid discussion within the peer review process is recognized as a deterrent to
effective peer review."); see also 40A AM.

JUR.

2D Peer review; privilege and immunity

§ 23 (2008); Alissa Marie Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States

and Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689 (2002-2003).
The relevant considerations are perhaps best summarized by the Arizona Court of
Appeals in Yuma Regional Medical Center v. Superior Court, 852 P.2d 1256 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993), a case in which the Court refused to allow an interrogatory asking for nothing
more than the identity of persons present at a peer review proceeding. That court observed:
Important policy considerations underlie the protection
afforded by the peer review privilege. The legislature has
mandated that peer reviews be conducted "for the purposes
of reducing morbidity and mortality and for the improvement
of the care of patients . . . . " A.R.S. § 36-445. However,
doctors are somewhat reluctant to engage in peer review.
Review by one's peers within a hospital is
not only time consuming, unpaid work, it is
also likely to generate bad feelings and
result in unpopularity ....
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Consequently, these reviews will effectively terminate if
they are subject to unlimited discovery processes.
Yuma Regional Medical Center, 852 P.2d at1259 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
If the physicians who participate in peer review proceedings (such as Dr. Fox, who
has been sued by Dr. Verska in this very litigation for serving on Saint Alphonsus's
Medical Executive Committee) are subject to subpoena, document discovery, deposition,
and the looming threat of suit, they will be unwilling to engage in the very activities the
statutory scheme is designed to promote and the purposes sought to be achieved by Idaho
Code will be obliterated. The privilege is "intended to prohibit the chilling effect of the
potential public disclosure of statements made to or information prepared for and used by
the committee in carrying out its peer review function." Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 383
(quoting Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111,114-15 (Fla. 1992». The potential chilling effect
of Dr. Verska's litigation strategy is precisely the reason he is not permitted to obtain Saint
Alphonsus's peer review files, and is not allowed to eviscerate the privilege by deposing
and otherwise harassing witnesses who contributed their valuable time and energies to the
process to improve the quality of the region's healthcare. For good reason, Idaho's peer
review statutes apply to this case, and those statutes should be enforced as written.

B.

Dr. Verska's Asserted "Need" for Expansive Discovery of Peer Review
Materials Is Not Grounds for Eviscerating the Privilege.

In Plaintiffs' Memorandum, Dr. Verska provides a bulleted discovery "wish list"
and argues that he needs peer review materials because expansive discovery of such
information is the only way he can "know all the facts." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 23.)
Without exception, the requested discovery seeks peer review records and related
information that are expressly protected from discovery by Section 39-1392b.
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Although the temptation for Defendants to waive the peer review privilege and
debunk Dr. Verska's conspiracy theories and other allegations is great - and although the
legislature has given Saint Alphonsus license to use peer review information in its own
defense if it so chooses (see Section 39-1392e(f) - doing so would subject the medical
stafT at Saint Alphonsus to the very sort of discovery and recrimination from which they
are meant to be insulated by Section 39-1392b. For the policy reasons articulated above,
Saint Alphonsus will not, for the sake of expediency, do this to the individuals who have
participated in the "time consuming, unpaid work" involved in peer review. The residual
etTect of this action would be to erode the quality of care Saint Alphonsus ofTers.
A desire to "know all of the facts" is not an exception to a privilege; if it were, the
"exception" would swallow the rule whole.

By definition privileges apply to bar the

discovery and use of potentially relevant information. Privileges are justified by a "public
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,9 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United

States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980». Again, peer review privilege statutes are intended "to
promote the public health, safety and welfare and to provide for basic standards of care and
treatment of hospital patients." Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 383 (quoting Shelton v. !vforehead

Mem'l HOJp., 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (N .C. 1986». This important public policy outweighs
an individual physician's need to find the supposed "truth" concerning his personal
financial affairs, and it bars the discovery sought by Dr. Verska in this case. See Vranos,
862 N .E.2d at 18 ("[T]he interests of the general public in quality health care are elevated
over the interest of individual health care providers in unfettered access to information
about peer review of their actions.").

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL AND CROSS-MOTION FOR PROTEC@)OO
ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW RECORDS - 12
760483

118

C.

Idaho's Peer Review Statutes Are "Limited" Only to the Extent of the
Limitations Established by the Legislature.

At page 26 of their Memorandum, Plaintiffs argue that "[ c]ourts in Idaho, as well
as other jurisdictions, permit the discovery of information and materials from a
credentialinglreappointment challenge." The majority of the argument at pages 26 to 32 is
directed to interpretation of the decision in Harrison v. Binnion, 214 P.3d 631 (Idaho
2009), with a limited of cases from other jurisdictions.
As has been stated herein, the peer review privilege is a creature of statute in Idaho.
The statutes at issue are plain and unambiguous, and do not allow for "creative
interpretations" or "public policy exceptions" that are directed to advancing Dr. Verska's
personal fInancial interests. By definition, the privilege applies to the review of Dr. Verska
and any resulting limitations on his ability to practice at Saint Alphonsus, and the privilege
precludes the discovery sought by Plaintiffs in their motion.
Harrison v. Binnion is inapposite. It is not a case about the peer review privilege,

or what discovery is and is not proper under Section 39-1392b - which are the issues
presented by Plaintiffs' Motion.

Saint Alphonsus disagrees with PlaintitTs' reading of

Harrison, which is a case in which an injured patient was seeking leave to sue Saint

Alphonsus for allowing a physician to practice at the hospital (the very fate that Saint
Alphonsus seeks to head off with respect to Dr. Verska), not a challenge to the peer review
process itself. See Harrison, 214 P.3d at 633-34. The peer review privilege is not even
mentioned in Harrison (except in the dissent to acknowledge the "confIdentiality of peer

review materials," see Harrison, 214 P.3d at 645 (Horton, J., dissenting in part)), and the
decision does not support a common law exception to the statutory privilege against the
discovery sought by Plaintiffs.
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Similarly, the summary judgment ruling dismissing a claim almost identical to Dr.
Verska's in Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, No. 98-0439-S-EJL (D. Idaho 2005)
says nothing whatsoever about the privilege. By law, a hospital such as Syringa is free to
use peer review materials to defend itself against a practitioner's claim. Idaho Code § 39 1392e(f). Defendants do not know how or why the materials referenced in the Laurino
order were obtained or considered, but there is no suggestion Judge Lodge was asked to
interpret or enforce Section 39-1392b. The conclusions Plaintiffs seek to draw from the
Laurino order cannot be found in the case.

The Seventh Circuit case Plaintiffs cite, lvfemorial Ho!'>pital v. Shadur, 664 F.2d
1058 (7th Cir. 1981), applying federal law to a federal antitrust claim, is simply a non
sequitur; there is, and can be, no argument that federal privilege law applies here.

Contrary to the heading preceding Plaintiffs' argument, nothing in the cited cases
"recognizes the limited nature" ofldaho's peer review privilege.

D.

Plaintiffs' "Public Policy" Arguments Are, in the End, Irrelevant and
Best Directed to the Legislature.

In a final section of tripartite argument (at pages 32 through 37), PlaintitTs argue
that "public policy" demands this Court disregard the peer review privilege. They argue
that a privilege against discovery of peer review materials will result in "absolute
immunity," that a number of other states have enacted exceptions for physician challenges
to credentialing decisions, and that federal law does not provide a comparable privilege.
These policy arguments have no merit and do not change Idaho law.
First, the statutory limitation on discovery does not establish "absolute immunity."

The law establishes a privilege, but limited judicial review of a credentialing decision is
available in an appropriate case under the principles announced by the Idaho Supreme
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Court in Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 87 P.3d 934 (Idaho 2004),
which provides for a determination of whether the peer review process afforded due
process to the practitioner. Mille, 87 P.3d at 834-35. Here, there is no dispute that Dr.
Verska (with the benefit of counsel) had the opportunity to present evidence and arguments
at a full hearing;

Plaintiffs disagree with the ultimate decision, but they fully availed

themselves of the process to challenge the recommendations of the Medical Staff in the
process. Plaintiffs are not confronting "absolute immunity," only a claim that fails under
Miller and Laurino.
Second, statutory exceptions enacted by other states do not apply to an Idaho

proceeding brought by Idaho plaintiffs against Idaho defendants applying Idaho law.
Without discussing the nuances of the laws in the 17 states that have allegedly enacted
exceptions, Idaho is not one of them, nor are the other 32 states that are not discussed by
PlaintifTs.

If anything, the existence of specific exceptions under Section 39-1392e,

coupled with the absence of the exception advocated by Dr. Verska, defeats the arguments
being made to this Court. See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 424 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.3
(11 th Cir. 2005) ("[W]here the legislature has included certain exceptions to the [general
rule], the doctrine of expressio unis est e exclusio allerius counsels against judicial
recognition of additional exceptions.").
Third, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.s.C. § 11101

("HCQIA") provides qualified immunity to persons and entities who participate in
professional review activities, but the fact that Congress did not provide an additional
privilege does not vitiate the Idaho privilege. "HCQIA allows individual states to provide
even further protection to medical peer review activities." Roe v. Walls Reg 'I H05p., Inc.,
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21 S.W.3d 647,652 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (applying state qualified immunity law and peer
review privilege statute, barring discovery of "records and proceedings of a medical peer
review committee," in a physician's defamation and negligence lawsuit against a hospital);

see also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 106 n.S (198S) ("The Act expressly provides that it
does not change other 'immunities under law,' § 11115(a), including the state-action
immunity, thus allowing States to immunize peer-review action that does not meet the
federal standard."); 40A AM.

JUR.

20 Peer revie'w; privilege and immunity § 24 (200S)

("The immunity provisions of the HCQIA are not intended to preempt any state laws
providing greater protection.").
Ultimately, Plaintiffs simply want Idaho law to be different than it is. Section 391392b of Idaho Code provides broad protection to peer review proceedings by barring
discovery and excluding evidence. These protections foster candor and assist hospitals in
securing the grudging participation of physicians that is critical to "enforcing and
improving the standards of medical practice in the state of Idaho," Section 39-1392, which
is the ultimate goal of peer review. Defendants have raised proper objections, the peer
review laws should be enforced, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel should accordingly be
denied.

IV.
A.

DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS

Defendants Are Entitled to a Protective Order Establishing the Peer
Review Privilege Applies in Plaintiffs' Challenge to the Verska Peer
Review Proceedings, and the Defendants and Other Third Parties Who
Are Subject to Deposition and Other Discovery Need Not Disclose
Privileged Peer Review Information.

Given that the written discovery propounded upon Saint Alphonsus is only the first
volley of discovery in this case, and that Plaintiffs have announced their intention to
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depose an unknown number of individuals with knowledge of the review process,
Defendants request a protective order that provides that Section 39-1392b means what it
says, and that Plaintiffs are not entitled to inquire into "peer review records," or any
"testimony relating thereto."

Idaho Code § 39-1392b.

See Idaho R. of Civ. P. 26(c)

(where appropriate, a court can enter a protective order "that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters"); Frost v.

Hofmeister, 97 Idaho 757, 762 (1976) (discussing protective order barring deposition
questions concerning grand jury testimony). The relief is necessary and appropriate, and
flows directly from denial of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. A proposed order is submitted
herewith for the Court's consideration.

The Court Should Strike the Portions of Plaintiffs' Submissions that
Are "Peer Review Records" as that Term is Defined in Section 391392a of the Idaho Code.

B.

As discussed above, "peer review records" are defined as "all evidence of
interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and
compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer review of
any health care organization." Idaho Code § 39-1392a(12).

Peer review records "shall

not be directly or indirectly ... admitted as evidence ... in any action of any kind." Idaho
Code § 39-1392b.
Here, in an effort to bootstrap an exception to this statutory peer review privilege,
PlaintitIs have filed peer review records which are inadmissible. Pursuant to Section 391392b, they should be stricken from the record. Specifically, Defendants object to, and
request that the Court strike, the following peer review records:
•

Portions of Exhibit A to the Powers Declaration, specifically Saint
Alphonsus's responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 3, 4, 14,
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15, 16,26,27,28,29,30,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,
43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57, 58, 59,60,
61,62,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77, 78, 79,
80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94, 95,96,97,
98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109 and 110;
•

Exhibit D to the Powers Declaration, the 2005 Greeley Report;

•

Exhibit E to the Powers Declaration, the Ad Hoc Committee
Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions of October 24,2005;

•

Exhibit F to the Powers Declaration, the February 12, 2007 letter
from Dr. McMartin to Dr. Verska;

•

Exhibit G to the Powers Declaration, the July 9, 2007 letter from
Ms. Bruce to Dr. Verska;

•

Exhibit H to the Powers Declaration, the 2007 Greeley Report;

•

Exhibit I to the Powers Declaration, the December 9, 2007 letter
from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska;

•

Exhibit J to the Powers Declaration, an unsigned February 24,
2008 letter from Dr. Verska to Dr. McMartin;

•

Exhibit K to the Powers Declaration, a March 14, 2008 letter from
Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska;

•

Exhibit L to the Powers Declaration, Meeting Notes of the Ad Hoc
Committee Commissioned to Investigate Dr. 958;
Exhibit M to the Powers Declaration, Ad Hoc Committee
Commissioned to Investigate Dr. 958: Summary and
Recommendations;

•

•

Exhibit N to the Powers Declaration, a June 25, 20008 letter from
Dr. Fox to Ms. Bruce;

•

Exhibit 0 to the Powers Declaration, a June 25, 2008 letter from
Ms. Bruce to Dr. Verska;

•

Exhibit P to the Powers Declaration, a September 30, 2008 letter
from Mr. Miller to Mr. Powers;

•

Exhibit Q to the Powers Declaration, excerpts of "Fair Hearing
Testimony; "
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•

Exhibit R to the Powers Declaration, Fair Hearing Panel
Recommendation; and,

•

Exhibit S to the Powers Declaration, December 9,2008 Minutes of
Medical Executive Committee.

All of the foregoing selectively chosen exhibits fall squarely within the definition
of "peer review records," Section 39-1392a(12), and the Court should immediately order
them stricken and removed from the court files. In addition, the Court should strike the
"Background Information" presented by Plaintiffs at pages 4 to 20 of their Memorandum.
Not only are peer review records confidential and privileged, but so is "testimony relating
thereto." Idaho Code § 39-1392b. At a minimum, the Court should place those portions of
the motion under seal to preserve the confidentiality of the peer review process.

V.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs unapologetically state their demands: They want discovery to which they
are not entitled, and they want to use peer review records that are inadmissible as a matter
of law. For the foregoing reasons, defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
Dr. Donald Fox, and Dr. Christian Zimmerman respectfully request the Court deny
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, and enter orders properly implementing Title 39, Chapter 13
of the Idaho Statutes governing peer review.
DATED this 20 th day of January, 2010.

Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20 th day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL AND
CROSS-MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW
RECORDS,

by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

Raymond D. Powers
Powers Tolman, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, 1D 83707
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

_

L
_

Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 577-5101
Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL AND CROSS-MOTION FOR PROTECOOO
ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW RECORDS - 20
760483

126

27

ORIGINAL
Raymond D. Powers
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstoiman.com

Portia L. Rauer
ISB #7233; pir@powerstolman.com

POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Post Office Box 9756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 577-5100
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101
W:\17\17-002\Disclosure - Reply and Pet.'T Review Response.docx

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,

Case No. CV OC 0911804

REPL Y IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
COMPEL AND RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTIONS
FOR (i) PROTECTIVE ORDER ON
PEER REVIEW, AND (ii) ORDER
STRIKING PRIVILEGED PEER
REVIEW RECORDS

Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE INSTITUTE OF
IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and
submit this reply in support of their Motion to Compel Production of Information Related to

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR (i) PROTECTIVE ORDER ON PEER REVIEW, AND (ii) ORDER STRIKING
PRIVILEGED PEER REVIEW RECORDS - 1
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)

SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment, as well their response to
Defendants' Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review and (ii) Order Striking
Privileged Peer Review Records.
INTRODUCTION

Dr. Verska moved this Court for an order that 1) the peer review privilege in Idaho Code
§ 39-1392b is inapplicable to the instant action, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section 39-1392c

is inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC from raising peer review and immunity objections in future
discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to produce the information requested in Dr. Verska's
interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission. Defendants argue that the
peer review statutes are unambiguous and applicable in this case. However, when the statutes
are read as a whole and in conjunction with the legislative purpose, it is clear that the legislature
did not intend to keep a physician from discovering information related to challenging
privileging decisions.

Furthermore, Defendants' own Bylaws and MSPP provide for the

disclosure of the peer review information upon consent by the physician.
Contrary to Defendants' assertions, discovery of the information sought by Dr. Verska
will not have a "chilling effect" on peer review activities, nor will it be a disincentive for
members of the medical staff to serve on the various hospital committees - assuming that the
peer review activities were conducted in good faith by those so serving. What discovery wi1l
chill, however, is bad faith conduct by Defendants.
Information surrounding the wrongful denial of a physician's privileges is exactly the
type of information that must be discoverable so that a physician who has been wronged will
have access to justice. Dr. Verska's motion to compel must be granted so that the Defendants
will be held accountable for their wrongful conduct.
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ARGUMENT
A.

THE PEER REVIEW STATUTES ARE INAPPLICABLE GIVEN THE
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE AND PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLYING THE
STATUTES.
"The words of a statute should be gIven their plain meanmg, unless a contrary

legislative purpose is expressed or the plain meaning creates an absurd result." Doe v. Boy
Scouts of America, Nos. 35639 and 35681, 2009 WL 5101498 (Idaho, Dec. 29, 2009) (emphasis
added). "If the words of the statute are subject to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous and
the statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean."

Id.

To

determine that intent, not only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the
proposed construction, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history must be
examined. Id.
To the extent the language of the peer review statutes are subject to differing
interpretations, the statutes are ambiguous and the Court must look to the legislative purpose,
intent and history, the reasonableness of the proposed construction, the public policy, and
whether an absurd result is created when only the plain meaning of the words is considered.

1.

Legislative Purpose, Intent, and History.

The statement of purpose from the original 1973 legislation contains compelling
language to support Dr. Verska's position that the peer review statutes are inapplicable:
It is essential to the preservation of optimum medical care that the
medical profession within Idaho be free to review patient care and
to constantly enforce and improve the standards of medical
practice within the state. Such intraprofessional action and review
is inhibited and discouraged by present law, however, because of
the lack of privilege for any proceedings or records which may be
developed and the threat that such materials may be obtained by

third parties, perhaps misinterpreted and used in litigation,
against the practitioner.
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This bill would impose a confidential and privileged status upon
certain reports, records and other materials developed by inhospital medical staff committees, medical society committees and
other approved entities concerned with research, discipline and
medical study. It would also encourage the free exchange of
information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to
persons providing information or opinions to such review and
study committees. Access to and court room use of individual

patients' records would not be affected.
House Bill 136 Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note (1973 Legislative Session) (emphasis added).
As much as Defendants would like to pretend the statement of purpose does not exist, it
is essential for interpreting the breadth of the peer review statutes. There is no mistake that the
statement of purpose specifically identifies the need for the protection to avoid the threat that
peer review materials could be used by third parties against the practitioner. The statement of
purpose is silent on protecting peer review materials in litigation when it is the practitioner who
seeks to use the materials in litigation against a hospital to challenge a privileging decision. Had
the legislature intended that the peer review materials would be protected from discovery in
cases such as Dr. Verska's it would have been included in the statement of purpose.
Defendants would also like to ignore the purpose of the 1997 amendment to Idaho Code
Section 39-1392 et seq. The purpose of the bill amending the statutes was summarized in a
handout. See Senate Bill No. 1115. The following italicized language reiterates the legislature's
intent that the purpose of providing such protection was to prevent peer review related
infOlmation from being used against a physician in a malpractice action:

This information is intended to help physicians improve, but
could also be used to discredit a physician in a malpractice suit.
Unless the information collected on physicians and the opinions
they render about their peers is protected from discovery,
physicians will refuse to participate in quality assurance programs.
Without quality assurance programs, health care quality will suffer.
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ld. (Emphasis added). The italicized sentence modifies the sentences that follow. The fact that

the legislature included the modifying sentence is proof that the infonnation that comes after the
modifying sentence must be interpreted in relationship to the preceding sentence. Therefore,
information collected on physicians and the opinions they render about their peers is protected
from discovery in malpractice suits. The legislature chose to reiterate the original statement of
purpose when it included the italicized language in the amendment. Again, there is no language
suggesting that the peer review materials in a wrongful denial of reappointment case will be
protected from discovery.
The language of 39-1392b and 39-1392c cannot be read in a vacuum, without considering
the legislative intent and history.

It is the legislative intent and history that provides the

necessary context to interpret and apply the language of the statutes. From the language quoted
above, the peer review statutes were not intended to apply to actions brought by a physician
challenging the denial of hislher reappointment to expose wrongful conduct by a hospital.
Several of the cases cited by Defendants are medical malpractice cases. As expected, the
rationale and analysis of the courts in Yuma Medical Center, Coburn, and Claypool support
finding peer review protection since those cases were brought by third parties seeking
information from the peer review process related to their medical malpractice claims.

Yuma

Medical Center v. Superior Court, 852 P.2d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Coburn v. Seda, 677
P.2d 173 (Wash. 1984»; Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 S.2d 373 (Miss. 1998).

Because the

holdings in these cases are medical malpractices actions, the cases are distinguishable on the
facts and have little value this instance.
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2.

Reasonableness of the Proposed Construction; Absurd Result.

The construction of the peer review statutes proposed by Defendants is unreasonable and
would create an absurd result. To follow Defendants' logic would result in absolute immunity
for the Defendants whereby there would never be an instance of accountability.

In their

responsive memorandum, Defendants do not address how it is that a physician can challenge the
wrongful conduct of a hospital without access to relevant information in possession of the
hospital. To find that the peer review statutes protect the kind of information Dr. Verska is
seeking would make the Defendants untouchable and above the law.

There is no proof

whatsoever that the legislature intended the peer review statutes to empower and protect the
hospital to such an extreme degree. Absolute immunity is an extreme protection and had the
legislature intended for it to be part of the peer review statutes, it surely would have made
mention of it. Defendants' interpretation of the statutes creates an absurd result that should not
be condoned by this Court.
Defendants contend that absolute immunity is not created by invoking the peer review
statutes because of the limited judicial review of credentialing decisions set forth in Miller v. St.
Alphol1SUS Reg'l Med. etr.

87 P.3d 934 (Idaho 2004) (addressing whether due process was

afforded). Defendants go on to claim that Dr. Verska was afforded the due process available to
him, implying somehow that there is no absolute immunity issue. The Miller case is factually
distinct from the present case because it involved the initial credentialing of a new physician to
the hospital and implicates different sections of the SARMC's Bylaws and MSPP. Furthermore,
contrary to Defendants' claim, Dr. Verska was not afforded the due process to which he was
entitled because he was denied reappointment without a fair hearing before his privileges were
adversely affected. Absolute immunity is created in this case if the peer review statutes are
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allowed to shield the Defendants because the very information needed to expose Defendants'
wrongful conduct will never be seen.
Dr. Verska has not argued that the peer review statutes are inapplicable in every situation.
Clearly, there is a need for peer review protection when third parties are attempting to use
information against a physician. Dr. Verska's case is very different and his interpretation of the
peer review statutes is reasonable given the facts and circumstances surrounding his particular
case.

It is entirely reasonable for a physician to have access to the information relative to

decisions that directly and adversely impact the physician. There is no third party involved who
is attempting to penetrate the privilege from the outside. The privilege should not be used to
deny a physician challenging the peer review process from discovering his own privileging
information.
The information Dr. Verska is seeking is information about him. It is reasonable that he
should be allowed access to this type of information.

3.

Public Policy Supports Compelling Defendants to Produce the Information.

The public policy surrounding disclosure of the information sought by Dr. Verska is
important to consider.

As argued above, the absurd result of absolute immunity would be

created if the Defendants are allowed to hide behind the peer review statutes and shield their
improper motivations and ill will. Such a result invites corruption and wrongful conduct. If the
hospital is not held accountable for its actions, then it can eliminate physicians from practicing at
SARMC by simply claiming that its actions are protected by the peer review statutes and are
never subject to scrutiny by anyone. Public policy does not support corruption and hiding
wrongful conduct. Public policy does not support cutting off a person's access to justice and
allowing an institution to be the judge, jury and executioner without some kind of accountability

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'O
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR (i) PROTECTIVE ORDER ON PEER REVIEW, AND (ii) ORDER STRIKING
PRIVILEGED PEER REVIEW RECORDS - 7

0 0 13 3

or oversight. The public has a right to every man's evidence and that must include Defendants'
evidence in this case.
Defendants have offered no proof that the public policy goals of encouraging the free
exchange of information and improving the quality of care will suffer if the statutes are found to
be inapplicable. None of the committee members directly and actively involved in the review of
Dr. Verska are named parties.

The very physicians who have served on the peer review

committees could be the next physicians to have their privileges adversely affected through
SARMC's wrongful conduct. Every member of the medical staff has a vested interest in this
Court finding that the peer review statutes are inapplicable when it is the physician who is
challenging a privileging decision. Allowing for discovery of privileging information will likely
improve the exchange of information because those serving on the committees and providing the
information will be more careful and thorough. The quality of care at SARMC could actually
improve if Defendants no longer had the protection of the peer review statutes in privileging
matters. It is possible that members of the medical staff will be more at ease and more willing to
participate, which will improve patient care, if they knew there was a deterrent in place to act as
a check on Defendants' conduct.
Throughout their briefing, Defendants have argued that Dr. Verska's financial position or
personal financial interests should not outweigh public policy. To be clear, Dr. Verska brought
this suit against Defendants for their wrongful conduct and to expose their bad faith, improper
motives, and ill will towards him. This is not a medical malpractice action. Dr. Verska has been
damaged and is entitled to a remedy for those damages. Public policy is not advanced by
disparaging Dr. Verska for claiming a remedy for his damages, nor is public policy advanced by
permitting Defendants to hide their wrongful conduct.
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Evaluating the legislative purpose, the reasonableness of the interpretation, and the public
policy leads to the conclusion that the peer review statutes are inapplicable in this case.
B.

THE PEER REVIEW STATUTES, WHEN READ AS A WHOLE, DO NOT
APPL Y IN ACTIONS BY PHYSICIANS WHO CHALLENGE THE PEER
REVIEW PROCESS ITSELF.
Idaho Code Section 39-1392b identifies the types of documents that are covered by the

peer review privilege, but does not distinguish who is entitled to assert the privilege. Rather, it
focuses upon the type of evidence that can be excluded from discovery. Companion subsections
show, however, that the physician who is the subject of the peer review can waive the peer
review privilege either by consent or by placing the peer review process at issue.
Idaho Code Section 39-1392e( d) provides for disclosure of peer review information if the
investigated physician consents.

In the context of a medical malpractice action where the

claimant or patient is requesting peer review information beyond that allowed by the statute,
section 39-1392e(d) states that "disclosures may be voluntarily made '" if all disciplined,
accused or investigated physicians ... consent thereto .... " The language of this subsection is
similar to the language from SARMC's own Bylaws, which also provides an avenue for the
physician to consent to disclosure of otherwise protected peer review information. J

J Article VII of the SARMC Medical Staff Bylaws expressly pennits a medical staff member to consent to disclosure
of his credentialing, peer review, corrective action, fair hearing, and appeal records. The relevant portion of the
Bylaws is as follows:

SECTION 3. CONFIDENTIALITY

A.

POLICY - Except as provided below, all written records of interviews, all
reports, statements, minutes, memorandum, charts, and the contents thereof, and
all physical materials relating to the process of an initial application for
appointment, corrective action procedures, hearing and appeal procedures and
the proceedings of all medical staff committees, will be confidential and no
disclosure of such information will be made outside the context of the
proceedings provided for in these Bylaws. Nothing herein will prevent limited
disclosure of information deemed confidential hereunder in the following
circumstances:
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Idaho Code Section 39-1392e(f) provides that if a physician who is the subject of a peer
review investigation brings suit on account of the investigation against the health care
organization "then, in defense thereof, confidentiality and privilege shall be deemed waived by
the making of such claim" and the health care organization shall be allowed to use protected
infonnation "for the purpose of presenting proof of facts surrounding such matter." The impact
of this particular subsection is to allow the hospital to use the peer review records in its defense
on the assumption that the physician has not consented to the disclosure of unfavorable
infonnation.
Since Section 13-1392b is silent as to who may exercises the privilege or who may waive
the privilege, it is reasonable to conclude Dr. Verska has the power to waive the privilege based
on the language found in section 13-1392e. It is also reasonable to conclude that Dr. Verska has
the power to waive the privilege since the privileging infonnation sought concerns him. And,
just as the health care organization under Idaho Code Section 39-1392e(f) shall be allowed to
present proof of facts surrounding a certain matters that would otherwise be privileged, it is
reasonable to conclude that this Court would also be interested in allowing Dr. Verska to present
proof of facts surrounding the matters that would otherwise be privileged.
It is difficult to fathom that the legislature intended that the privileging statutes could be

used as both a sword and a shield by a hospital. A hospital should not be allowed to use the

2.

Where the Medical Staff Member about whom the information
pertains consents to the disclosure of such information and no
privileged or confidential information regarding any other patient,
physician or person will be disclosed thereby;

(Emphasis added). SARMC Medical Staff Bylaws, Art. VII, Sec. 3.
The records that Dr. Verska seeks through discovery are the same records described in the article and do not involve
other patients, physicians or persons.
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privilege statutes as a sword and permitted to waive the privilege to use information favorable to
it in its defense, while at the same time using the privilege statutes as a shield against disclosure
when the information to be disclosed is less than favorable and would benefit the other party.
There is no logical reason to prohibit Dr. Verska from consenting to the disclosure of
information that is directly related to the peer review process of which he was the subject. This
is not a medical malpractice action where the patient is claiming that a physician is liable for
personal injury damages as the result of negligent medical care and is seeking peer review
information to prove his/her case against the physician or the hospital.

Dr. Verska is the

investigated physician. He consents to the disclosure of his own peer review infoffi1ation in an
action where he is challenging the outcome of the peer review process that was conducted by
SARMC, and where presentation of the proof of facts surrounding the matter are crucial in the
search for truth.

C.

OTHER COURTS HAVE ALLOWED THE DISCOVERY OF PEER REVIEW
INFORMATION.
Other courts have specifically addressed the peer review statutes

physicians have challenged hospital decisions regarding staff privileges.

lI1

cases where

In Hayes v. Mercy

Health Corp., 739 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1999), Dr. Hayes challenged the hospital's suspension of his
privileges. [d. at 115. In its decision allowing the discovery of peer review information, the
court focused on the intent of the Pennsylvania statute which sought to keep peer review
proceedings confidential. The statute states, in part, that peer review proceedings are to remain
confidential "in any civil action ... arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation
and review by such committee." [d. The court interpreted the language of the statute to mean
that it was intended "to prevent the disclosure of peer review information to outside parties
seeking to hold professional health care providers liable for negligence, while at the same time
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ensuring •.• confidentiality did not operate to shield from discovery those rare instances in
which the peer review process was misused." Id. at 118 (emphasis added). Furthennore, Dr.
Hayes' challenge of the suspension did not arise out of the substantive issue of patient care. Id.
at 117. The court recognized that peer review statutes were originally enacted to protect parties
contributing to the peer review process from third parties alleging negligence via their
participation.
The Hayes court recognized that there were situations in which the confidentiality
provision did not apply, especially where a protection is not expressly worded in the statute. The
court recognized that the issues at stake were the fairness and integrity of the peer review
proceedings and whether the plaintiff-physician was the victim of bad faith.
A similar result was reached by the federal trial court in Oklahoma where it recognized
that disclosure of peer review records is appropriate when a physician challenges a sham peer
review process. In Cohlmia v. Ardent Health Services, LLC, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Okla.
2006), plaintiff alleged numerous state and federal claims.

The defendants, in turn, filed a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and sought privilege and confidentiality protection
under Oklahoma's peer review statutes. The district court observed that federal antitrust claims
had been alleged and that exclusion of "relevant and possibly crucial evidence by application of
the [peer review] privilege" ran against strong public policy. Id. at 1273. In finding the peer
review privilege inapplicable, the court further noted that allowing discovery of the peer review
materials was especially appropriate given the allegations of sham peer review proceedings. Id.

Cohlmia recognizes, then, that peer review records are essential to a physician challenging a
sham peer review process.
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While Hayes and Collimia are not binding, they illustrate that other jurisdictions have
recognized the limited application of peer review statutes and have been willing to find the
statutes inapplicable.
Defendants have made a cursory attempt to distinguish several of the cases previously
cited by Dr. Verska. Defendants suggest that Harrison v. Binnion is not applicable to the present
case because Harrison does not mention peer review and arose from a medical malpractice
action.

147 Idaho 645, 214 P.3d 631 (2009). Dr. Verska did not argue that Harrison was

directly on point factually. It is true that in Harrison the plaintiffs were moving to amend their
medical malpractice action to include a claim for negligent credentialing. [d. at 214 P.3d at 63536. The Harrison case must not be dismissed out of hand because the court's rationale is
applicable to the present case.

As argued in previous briefing, credentialing decisions and

privileging decisions are virtually identical. In finding that St. AI's did not enjoy immunity with
regard to credentialing decisions, the court explained that there was nothing in the wording of the
statute that purported to grant immunity for making a credentialing decision. [d. at 214 P.3d at
634. Likewise in the instant case, there is nothing in the wording of the statute, or the legislative
purpose, that purports to grant the hospital the protection of peer review privilege or immunity
when a physician challenges the hospital's credentialing or privileging decision. The result from
Harrison should be the result here - no statutory protection is afforded the hospital to avoid

accountability for their reappointment decision.
Defendants also attempted to distinguish Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, claiming
that it was unknown how or why the referenced peer review materials were part of the record.
The "how or why" is less important than the fact that Judge Lodge heavily relied on the
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information in reaching his decision. Clearly, the peer review information was important. No.
CIV 98-0439-S-EJL (D. Idaho March 14,2005) (Order Granting Summary Judgment).
Defendants also attempted to distinguish Memorial Hospital v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058
(7th Cir. 1981), by stating that federal privilege law does not apply. However, Defendants failed
to appreciate that the federal court was applying the Illinois medical peer review statutes when it
allowed discovery. Defendants would have this Court ignore the analysis and holdings of the
federal courts. However, because state courts generally, and Idaho specifically, do not have
large bodies of case law on the subject, it makes sense to look to the federal courts for guidance.
The case law provided by Dr. Verska supports his position that the peer review statutes
are inapplicable in cases where physicians are challenging decisions related to the physician's
privileges; therefore, his motion to compel should be granted in full.

D.

DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS MUST BE DENIED.
1.

Defendants' Cross Motion for Protective Order Related to the Peer Review
Privilege Must be Denied.

Through their responsive briefing, Defendants have moved for a protective order asking
the Court to find the peer review statutes applicable. Dr. Verska objects to Defendants' cross
motion as argued throughout this reply and as argued in his memorandum in support of his
motion to compel, which is incorporated herein by reference.

2.

Defendants' Cross Motion Striking Plaintiffs' Submission of Peer Review
Records and "Background Information" Must be Denied.

Defendants have moved to strike most of the documents Dr. Verska provided to the Court
in support of his motion to compel on the ground that they are inadmissible. Defendants have
also moved to strike the "Background Information" segment of Dr. Verska's memorandum. Dr.
Verska objects to Defendants' motion on the grounds that the Court has not been asked to
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determine the admissibility of the documents or background infonnation; it has only been asked
to determine the discoverability of information related to the peer review process and the
decisions made involving Dr. Verska's reappointment. The documents and information were
provided to enlighten the Court as to the wrongful conduct and inconsistencies that Dr. Verska
was subjected to throughout his review by Defendants. This information is essential to provide a
context for the Court in reaching a decision on the applicability of the peer review statutes.
Defendants executed a Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order which will protect the
confidentiality of the documents. The Court has yet to sign the protective order; therefore, the
documents to which Defendants refer have not been technically filed, although a courtesy copy
was provided to the Court's chambers for reference, anticipating that the protective order would
be signed.

Defendants were aware of this arrangement.

Dr. Verska will agree to the

"Background Information" being placed under protective seal and believes such action is
contemplated in the Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order. Dr. Verska does not agree that the
documents and background information should be stricken from the record.
Because the parties have executed a stipulation for protective order sealing the
confidential documents and information, Defendants' motion to strike must be denied.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in Dr. Verska's memorandum in
support of his motion to compel, Dr. Verska's motion to compel should be granted in full and
Defendants' cross motions must be denied in full.

The Idaho Peer Review Statutes are

inapplicable in the instant action and Dr. Verska is entitled to discover infOlmation related to the
wrongful denial of his reappointment to the medical staff.
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Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The interpretation and application of Idaho's peer review privilege has been raised
by both sides in competing cross-motions. Plaintiffs have moved to compel responses to
specific discovery requests; the Defendants

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center,
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Dr. Donald Fox and Christian Zimmerman

seek a protective order enforcing Section 39-

1392b of the Idaho Code, and move to strike privileged peer review materials from the
record. In opposition to Defendants' cross-motions, Dr. Verska "incorporate[s] by
reference" his motion to compel as well as the argument in his "reply." Plaintiffs' Reply at
14. Defendants make this brief reply in support of their cross-motions.

II.
A.

REPLY ARGUMENT

Idaho's Peer Review Laws are Not "Ambiguous," Nor Does The
Application of Those Laws Produce an "Absurd Result"

While acknowledging that statutes are generally to be applied as they are written,
Plaintiffs argue that Idaho's peer review laws are either "ambiguous," or that applying the
statutes according to their terms would produce an "absurd result."

Neither argument

withstands even passing scrutiny.
The Idaho Legislature could not have been more clear or emphatic in the language
used in Idaho Code § 39-1392b.

Peer review records and related testimony are not

discoverable and shall not be used "in any action of any kind in any court ... for any
purpose whatsoever." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1392b (2009). As recently stated by the
Idaho Supreme Court:
A statute is ambiguous when the language is capable of more
than one reasonable interpretation. Porter v. Bd. a/Trustees,
141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004). However, a
statute may not be deemed ambiguous merely because
parties present differing interpretations to the court. Id.

Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289, 293 (Idaho 2009). Reading
the language of section 39-1392b to say that the peer review privilege applies only in
"malpractice cases" is not reasonable, and Plaintiffs' bare plea for such an interpretation
does not create an "ambiguity" where none fairly exists.
DEFENDANTS' REPLY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
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Nor does enforcement of the peer review privilege as written produce an "absurd
result." As discussed and supported with abundant citations in Defendants' opening brief,
improving the quality of healthcare by promoting both the free flow and use of relevant
inforn1ation is the primary objective of the peer review privilege. If the busy doctors who
give their time to participate in peer review proceedings or if the persons who provide
inforn1ation in aid of that process are subject to deposition, document discovery, and
eventually suit - like Dr. Fox, who has been sued by Dr. Verska for his role in the subject
peer review proceedings - participation will evaporate.

Peers will not provide critical

information, and reviewing doctors will refuse to serve on committees. Peer review "will
effectively terminate if [participating doctors] are subject to unlimited discovery
processes."

Yuma Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 852 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1993).
While Dr. Verska alleges a lack of due process, that does not give him license to
conduct discovery concerning protected matters. There is nothing remarkable or absurd
about this. A litigant can argue that this Court violated his or her rights, but that litigant
generally cannot depose Your Honor or the court staff, nor is a litigant entitled to demand
discovery of the Court's notes, drafts or other confidential information except in the most
egregious of circumstances. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-340a(2); LeAR. 32(g)(l8) (am.
& eff. Feb. 1, 2009). Similarly, a disappointed participant in an arbitration is generally not

entitled to depose the arbitrator to substantiate an allegation of bias.

Woods v. Saturn

Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 430 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Although it may be difficult to
prove actual bias without deposing the arbitrators, deposition of arbitrators [is] 'repeatedly
condemned' by courts.") (citing OR. Sec., Inc. v. Prof,! Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d
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742, 748 (11 th Cir. 1988».

Parties regularly challenge due process without taking

discovery as to why a tribunal did what it did.
Here, the peer review laws are unambiguous. Applying them according to their
terms promotes important societal goals and is entirely consistent with the legislation's
legislative history.

The tradeoff is that certain matters that would otherwise be

discoverable or admissible are not, which, by definition, is the effect of any privilege,
including the one created by the Idaho legislature that governs in this case. "Although it
may be inequitable that information contained in privileged materials is available to only
one side in a dispute, a determination that communications or materials are privileged is
simply a choice to protect the communication and relationship against claims of competing
interests. Any inequity in terms of access to information is the price the system pays to
maintain the integrity of the privilege." Admiral Ins. Co. v. Us. Dist. Ct. of Ariz., 881
F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize an "unavailability exception" to the
attorney-client privilege) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 171 (3d ed. 1984».

B.

Dr. Verska May Waive His Own Rights, But May Not Waive the
Defendants' Peer Review Privilege

At pages 9 to 11 of Plaintiffs' Response, Plaintiffs argue for the first time that the
peer review privilege belongs to Dr. Verska, not Saint Alphonsus and the participants in
the peer review process. Again, this is simply incorrect. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the
proposition that the peer review privilege belongs exclusively to the physician and not the
health care organization.

To the contrary, Section 39-1392d of Idaho Code expressly

provides: "All peer review records of a health care organization shall be the property of

the health care organization concerned which obtains or compiles the same." (Emphasis
added.)
DEFENDANTS' REPLY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
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Both the Idaho Code and Saint Alphonsus's Bylaws provide specific circumstances
under which a health care organization may disclose otherwise confidential peer review
records. Portions of Title 39 of the Code discuss when a hospital may use or provide such
materials to others without waiving the peer review privilege, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§
39-1392d, 39-1392e(t) (when a physician makes a claim against the hospital); the
legislature also knew how to state what a hospital was required to disclose. See id. § 391392e(a) ("In the event of a claim or civil action against a physician ... any health care
organization having information of the kind covered by section 39-1392b, Idaho Code,

shall, when interrogated as hereinafter provided, advise any such claimant .... "; even
then disclosure is limited to certain facts, not peer review records) (emphasis added).
Similarly, Saint Alphonsus's Bylaws states that "[n]othing [in the Bylaws] will prevent
limited disclosure" of confidential information "[ w ]here the Medical Staff Member about
whom the information pertains consents .... " Article VII, Section 3. The disclosure and
use of peer review information is permissive in cases such as this, not mandatory.

C.

The "Other Cases" Cited by Plaintiffs Are Inapposite to the
Interpretation and Application of Idaho Law in This Case

In what is largely a rehash of their original arguments, Plaintiffs cast an even wider
net, seeking to find at least one decision that support their arguments concerning Idaho
Code § 39-1392b. To this end, Plaintiffs cite Hayes v. Mercy Health Corp., 739 A.2d 114
(Pa. 1999), and Cohlmia v. Ardent Health Services, LLC, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D.
Okla. 2006). Once again, Plaintiffs overreach in describing the cited decisions.

Dr. Verska fails to cite the full language of the Pennsylvania peer review statute at
issue in Hayes. That statute states that:
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The proceedings and records of a review committee shall be
held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or
introduction into evidence in any civil action against a
professional health care provider arising out of the matters
which are the subject of evaluation and review by such
committee ....
739 A.2d at 25 (quoting 63 P.S. § 425.4). The court found that this language meant that
peer review protection applied in civil actions in which a provider was being sued because
of events that were under review, but not challenges to the peer review process. Notably,
the court found that the language above reflected "words of limitation; 'had the legislature
intended the privilege to be absolute, it could have simply left these words out of the
statute.'" ld. at 26 (quoting Sanderson v. Frank S. Bfyan, AlD., Ltd., 522 A.2d 1138, 1142
(Pa. 1987». Of course, in Idaho, no such "words of limitation" or qualification appear:
Idaho's peer review protection applies "in any action of any kind in any court ... for any
purpose whatsoever." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1392b.
In reality, Hayes undercuts Plaintiffs' arguments.

The Cohfmia case cited by

Plaintiffs is nothing more than an application of the previously cited Shadur ruling that the
state privilege law does not apply to a case involving federal antitrust claims. Despite their
thorough search, Plaintiffs have failed to find a single authority that supports either their
argument that Section 39-1392b includes the implicit exception they seek to create, or the
contention that "public policy" invalidates Idaho's peer review privilege.

D.

A Protective Order Does Not Achieve the Protections Afforded by the
Peer Review Privilege

Near the end of their reply brief, Plaintiffs mention that the parties have agreed to a
protective order that provides for the sealing of certain confidential materials. Plaintiffs'
Reply at 14-15. The protective order is wholly unrelated to the peer review privilege, and
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sealing is not an alternative to the more substantial protections afforded by the privilege.
Indeed, before executing the stipulation requested by Plaintiffs, Defendants' counsel wrote
as follows:
Ray and Portia:
The protective order looks OK for general purposes. We would ask that you add the
following to the proposed order:
*
By stipulating to the terms of this protective order, Defendants are in no way
waiving the protections afforded by Section 39-1392b of the Idaho Code and other
law on peer review materials and testimony, rights and protections which are
expressly asserted by Defendants in this proceeding.

I don't want our willingness to enter into a protective order to be used to somehow argue
against peer review protection. If you are agreeable to that language, could you add it and
recirculate the proposed final of the order?

See Appendix A. The language demanded by Defendants is found at paragraph 18 of the
proposed order. Section 39-1392b provides that peer review records "shall not be directly
or indirectly subject to ... discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence ... for any
purpose whatsoever." That includes the purposes for which PlaintifTs seek to use them in
this matter, and they are properly stricken. See United States v. Asarco, Inc., 28 F. Supp.
2d 1170, 1172 (D. Idaho 1998) (granting motion to strike privileged correspondence
"inadvertently produced during discovery"), vacated on other grounds, 214 F .3d 1104 (9th
Cir.2000).

III.

CONCLUSION

Idaho's peer review privilege is found in a direct and plainly worded statute. The
purpose of the privilege is to promote the greater good - namely the health and well-being
of the citizens of Idaho.

The legislature concluded that this public good trumps the

financial interests of individual providers and, to a more limited extent, injured claimants.
The Defendants - Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman
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are entitled to a protective order implementing Section 39-1392b of the Idaho Code, and
request that such an order be entered forthwith.
DA TED this 1st day of February, 2010.

Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 151 day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REPLY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW RECORDS, by the method indicated below,

and addressed to each of the following:
Raymond D. Powers
Powers Tolman, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707

_

X
_

Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 577-5101
Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

Attorneysfor Plaintiffs

Robert B. White

DEFENDANTS' REPLY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW RECORDS - 9
770687

000151
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ORIGINAL
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FEB 0'5 2010

~~
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV OC 0911804

PROTECTIVE ORDER

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the parties' Stipulation for Entry of
Protective Order, and the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing
therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the terms of the
Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order entered into by the parties shall be, and hereby are,

APPROVED. The Court enters this Protective Order and adopts the terms of the Stipulation.
DATED this

~y of ~I'IJ.~, 2

ID.

District Judge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _'0_"_ day of Jomnaxy, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing PROTECTIVE ORDER, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:
Raymond D. Powers
Portia L. Rauer
POWERS TOLMAN
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Boise, ID 83706
Fax No.: 577-5101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Robert B. White
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise,ID 83701-2720
Fax: 388-1300
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Fax: (206) 757-7700
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

ST~ OFFIi..ED

IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

fEB 11 2010

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE) Case No.: CV OC 0911804
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
) ORDER RE: MOTION TO
) COMPEL/PROTECTIVE ORDER
)

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD FOX,
M.D.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

This action arises from the decision of St. Alphonsus Hospital to deny Dr. Verska
reappointment to its medical staff. The plaintiffs have moved to compel production of
information relating to St. Alphonsus' decision and have moved that the Court overrule the peer
review privilege and immunity objections the Hospital has asserted in response to the plaintiffs'
requests. The Hospital has objected to producing information protected by the peer review
privilege and has asserted immunity pursuant to I.C. § 39-1392c.
The plaintiff, Joseph Verska M.D., is an orthopedic spine surgeon who has practiced in
Idaho at The Spine Institute, a medical practice which he formed which provides surgical,
rehabilitation and radiographic services for spine related conditions. Dr. Verska had privileges
at St. Alphonsus from January 22, 1996 through July 1,2008. He filed this action against St.
Alphonsus and the individually named physician defendants on June 23, 2009. In his
Complaint, he alleges that he was subject to peer reviews by the Hospital beginning in 2004. He
states that he cooperated with the peer review processes. He asserts that the peer review
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processes, at least at the Ad Hoc Committee level, resulted in recommendations which were
favorable to him. He asserts that positive recommendations were overridden, that confidential
information was disclosed to third party, non-hospital personnel and to hospital personnel who
were not involved in the peer review process, that a direct competitor with a conflict of interest
served on one of the committees, and that his privileges were not renewed as of July 1, 2008 as a
result of an unfair and slanted process. Although he did receive a hearing after his privileges
were not renewed in which he did participate, and, although the fair hearing panel recommended
his reinstatement, the Board of Trustees and St. Alphonsus' administration overrode the positive
finding and continued to deny him privileges. He has asserted a number of causes of action-all
of which arise from the allegedly tainted peer review process with the exception of allegations
that Dr. Fox breached the confidentiality of the peer review process and disclosed information to
people who were not entitled to it.
In his discovery, he has requested information about the recommendations of the
credentials committee, the handling of peer review issues and confidentiality, the identification
and provision of all documents and information reviewed by the ad hoc committees, the
information presented to the Board of Trustees, the criteria for selecting the members of the peer
review committees. The defendants have moved for a protective order asserting that peer review
materials are not subject to discovery pursuant to I.C. § 39-1392(b). Dr. Verska contends that
neither I.e. § 39-1392b or I.C. § 39-1392c apply when the issue is discovery of information
related to credentialing and reappointment of a physician. While Dr. Verska cites the policy
behind the Idaho statutes and other statutory schemes in other states which permit discovery by
physicians who are challenging peer review proceedings which have led to negative
credentialing or reappointment decisions by hospitals, the plain language of the Idaho statutes is
broad and clear. Idaho law does not contain an exception for physicians seeking discovery to
challenge credentialing or reappointment. I.e. § 39-1392b provides:
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Records confidential and privileged.

Except as provided in section 39-1392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall be
confidential and privileged, and shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or
discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto be
admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court or before any administrative
body, agency or person for any purpose whatsoever. No order of censure, suspension or
revocation of licensure, or of a certification in the case of emergency medical services
personnel, or health care organization privilege of any physician licensed to practice medicine
in Idaho shall be admissible in any civil proceeding seeking damages or other civil relief
against the physician, emergency medical services personnel, or health care organization
which may be a defendant in said cause....

I.e. § 39-1392e also contains a limited exception to the privilege against disclosure if a claim has
been brought against a physician, hospital or other medical personnel concerning the health care
delivered to a specific patient when disclosure is requested by the patient or the patient's
representative. Immunity is also accorded to those who furnish information or provide opinions
to any health care organization. LC. § 39-1392c:
The furnishing of information or provision of opinions to any health care organization or the
receiving and use of such information and opinions shall not subject any health care organization
or other person to any liability or action for money damages or other legal or equitable relief.
Custodians of such records and persons becoming aware of such data and opinions shall not
disclose the same except as authorized by rules adopted by the board of medicine or as otherwise
authorized by law. Any health care organization may receive such disclosures, subject to an
obligation to preserve the confidential privileged character thereof and subject further to the
requirement that such requests shall be made and such use shall be limited to aid the health care
organization in conducting peer review.

In Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 214 P.3d 631 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court held that
in a malpractice action brought against physicians and a hospital, the hospital did not have
immunity from a cause of action for negligent credentialing.

The Court did not address a

hospital's liability for making a credentialingJreappointment decision when the action was
brought by the physician nor did it address the broader statutory exceptions from the privilege,
i.e., I.C. § 39-1392e. It simply held that LC. § 39-1392c did not grant immunity for credentialing
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decisions and that the trial judge went beyond the statutory language in holding that there was
such immunity.
The case before the Court seeks information created as part of the peer review process.
The "peer review process" is defined as "the collection, interpretation and analysis of data by a
health care organization" to improve health care delivery or improve the quality of patient care
and includes" credentialing, privileging or affiliating of health care providers as members of, or
providers for, a health care organization." I.e. § 39-1392a (l1)(a). "Peer review records" are
broadly defined as "all evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes,
investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating
to peer review of any health care organization" with the exclusion of patient care records except
when used as part of a peer review. I.e. § 39-1392a(12). I.e. § 39-1392b plainly exempts peer
review records from discovery. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in section 39-1392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall
be confidential and privileged, and shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena
or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto
be admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court or before any
administrative body, agency or person for any purpose whatsoever. ...

I.C. § 39-l392b. As noted previously, there is an exception for patient care records when
requested by a patient in this section as well as in I.C. § 39-1392e which also provides a limited
exception to the privilege and confidentiality requirements when a patient brings an action.
Statutory interpretation is a question oflaw. Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 216 P.3d
130 (2009) State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008). Statutory
interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute which must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning. Id.; State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 5l3, 164 P.3d 790, 793 (2007). Ifa
statute is unambiguous, then there is no resort to statutory construction and the statute's plain
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meaning is applied. Callies v. 0 'Neal, supra. 147 Idaho at 847. Unlike Harrison v. Binnion, this
Court is not extrapolating from the statute, the Court is relying on the express and plain language
of the statute.
I.e. § 39-1392b unambiguously protects all peer review records from discovery of any
type and bars any testimony about those peer review records. Credentialing and privileging
decisions are expressly defined as peer review activities. I.e. § 39-1392a(11). The statute is
plain and unambiguous and is to be given its plain meaning. There can be no discovery of the
peer review records nor can any witness be questioned about any information provided to the
peer review committees nor the interpretation nor analysis of any evidence submitted as part of
this process. The Court notes that the Complaint contains allegations that information was
provided to unrelated third parties, obviously, the plaintiff may enquire about information
provided outside of the peer review process.
The motion to compel is denied. The motion for protective order is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated this 11 th day of February, 20lO.

~tLA.W
Deborah A. Bail
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 11th of FEBRUARY, 2010, I mailed (served) a true
and correct copy of the within instrument to:

RAYMOND POWERS
PORTIA RAUER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 9756
BOISE ID 83707-9756
ROBERT WHITE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
POBOX 2720
BOISE ID 83701-2720
BRAD FISHER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1201 THIRD AVENUE SUITE 2200
SEATTLE WA 98101-3045

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

Deputy Court Clerk
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Raymond D. Powers
ISB #2737; rdp@powersrolman.com

Portia L. Rauer
ISB #7233; Qlr@powerstolman.com

POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Post Office Box 9756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 577-5100
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV OC 0911804
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,
Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and the SPINE INSTITUTE OF
IDAHO, by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and hereby
allege the following as and for claims against Defendants in the above-captioned litigation.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - I

)
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JURISDICTION & PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff Joseph M. Verska, M.D. CDr. Verska")

IS

an Idaho resident and

orthopedic spine surgeon, licensed and practicing in the State of Idaho.
2.

The Spine Institute of Idaho is a professional corporation conducting business in

the State of Idaho.
3.

Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") is a non-profit corporation

conducting business and providing medical services to the general public in the state of Idaho.
4.

Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing

medicine in the State of Idaho. Dr. Zimmerman is a neurosurgeon whose specialty includes the
practice of spine surgery.
5.

Donald Fox, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing medicine in the

State of Idaho. Dr. Fox's specialty is anesthesia.
6.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court under Idaho Code §S-404. The

amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of this Court.

FACTS
7.

Dr. Verska created The Spine Institute of Idaho in April, 2001.

The Spine

Institute of Idaho provides services to the general public that include surgical, rehabilitation and
radiographic services for spine related conditions.
8.

Dr. Verska applied for and was granted privileges at SARMC on January 22,

1996. Since that time and until July 1, 2008, Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed at SARMC
on a regular basis, without lapse. Every time Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed, he was
presented by SARMC with a new set of Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans ("MSPP").
Dr. Verska and SARMC and its agents agreed to act and deal with one another in a consistent
fashion by virtue of the Bylaws and MSPP. By virtue of their respective conduct and actions,
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SARMC and Dr. Verska entered into a fiduciary relationship pursuant to SARMC's MSPP and
Bylaws as a result of Dr. Verska being granted renewed privileges and continuously practicing
medicine at SARMC.
9.

The actions and conduct of SARMC and Dr. Verska established duties and

responsibilities between SARMC and Dr. Verska wherein both parties held reasonable
expectations that each would act in good faith in fulfilling their respective responsibilities set
forth in the SARMC MSPP and Bylaws.
10.

In January of 2004, SARMC initiated a review of Dr. Verska's practice.

11.

Commencing in 2004 and continuing thereafter, together SARMC, its agents,

employees and Board Members, Dr. Zimmerman and Dr. Fox conspired to damage Dr. Verska' s
professional reputation and his ability to practice spine surgery in Boise, Idaho. This effort
continues on the date of the filing of this complaint.
12.

In 2004, SARMC approached Dr. Verska and asked him to provide on-call trauma

spine services at SARMC. Dr. Verska agreed in an effort to assist SARMC manage the loss of
trauma spine neurosurgeons created by the Hospital's dispute with the Neurosurgical Group.
13.

In March of 2005, the SARMC Medical Executive Committee ("MEC")

appointed an Ad Hoc committee to conduct a peer review of certain aspects of Dr. Verska's
practice. Dr. Verska cooperated in the peer review process.
14.

In January of 2006, the Ad Hoc Committee presented its findings to the MEC and

made certain recommendations. Dr. Verska complied with the recommendations.
15.

In 2006, the Spine Medicine Institute ("SMI") was conceived and created by

SARMC. It was at the time and remains the vision of SMI at SARMC to be the destination spine
care program for the Northwest. SMI offers multidisciplinary management of back and neck
pain, including medical evaluation, diagnostic imaging, pain management, physical therapy,
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spine surgery, psychosocial care. SMI competes directly with the services offered by Dr. Verska
and the Spine Institute of Idaho.
16.

Dr. Christian Zimmerman is held out by SARMC as a spine surgeon affiliated

with SMI. Dr. Zimmerman is an employee of SARMC. The physicians affiliated with SMI are
direct competitors of Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho.
17.

Dr. Donald Fox was appointed Vice President and President Elect of the Medical

Staff in February of 2005.
18.

In April of 2006, the SARMC Quality Care Committee modified the Ad Hoc

Committee's earlier recommendation and the review of Dr. Verska' s practice continued.
19.

In January of 2007, the MEC voted to discontinue the ongoing peer review of

Dr. Verska. Nevertheless, the Board of Trustees of SARMC, without justification, directed the
MEC to continue its investigation of Dr. Verska.
20.

In October of 2007, the MEC, led by Dr. Fox as the President of the Medical

Staff, voted to commission another Ad Hoc Committee to conduct another peer review.
21.

In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the MEC and

consisting of Dr. Michael McMartin, Dr. Gertjan Mulder and Dr. Timothy Floyd, recommended
another review of Dr. Verska's practice at SARMC. Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon who was and is
a direct competitor of Dr. Verska's. Dr. Floyd was and is affiliated with SMI. Dr. McMartin is a
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC.
Dr. McMartin's practice competes with services offered by the Spine Institute of Idaho.
Dr. Mulder is a former president of the medical staff at SARMC.
22.

SARMC, its Board, Dr. Fox and the MEC knew that Dr. McMartin and Dr. Floyd

had a conflict of interest acting as members of the Ad Hoc Committee conducting the peer
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review of Dr. Verksa. Nevertheless, SARMC, through its agents, selected them to be members
of the Committee conducting the peer review of Dr. Verska' scare.
23.

In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee presented the MEC with its initial

recommendations, which were approved; Dr. Verska complied with the requests for information
from the Committee and cooperated in its review of his practice.
24.

On December 6, 2007, through a letter from Dr. Fox, Dr. Verska was notified of

the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation and the continuing peer review as directed by the
SARMC Board of Trustees. Members of the Ad Hoc Committee considered the process a peer
review with no punitive or adverse consequences to Dr. Verska.
25.

From January through June of 2008, Dr. Verska submitted additional materials to

the Ad Hoc Committee as it continued its peer review. During this same period of time, Dr. Fox
breached confidentiality and disclosed privileged, confidential peer review information regarding
the review to physicians outside of the peer review process, including Dr. Zimmerman.
26.

Dr. Fox breached confidentiality by disclosing confidential information to

individuals outside of the process in violation of the Bylaws of SARMC and in breach of the
responsibilities and duties attached to the position of President of the Medical Staff. This breach
of confidentiality damaged Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community.
27.

During the review process at SARMC, Dr. Zimmerman has disclosed confidential

infonnation relative to Dr. Verska's practice to members of the medical community, employees
and staff members at SARMC, SARMC administrators, including Dr. Robert Polk and former
CEO, Sandra Bruce, health care insurers, pharmaceutical representatives and the general public
in an effort to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation, undermine Dr. Verska's medical
practice and increase income generated by SMI.

These representations and actions were
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intended to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community and further the
interests of SMI.
28.

In June of 2008, the Ad Hoc Committee, consisting of Dr. Mulder, Dr. Floyd and

Dr. McMartin, made certain recommendations to the MEC.
29.

The recommendations set forth by the Ad Hoc Committee were intended by the

Committee to constitute collegial intervention and be non-punitive as provided under Chapter
VIII, Section 6 of the MSPP. Nowhere in the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation is there any
indication that they intended their recommendation be punitive resulting in Dr. Verska's
privileges not being renewed at SARMC.
30.

On June 25, 2008, Dr. Fox with the approval of the SARMC Board of Trustees

presented information to the MEC regarding the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations.
Dr. Fox knowingly misrepresented and intentionally omitted presenting relevant infonnation and
manipulated the recommendations and conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee in an effort to
exclude Dr. Verska from medical staff membership at SARMC. Dr. Fox was successful in this
effort and the MEC voted to ignore key recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee resulting in
Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed on July 1,2008.
31.

On July 1,2008, SARMC refused to renew Dr. Verska's privileges.

32.

On July 9, 2008, Dr. Verska requested a hearing before a Fair Hearing Panel

(,'FHP").
33.

Under the language of the MSPP, Dr. Verska was entitled to a formal hearing to

challenge an adverse action before his privileges could be adversely affected. SARMC failed to
comply with the MSPP and its own Bylaws in this regard in its decision to not renew
Dr. Verska's privileges on July 1, 2008, effectively removing Dr. Verska from the medical staff
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with no opportunity for Dr. Verska to have a hearing to review and challenge the basis for the
decision.
34.

The MSPP provided that a panel of three physicians be appointed to hear and take

evidence from both parties. Under Chapter XII, Section 17 Burden of Proof, Fair Hearing Plan,
the Hospital's MEC had the burden of initially presenting evidence in support of its
recommendation. The burden then shifted to the physician. The section goes on to state that
[T]he Hearing Panel will recommend against the Practitioner who
requested the hearing unless it finds that said Practitioner has
proved that the recommendation which prompted the hearing was
unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, or otherwise
unfounded.
35.

In 2008, Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC.

His

responsibilities as an employee of SARMC include recruitment of spine surgeons to SMI and
efforts to increase the volume of patients and income generated by SMI.
36.

In late September, 2008, SARMC adopted a position before the FHP regarding

Dr. Verska's competence and skill which misrepresented the conclusions and recommendations
reached by the Ad Hoc Committee in June 2008.
37.

In

September

of 2008,

SARMC

through

its

agents,

employees

and

representatives, disclosed confidential information to St. Luke's Regional Medical Center's
agents and officers regarding Dr. Verska's status at SARMC and the confidential process that
SARMC had engineered leading to Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed. The disclosure
violated the terms and conditions of the MSPP and Bylaws and misrepresented the facts and
circumstances regarding Dr. Verska's competence to practice and be a member of the medical
staff at SARMC.

The disclosure was intended to damage the professional reputation of

Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho.
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38.

Between October 28,2008 and October 30,2008, the FHP appointed by SARMC

heard evidence presented by SARMC and Dr. Verska on the issue of whether SARMC's
decision to now renew Dr. Verska's privileges was unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence,
or was otherwise unfounded. At the hearing both parties presented evidence, called witnesses,
cross-examined witnesses, and presented written closing statements to the panel members.
Dr. Verska presented evidence rebutting the position adopted and maintained by SARMC.
39.

In November of 2008, after considering the evidence and applying the burden of

proof outlined in the MSPP, the FHP found that SARMC's position that Dr. Verska was not
qualified to be on staff and the MEC decision to not renew Dr. Verska's privileges were not
supported by the evidence, and were unfair and unreasonable. The FHP recommended that
Dr. Verska have his privileges at SARMC reinstated immediately.
40.

Thereafter, Dr. Fox misrepresented the FHP's conclusions and recommendations

in a meeting with the MEC. On December 15, 2008, the MEC chose to ignore the FHP and
instead embraced the position first articulated in September, 2008 that Dr. Verska was not
competent and qualified to be on the SARMC medical staff.
41.

The MEC did not seek the assistance or benefit of a spine surgeon to assist it in

analyzing the recommendation of the FHP. Instead it relied upon advice, misrepresentations and
intentional omissions of information provided by Dr. Fox. Dr. Fox in presenting the issues to the
MEC mischaracterized the Fair Hearing process, the findings of the FHP, and the responsibilities
of SARMC and the MEC under the terms of the MSPP.
42.

Dr. Verska appealed the misinformed and arbitrary recommendation of the MEC.

The SARMC Board of Trustees, after hearing Dr. Verska's appeal, chose to ignore the FHP's
recommendation, the terms of the MSPP and affirmed the unsupportable, arbitrary MEC
directive that Dr. Verska was not qualified to be on its medical staff.
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43.

In July of 2009, Dr. Verska submitted his application for reappointment to

the medical staff at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center (St. Luke's). As part of their
credentialing process, St. Luke's requested that SARMC complete a "Confidential
Affiliation Questionnaire" relative to Dr. Verska.
44.

SARMC was aware that Dr. Verska had signed the required documents for

the confidential release of information and limited immunity at St. Luke's and at SARMC,
giving his consent, pursuant to Article VII, Sec. 3.A.2 and 3.B of SARMC's Bylaws, to the
exchange of information that St. Luke's had requested of SARMC.
45.

In a letter dated August 28, 2009, SARMC, through its legal counsel, notified

Dr. Verska's legal counsel that given Dr. Verska's pending lawsuit and the allegations set
forth therein, SARMC would not provide the information requested by St. Luke's.
SARMC would be willing to "assess what additional information it may provide while
maintaining peer review protection for the information," if Dr. Verska provided a "full
release to SARMC and the individuals involved in the credentialing and peer review
process." SARMC reiterated that if "Dr. Verska would like to pursue this further," he
would need to execute a "full, unqualified release."
46.

SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's with the information it requested

with regard to Dr. Verska has resulted in St. Luke's being unable to complete the process
of reviewing Dr. Verska's application for reappointment of privileges to its medical staff.
St. Luke's notified Dr. Verska through a letter to him dated October 28, 2009, that his
application remained incomplete and it was unable to process it.
47.

SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's with the information it requested

with regard to Dr. Verska has resulted in St. Luke's refusal to consider Dr. Verska's
application for reappointment on the ground that Dr. Verska's application was incomplete
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without the requested SARMC information.
SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's with the information it requested

48.

with regard to Dr. Verska was unwarranted and was intended to damage Dr. Verska's
professional reputation and interfere with his ability to practice medicine in the Boise
community.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil Conspiracy
49.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
50.

SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman, as well as with other unnamed co-

conspirators, who include physicians and hospital staff employed by or who are agents of
SARMC and SMI, conspired with malice and intent to injure Plaintiffs' professional practice and
reputation and;
(a)

engaged in a pattern of conduct pursuant to which they improperly
removed Dr. Verska from the SARMC medical staff in bad faith, thus
preventing Dr. Verska from pursuing his livelihood and practicing his
specialty in the hospital;

(b)

fabricated and exaggerated claims against Dr. Verska regarding quality of
care issues, his surgical skill and competence, used discriminatory criteria
in quality of care determinations, and acted in secrecy to further their
personal and corporate interests rather than those of the patients of
SARMC;

(c)

subverted the mandated SARMC peer review process and SARMC's
MSPP and Bylaws;

(d)

concealed the real anti-competitive motives for not renewing Dr.
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medical staff privileges;
(e)

caused Dr. Verska's privileges not to be renewed by SARMC by
improperly influencing and manipulating SARMC Medical Executive
Committee in bad faith; and

(f)

fabricated additional allegations against Dr. Verska during the pendency
of and following the appeal process from his denial of medical staff
privileges at SARMC in an attempt to further alter the record and give
credibility to their arbitrary actions.

51.

SARMC and other unnamed co-conspirators, who include physicians and

hospital staff employed by or who are agents of SARMC and SMI, conspired with malice
and intent to injure Plaintiffs' professional practice and reputation in the community by
refusing to provide information requested of it by St. Luke's with regard to Dr. Verska,
even though Dr. Verska had consented to such disclosure, resulting in St. Luke's denial of
Dr. Verska's application for reappointment due to it being incomplete.
52.

Such conduct has harmed and will continue to harm in the future, consumers of

orthopedic neck and back care in Southwestern Idaho.
53.

The actions taken by Defendants SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman were

intended to damage Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho, Dr. Verska's reputation and
career, as well as financially cripple his professional practice.
54.

As a direct and proximate result of the reckless, wrongful acts of Defendants,

Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
55.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth
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in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
56.

SARMC failed to comply with its own Bylaws and MSPP when it did not inform

Dr. Verska that his staff privileges were being reviewed under the Corrective Action plan of the
MSPP, thereby breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing with Dr. Verska.
57.

SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP and inappropriately manipulated the

MSPP for the purpose of depriving Dr. Verska of the ability to practice at SARMC.
58.

As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not

have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process.
59.

As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, SARMC unjustly and

without good cause refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges
and required him to fulfill a one year spine fellowship effectively removing him from the
medical community for a period of one to two years, before it would even consider granting him
staff privileges.
60.

Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing when it refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges only
five days before his privileges were to lapse with no right to a hearing or due process.
61.

Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing by failing to discharge its responsibilities as outlined in the MSPP and as required by the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).
62.

Defendant SARMC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by

failing to comply with its own Bylaws and MSPP when it refused to provide the
information requested of it by St. Luke's with regard to Dr. Verska, even though Dr.
Verska had consented to such disclosure.
63.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants SARMC's and Dr. Fox's actions,
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Plaintiffs have been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount
to be determined at trial.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent
Interference with Economic Advantage
64.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
65.

Dr. Verska has been a member of the Boise medical community for over fifteen

(15) years and has established a wide patient base throughout Southern Idaho and is affiliated
with a number of medical institutions in the community. Dr. Verska has invested substantial
sums of money to establish continuing treatment relationships with patients, members of the
medical community, colleagues, and institutions in the community.
66.

Defendants knew or should have known about the relationships established

between Dr. Verska, his patients, physicians, and other institutions in the medical community.
67.

SARMC's refusal to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of staff privileges

at SARMC was an intentional attempt to harm and undermine Dr. Verska's professional practice.
SARMC inappropriate refusal to renew Dr. Verska's privileges amounts to dishonest, reckless,
improper, and unfair acts to affirmatively damage Dr. Verska's reputation.

68.

SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's Regional Medical Center with the

information it requested of SARMC with regard to Dr. Verska was an intentional attempt
to harm and undermine Dr. Verska's professional practice.

SARMC's inappropriate

refusal to provide the information to St. Luke's amounts to bad faith and reckless conduct
intended to affirmatively damage Dr. Verska's reputation.
69.

The reckless interference by Defendants with Dr. Verska's reputation and

business will permanently damage the business relationships between Dr. Verska, his patients
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and those medical institutions in the community that he is affiliated with.
70.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' reckless actions, Plaintiffs have

been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount to be
determined at trial.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Interference with Prospective
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations
71.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
72.

Dr. Verska has continuing professional and business relationships with other

physicians and medical institutions who permit Dr. Verska to practice at their facilities.
73.

Defendants knew of these relationships between Dr. Verska and these institutions

and acted recklessly in their actions.
74.

Defendants intentionally and wrongfully interfered with these relationships and

business expectations by their bad faith actions outlined herein, including SARMC's refusal to

provide information to St. Luke's regarding Dr. Verska, and as a direct and proximate result,
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se
75.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
76.
fabricating

Defendants have maliciously, willfully and intentionally defamed Plaintiffs by
instances

of misconduct,

exaggerating and misrepresenting Dr.

Verska's

qualifications and abilities, and reporting such false and defamatory statements to members of
the Medical Staff at SARMC, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, members of the medical
community, health care insurers and state and federal regulatory authorities, including but not
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limited to, the Idaho State Board of Medicine and the Idaho State Board of Pharmacy, all in
furtherance of its attempt to damage Dr. Verska's reputation and exclude Dr. Verska from
competing in orthopedic spine care with SARMC, SMI, and Dr. Zimmerman.
77.

Defendants, by improperly refusing to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal

of staff privileges, and other defamatory conduct and statements set forth herein, knew that
Dr. Verska would be compelled to disclose the outcome and recommendations of the SARMC
committees in connection with applications for hospital medical staff privileges of other
institutions in Southern Idaho where he held privileges or could have applied for privileges,
malpractice insurance, membership in professional organizations, credentialing with health
insurers and related purposes.
78.

Dr. Verska, in fact, has been compelled to disclose the outcome of the SARMC

committee actions to malpractice insurers, licensing boards, state and federal regulatory
agencies, health insurers and other healthcare institutions, and will be compelled to make further
disclosures of this type for the remainder of his professional career.
79.

Defendants' reckless conduct and actions were performed with malice, ill will,

personal spite, with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity, and for the purpose of injuring Dr. Verska's professional reputation, the reputation of the
Spine Institute of Idaho and preventing competition from Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of
Idaho.
80.

By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have uttered and published false and

defamatory statements about Dr. Verska in writing and, upon infonnation and belief, orally, with
respect to Dr. Verska's conduct, skill level, competence, employment, career, and qualifications
to practice medicine, and have compelled Dr. Verska to repeat Defendants' defamation to others
in connection with his professional career, with the intent of steering business away from
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Dr. Verska and to SARMC and SMI thereby limiting competition.
81.

Such statements constitute defamation per se, libel per se and/or slander per se.

82.

Plaintiffs have had their business reputation damaged. Plaintiffs have been and

will continue to be damaged financially as a result of such defamatory statements, causing
damage in an amount to be proven at trial.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights

83.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
84.

SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP when it allowed a peer review process

to result in a denial of privileges without a hearing and due process.
85.

As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not

have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process, which is a denial of
his common law right to a fair procedure.
86.

The decision by SARMC to refuse to grant Dr. Verska' s application to renew his

staff privileges without a hearing was without justification and not supported by any reasonable
ground and constitutes a violation Dr. Verska's common law right to a fair procedure and due
process.
87.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have been

damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages
in an amount to be determined at trial.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Fiduciary Duties

88.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
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89.

Dr. Verska trusted in and relied upon Defendant SARMC to follow the MSPP and

assure that proper policies and procedures were implemented, established, and adhered to both
by SARMC and those appointed by SARMC to serve on committees and in position of authority.
This relationship of trust and confidence between Dr. Verska and SARMC established fiduciary
duties on behalf of SARMC to act in good faith and with due regard to Dr. Verska's interests.
90.

SARMC breached said fiduciary duties by, inter alia, inducing Dr. Zimmerman,

Dr. Fox and other unnamed parties, to conspire to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation
and wrongfully deny Dr. Verska's application for renewal of privileges. Defendants' conduct
was reckless in this regard.
91.

SARMC breached said fiduciary duties by, inter alia, refusing to provide the

information requested of it by St. Luke's with regard to Dr. Verska, even though Dr.
Verska had consented to such disclosure.
92.

As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs have been damaged and

will continue to be damaged in an amount to be proved at trial.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Due Process Rights
93.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
94.

SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights when they chose to ignore the

findings and recommendation of the three neutral, objective panel members comprising the FHP
and continued to rely on the unjustified, arbitrary decision of the MEC made in June of 2008.
95.

The FHP found that Dr. Verska had met his burden of proof as set forth in the

Bylaws and determined that the decision by the MEC was unfair. The FHP's recommendation
was based on substantial evidence and testimony by both parties. The FHP's recommendation to
reinstate Dr. Verska's privileges immediately was reasonable in light of the evidence presented.
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By ignoring the FHP recommendation, SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights.
96.

The decision by the MEC and SARMC to repeatedly ignore the recommendations

of internal committees and the FHP is patently unfair to Dr. Verska and violates his due process
rights.
97.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant SARMC's reckless actions,

Plaintiffs have been damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be
compensated for those damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

98.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
99.

Defendants intentionally, willingly and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress

upon Dr. Verska by acting in bad faith and unjustly refusing to renew Dr. Verska's privileges at
SARMC.
100.

As a result of Defendants' reckless, extreme and outrageous conduct, Dr. Verska

has suffered, and continues to suffer, severe emotional distress, including physical manifestations
of that distress.
101.

Defendants' acts and/or omissions were intentional, reckless, willful, malicious,

and/or grossly negligent.
102.

As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts of SARMC, Plaintiffs have

been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Injunctive Relief

103.

Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth

in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege:
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104.
medicine.

Dr. Verska has a right to earn a living and has done so through the practice of
He has been, and continues to be, greatly harmed due to his exclusion from the

medical staff of SARMC.
105.

Based upon the improper refusal of SARMC to renew Dr. Verska's privileges, Dr.

Verska seeks injunctive relief restoring his privileges and his ability to earn a living, to which he
is entitled, pending the final outcome of the present action.
106.

Based upon the improper refusal of SARMC to provide information

requested of it by St. Luke's, Dr. Verska seeks injunctive relief requiring SARMC to
provide the information to St. Luke's in order for St. Luke's to complete the credentialing
process with regard to Dr. Verska's application for reappointment to St. Luke's medical
staff.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Plaintiffs have been required to retain counsel to pursue this matter.

Plaintiffs have

retained the law firm of POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and have agreed to pay said attorneys a
reasonable fee. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred
in the prosecution of this matter pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and
Idaho Code §12-121, or other applicable law.

PRAYER
Plaintiffs' claims for damages exceed the jurisdiction amount of this Court and include,
but are not limited to loss of income due to Dr. Verska's inability to perform surgery at SARMC,
damage to his reputation, interference with his past and present business and professional
relations.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the above-named Defendants
as follows:
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1.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages

III

an

amount to be proven at trial;
2.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
3.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
4.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
5.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages

III

an

amount to be proven at trial;
6.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Sixth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
7.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
8.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Eighth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial;
9.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Ninth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial; and
10.

Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Tenth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an

amount to be proven at trial.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint to include a cause of action for
punitive damages, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604.

000179
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 20

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury as to all issues so triable pursuant to Rule 38(b)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and will not stipulate to a jury of less than 12 jurors.
DATED this

3

day of March, 2010.

POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC

By

Raymond D. Powers - Of the Firm
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
That he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled action and that he has read the foregoing
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the cont s there and believes the same to be true.

Joseph M. Verska, M.D.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~ day of March, 2010.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
~aYl
Commission expires
0'1/2...11/7..613

000181
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, by
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Robert B. White
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise,ID 83701-2720
Fax: 388-1300
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Fax: (206) 757-7700
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

L/

Raymond D. Powers
Portia L. Rauer
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NO

___

AM:'~~~- --lF~ILp~E.~-.1j.+-J;~:n

10
J.
Robert B. White (ISB #4438)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
rbw@givenspursley.com
Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
DA VIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, W A 98101-3045
Telephone: 206-757-8063
Facsimile: 206-757-7063
Attomeys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
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JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE SPINE
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
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PERMISSIVE APPEAL

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN,
M.D.; and DONALD FOX, M.D.,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In its Order re Motion to Compel/Protective Order dated February 11, 2010 (the
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"Order"), the Court ruled that Idaho's peer review privilege is to be applied as wTitten, and
that the statute precludes the discovery or use of peer review materials "in any action of
any kind in any court ... for any purpose whatsoever." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1392b.
Plaintiffs now move the Court for an order granting them leave to bring a permissive
appeal of this ruling to the Idaho Supreme Court under Idaho Appellate Rule 12.
Plaintiffs overstate the significance of the ruling given the limited scope of judicial
review that is provided by Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 87 P.3d 934
(Idaho 2004), but regardless, the Court's ruling is sound, and does not present either "a
controlling question of law" or one "as to which there are substantial grounds for
difference of opinion." The issue is not appropriately appealed in the middle of this case,
and defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Dr. Donald Fox and Dr.
Christian Zimmerman respectfully request that the Court deny the motion so that the case
can proceed expeditiously to a resolution under the existing case schedule.

II.

OPPOSITION ARGUMENT

The fundamental failing in plaintiffs' motion is that application of the peer review
privilege to the discovery sought in this case is simply not an issue on which there are
substantial grounds for difference of opinion. Whatever the import of the ruling (which,
unlike commonplace rulings on issues such as statutes of limitations, does /lot preclude
plaintifJs from bringing their c1aimsl), the meaning of the peer review privilege statute is
not fairly debatable. As stated by the Court, "I.C. § 39-1392b unambiguously protects all

1 As such, defendants submit that the Court's ruling does not present a "controlling issue of
law," which is an independent basis for denying plaintiffs' motion. See United States v.
Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959) (denying application for interlocutory review of
ruling on privilege).
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peer review records from discovery of any type and bars any testimony about those peer
review records." Order at 5.
The peer review privilege has been applied regularly in all sorts of different
proceedings, including numerous District Court cases. In the rare instances in which the
Idaho appellate courts have had occasion to comment on the privilege, they have affirmed
that it precludes the discovery or use of peer review materials. As stated in Murphy v.
Wood:

In viewing the act as a whole, including this statement of
purpose, we believe that the legislature intended to establish
a broad privilege for the records and proceedings of hospital
medical staff committees. The privilege extends to all
discussions and proceedings by hospital staff committees,
conducted for the purpose of research, discipline or medical
study. Such confidentiality is in the public interest because it
encourages a free exchange of medical information that will
ultimately benefit the public in the form of improved medical
care. We conclude that the Idaho statute was intended to
provide broader protections of confidentiality, privilege and
immunities than are afforded by mere peer review statutes.
667 P.2d 859, 863 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). Even Harrison v. Binnion, 214 P.3d 631, 635
(Idaho 2009), the case plaintiffs cite as somehow impliedly rejecting the privilege,
recognizes that "[t]he obvious purpose of the statute is to encourage the free exchange of
information and opinions regarding peer review activities, which includes credentialing"
by protecting the participants.
The fact that there is no appellate decision expressly rejecting plaintiffs' arguments
does not mean they are somehow meritorious; rather, the absence of reported case law in
the 37 years since the peer review privilege was first codified instead reflects that the
language used by the legislature is so direct that the issue is never litigated. And, in any
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event, it is axiomatic that "just because a court is the first to rule on a particular question
... does not mean that there is such a substantial difference of opinion as will support an
interlocutory appeal." 4 AM. JUR. 2D, Appellate Review § 123 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
At this juncture, a permissive appeal will do nothing more than delay this matter for
many months, if not longer. The issue under Miller is whether Dr. Verska received due
process, not whether the decision concerning Dr. Verska's privileges was subjectively
"correct." If, as plaintiffs suggest, "it will be impossible for Dr. Verska to prove his claims
against the Defendants" without the barred discovery, Motion at 5, then they are claims
that should not have been filed in the first place.

The defendants - who have been

vvTongfully accused of all sorts of wrongdoing - are anxious to clear their names and bring
this matter to a conclusion, and do not want further delay.

III.

CONCLUSION

Idaho's peer review privilege is found in a direct and unambiguous statute. The
application of such a statute does not present a suitable case for a permissive appeal under
I.A.R. 12. As stated in Budell v. Todd, 665 P.2d 701,703 (1983), "[T]he Court intends by
Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not intend by the rule to
broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under LA.R. 11. For these
reasons, the Court has, over the six year experience of the use of Rule 12, accepted only a
limited number of the applications for appeal by certification."

This is not such an

exceptional case, and defendants request that the case proceed on the merits.
II
II
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DATED this 10th day of March, 2010.

Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the

following:
Raymond D. Powers
Powers Tolman, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste # 150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707
Attorneys for Plaintifls

_ Hand Delivery
~ Facsimile (208) 577-5101
_ Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

Robert B. White
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1
Robert B. White (lSB #4438)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
rbw@givenspursley.com
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Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
DA VIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Telephone: 206-757-8063
Facsimile: 206-757-7063
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
v.

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX, M.D.,
Defendants.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 0911804
DEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S
AND DONALD FOX, M.D.'S ANSWER
TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

-----------------------------)
COMES NOW Defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and Donald Fox,
M.D. ("Defendants"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis
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Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial ("Amended Complaint") on file herein, admit, deny, and allege as follows:

JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants are

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
2.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants are

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
3. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint.
4. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint.
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint.
6.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint, although

Defendants believe the claims asserted against them are brought without basis in law or fact, they
do not challenge venue or jurisdiction.

FACTS
7.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 ofthe Amended Complaint, Defendants are

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
8.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants

admit that Dr. Verska was granted certain privileges at SARMC on or about January 22, 1996,
that he had certain privileges after that time until July 1, 2008, and that his privileges were
governed by certain Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans.

Defendants deny that

SARMC and Dr. Verska had a fiduciary relationship. Except as expressly admitted or denied,
DEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S AND DONALD FOX, M.D.'S
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Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or
falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore
deny them.
9. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint.
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint.
11. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint.
12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that SARMC asked Dr. Verska to provide certain on-call trauma services. Except as
expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint,
and therefore deny them.
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that in 2005, the Medical Executive Committee (the "MEC") appointed a committee to
review certain aspects of Dr. Verska's practice. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
remaining allegations in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them.
14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that in January 2006, the committee reported certain findings to the MEC and made certain
recommendations.

Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in
paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them.
15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that the SARMC offers mUltidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies
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that the SARMC or SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as
expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended
Complaint, and therefore deny them
16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that Dr. Zimmerman is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other
things, as a spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other
allegations in paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that Dr. Fox was elected as President Elect of the MEC in February 2005, and denies the
remaining allegations.
18. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Amended Complaint.
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that the MEC voted to discontinue the review of Dr. Verska's practice and that the
SARMC Board of Trustees elected to continue the investigation. Except as expressly admitted,
Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint.
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that MEC elected to commission a committee to review certain aspects of Dr. Verska's
practice.

Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information

sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 20 of
the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them.
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
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admit that a committee comprised of Dr. McMartin, Dr. Floyd and Dr. Mulder made certain
recommendations, that Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon, that Dr. Floyd has been a participant in
meetings and other activities of the Spine Medicine Institute, that Dr. McMartin is a
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC, and that
Dr. Mulder is a former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC. Except as expressly admitted,
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint.
22. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Complaint.
23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that the committee presented initial recommendations to the MEC. Except as expressly
admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint,
and therefore deny them.
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that Dr. Verska received a letter from Dr. Fox on or about December 6, 2007. Except as
expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint,
and therefore deny them.
25. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint.
26. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint.
27. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint.
28. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Amended Complaint.
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
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allegations, and therefore deny them.
30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that Dr. Fox met with the MEC on or about June 25, 2008, and deny the remaining
allegations.
31. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint.
32. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Amended Complaint.
33. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Amended Complaint.
34. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Amended Complaint.
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC in 2008, and deny the
remaining allegations therein.
36. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 36 of the Amended Complaint.
37. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Amended Complaint.
38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that a hearing took place between October 28 and 30, 2008, and denies that Dr. Verska
presented evidence rebutting SARMC's position.

Except as expressly admitted or denied,

Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or
falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore
deny them ..
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that the panel made recommendations that differed from those of SARMC, and deny the
remaining allegations.
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
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admit that the MEC disagreed with the recommendations of the panel, and deny the remaining
allegations.
41. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Amended Complaint.
42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that Dr. Verska appealed to the Board of Trustees and that the appeal was rejected. Expect
as admitted, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 42 of the Amended
Complaint.
43. Answering the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
44. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Amended Complaint.
45. Answering the allegation in paragraph 45 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
admit that Saint Alphonsus's counsel sent a letter on August 28, 2009, and aver that the
document speaks for itself.

Except as admitted, Defendants deny the remaining allegations

contained in paragraph 45 of the Amended Complaint.
46. Answering the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
47. Answering the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
48. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Amended Complaint.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil Conspiracy
49. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 48 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
50. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Amended Complaint, and
each of its subparagraphs (a)-(t).
51. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Amended Complaint.
52. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Amended Complaint.
53. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Amended Complaint.
54. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Amended Complaint.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
55. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 54 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
56. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Amended Complaint.
57. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Amended Complaint.
58. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Amended Complaint.
59. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Amended Complaint.
60. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 60 ofthe Amended Complaint.
61. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Amended Complaint.
62. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Amended Complaint.
63. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Amended Complaint.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent
Interference with Economic Advantage
64. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 63 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
65. Answering the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
66. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Amended Complaint.
67. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Amended Complaint.
68. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Amended Complaint.
69. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Amended Complaint.
70. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Amended Complaint.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Interference with Prospective
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations
71. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 70 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
72. Answering the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants
are without knowledge or infomlation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
73. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Amended Complaint.
74. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 74 of the Amended Complaint.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se
75. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 74 of the Amended
DEFEN DANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S AND DONALD FOX, M.\lr':\
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Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
76. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Amended Complaint.
77. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Amended Complaint.
78. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Amended Complaint.
79. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 79 of the Amended Complaint.
80. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Amended Complaint.
81. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Amended Complaint.
82. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Amended Complaint.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights
83. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
84. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Amended Complaint.
85. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Amended Complaint.
86. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Amended Complaint.
87. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Amended Complaint.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Fiduciary Duties
88. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
89. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Amended Complaint.
90. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Amended Complaint.
91. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Amended Complaint.
92. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Amended Complaint.
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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Due Process Rights
93. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 92 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
94. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Amended Complaint.
95. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Amended Complaint.
96. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 96 of the Amended Complaint.
97. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 97 of the Amended Complaint.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
98. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 97 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
99. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 99 ofthe Amended Complaint.
100.

Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 100 of the Amended Complaint.

101 .

Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 101 of the Amended Complaint.

102.

Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 102 of the Amended Complaint.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Injunctive Relief
103.

Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 102 of the

Amended Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
104.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 104 of the Amended Complaint,

Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or
falsity of the allegations, and therefore denies them.
105.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 105 of the Amended Complaint,

Defendants deny the Dr. Verska is entitled to the requested relief, and deny any other allegations
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contained therein.
106.

Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 106

of the Amended Complaint
107.

Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 19-21 of the Amended

Complaint, Defendants deny that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested.
108.

Any allegations in the Amended Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise

addressed above are hereby denied.
109.

Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendants

reserve the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims:

DEFENSES
110.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against

Defendants, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants.
111.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against

Defendants, was made without good cause, and without any basis in law or fact.
112.

Defendants are immune from the claims asserted by plaintiff under federal and

state law. Specifically, and without limitation, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986, 42 U.S.C. §11101, et. seq., and Idaho Code §§ 39-1392c, provide Defendants with
immunity from the claims asserted by plaintiff in this action.
113.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or

negligence.
114.

Defendants are not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs.

115.

Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were privileged.

116.

Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were true.

117.

Defendants' conduct is privileged under both state and federal law.

DEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER'S AND DONALD FOX, M.D.'S
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 12

000199

817293

118.

Plaintiffs have unclean hands.

119.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the

superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities.
120.

Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction

of other persons or entities over whom Defendants have no control and no responsibility. To the
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintiffs' recovery, if any, must be proportionately
reduced and/or barred.
121.

Defendants reserve the right to assert additional defenses based upon further

investigation and discovery.

PRAYER
Wherefore, Defendants pray for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows:
1. For judgment in their favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint;
2. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law,
including Idaho Code § 12-121; and
3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendants hereby demand a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b).
DATED this 16th day of March, 2010.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
_ Hand Delivery
-.2(Facsimile (208) 577-5101
_ Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

Raymond D. Powers
Powers Tolman, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707
A ttorneys for P laintifJs

a.
Robert B. White
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Robert B. White (ISB #4438)
G IVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
rbw@givenspursley.com
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Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Telephone: 206-757-8063
Facsimile: 206-757-7063
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,

v.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX, M.D.,
Defendants.
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No. CV OC 0911804
DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D. 'S ANSWER TO
AMENDED COMPLAINT

---------------------------)
COMES NOW Defendant Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. ("Defendant"), by and through
his attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Amended Complaint") on file
herein, admits, denies, and alleges as follows:

J
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
I.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
2.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
3. Answering the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
4. Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint.
5. Answering the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
6.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint, although

Defendant believes the claims asserted against him are frivolous and are brought without basis in
law or fact, he does not challenge venue or jurisdiction.

FACTS
7.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
8.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
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9.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
10. Answering the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
11. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint.

12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or infom1ation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is

without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.

14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.

15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant
admits that SARMC offers multidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies that
SARMC or SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as expressly
admitted or denied, Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and therefore
denies them
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16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant
admits that he is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other things, as a spine
surgeon.

Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendant is without knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in
paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore denies them
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
18. Answering the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or infonnation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant
admits that Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted, Defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other
allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore denies them.
22. Answering the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
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allegations, and therefore denies them.
23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
25. Answering the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of Dr.
Verska's peer review process in January through June of 2008 and therefore denies them.
Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint.
26. Answering the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
27. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint.
28. Answering the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
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allegations, and therefore denies them.
31. Answering the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
32. Answering the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
33. Answering the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
34. Answering the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant
admits that he was offered employment by SARMC, and denies the remaining allegations
therein.
36. Answering the allegations in paragraph 36 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them ..
37. Answering the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant
denies the allegations to the extent they are directed to him, and is otherwise without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, and therefore
denies them.
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38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
41. Answering the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
43. Answering the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
44. Answering the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
45. Answering theallegations in paragraph 45 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
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allegations, and therefore denies them.
46. Answering the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
47. Answering the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
48. Answering the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Civil Conspiracy
49. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 48 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
50. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Amended Complaint, and
each of its subparagraphs (a)-(t).
51. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Amended Complaint.
52. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Amended Complaint.
53. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Amended Complaint.
54. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Amended Complaint.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
55. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 54 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
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56. Answering the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
57. Answering the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
58. Answering the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
59. Answering the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
60. Answering the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
61. Answering the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
62. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Amended Complaint.
63. Answering the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent
Interference with Economic Advantage
64. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 63 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
65. Answering the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Amended Complaint, Detendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
66. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Amended Complaint.
67. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Amended Complaint.
68. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Amended Complaint.
69. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Amended Complaint.
70. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Amended Complaint.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Interference with Prospective
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations
71. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 70 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
72. Answering the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore deny them.
73. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Amended Complaint.
74. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 74 of the Amended Complaint.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se
75. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 74 of the Amended
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Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
76. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Amended Complaint.
77. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Amended Complaint.
78. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Amended Complaint.
79. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 79 of the Amended Complaint.
80. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Amended Complaint.
81. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Amended Complaint.
82. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Amended Complaint.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights
83. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
84. Answering the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
85. Answering the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
86. Answering the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
87. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Amended Complaint.
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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Fiduciary Duties
88. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
89. Answering the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
90. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Amended Complaint.
9 I. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Amended Complaint.
92. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Amended Complaint.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Violation of Due Process Rights
93. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs

through 92 of the Amended

Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
94. Answering the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
95. Answering the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
96. Answering the allegations in paragraph 96 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.
97. Answering the allegations in paragraph 97 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is
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without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the
allegations, and therefore denies them.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
98. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 97 of the Amended
Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
99. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 99 of the Amended Complaint.
100.

Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 100 of the Amended Complaint.

101.

Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 10 1 of the Amended Com plaint.

102.

Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 102 of the Amended Complaint.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Injunctive Relief
103.

Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 102 of the Amended

Complaint as if set forth fully herein.
104.

Answering the allegations

III

paragraph 104 of the Amended Complaint,

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or
falsity of the allegations, and therefore denies them.
105.

Answering the allegations in paragraph 105 of the Amended Complaint,

Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or
falsity of the allegations, and therefore denies them.
106.

Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 106

of the Amended Complaint.
107.

Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 19-21 of the Amended

Complaint, Defendants denies that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested.
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108.

Any allegations in the Amended Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise

addressed above are hereby denied.
109.

Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendant

reserves the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims:

DEFENSES
110.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against

Defendant, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant.
III.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against

Defendant, was made without good cause, without any basis in law or fact, frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation.
112.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or

negligence.
113.

Defendant is not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs.

114.

Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, if any, were privileged.

115.

Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, ifany, were true.

116.

Defendant's conduct is privileged under both state and federal law.

117.

Defendant is immune from the claims asserted by plaintiffs under federal and

state law. Specifically, and without limitation, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986,42 U.S.C. §11101, el seq., and Idaho Code § 39-1392c, provide Defendant with immunity
from the claims asserted by plaintiffs in this action.
118.

Plaintiffs have unclean hands.

119.

Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the

superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities.
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120.

Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction

of other persons or entities over whom Defendant has no control and no responsibility. To the
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintiffs' recovery, if any, must be proportionately
reduced and/or barred.
121.

Defendant reserves the right to assert additional defenses based upon further

investigation and discovery.

PRAYER
Wherefore, Defendant prays for jUdgment against Plaintiffs as follows:

1. For judgment in his favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint;
2. For a finding that the claims against Defendant were brought frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation;
3. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law,
including Idaho Code § 12-121 and other law; and
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Defendant hereby demands a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b).
DATED this 16th day of March, 2010.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

/I.
Robert B. White
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 16 th day of March. 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Raymond D. Powers
Powers Tolman, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste # 150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707
Attorneysjor Plaintiffs

_

Hand Delivery

_

Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

:i- Facsimile (208) 577-5101

(2. ~J
Robert B. White
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. CV OC 0911804
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE
APPEAL

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,
Defendants.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court for hearing on the 17th day of March,

2010, upon the Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal, and after considering the memoranda
filed by the parties, having heard oral argument and the Court being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal, pursuant to

Rule 12, LA.R., is granted, allowing Plaintiffs to pursue interlocutory appeal of this Court's
February 11, 2010 decision, which denied Plaintiffs' "Motion to Compel Production of
Information Relevant to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Wrongful Denial of Dr.
Verska's Reappointment."
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'23:C.L
ORDERED this __ day of March, 2010.

BY__~L-~_ _ _ _ _ _~~~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____
DEBORAH A. BAIL
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.2Jih'l

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE
APPEAL, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Raymond D. Powers
Portia L. Rauer
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Boise, ID 83706
Fax No.: 577-5101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Robert B. White
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise,ID 83701-2720
Fax: 388-1300
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Fax: (206) 757-7700
Attorneys for Defendants

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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ORIGIN
Raymond D. Powers
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstolman.com

Portia L. Rauer
ISB #7233; plr@powerstolman.com

POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150
Post Office Box 9756
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 577-5100
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101
W;\17\17-002\Notice of Appeal.doex

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vs.

Case No. CV OC 0911804
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Category:
L
Fees: $101.00

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,
DefendantslRes pondents.
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS SAINT ALPHONSUS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D., AND
DONALD FOX, M.D., THEIR ATTORNEYS, ROBERT B. WHITE OF GIVENS
PURSLEY, LLP, 601 W. BANNOCK STREET, BOISE, ID 83702, ROBERT G.
HOMCHICK AND BRAD FISHER OF DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP, 1201
THIRD AVENUE, SUITE 2200, SEATTLE, WA 98101-3045, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Rule 17, of the Idaho Appellate Rules, that:
1.

The above-named appellants, JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE

INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme
Court from the:
a.

Order Re: Motion to CompellProtective Order entered February 11,2010,

by the Honorable Deborah A. Bail.
2.

The appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to

Rule 12(a), I.A.R., and as set forth in the Idaho Supreme Court's Order Granting Motion for
Permissive Appeal, entered on May 17,2010.
3.

The following is a preliminary statement of the issues which appellants intend to

assert on appeal. This list of issues shall not prevent the appellants from asserting other issues on
appeal:
a.

Whether Idaho Code § 39-1392b can be expanded beyond its wording to

prevent a physician from discovering information, pursuant to Rules 30, 33, 34, and 36, Idaho R.
Civ. P, related to a healthcare organization's credentialinglprivileging decision to deny the
physician reappointment to its medical staff, when it is the physician who is seeking the
information to challenge the organization's decision.
b.

Whether Idaho Code § 39-1392c can be expanded beyond its wording to grant a

healthcare organization immunity from liability for a credentialinglprivileging decision denying
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a physician reappointment to its medical staff, when it is the physician who is challenging the
organization's decision.
4.

A protective order was ~ entered on February 5, 2010, to protect sensitive

information designated as confidential by the party seeking the protection.
5.

Appellants request that the reporter prepare a partial transcript, pursuant to Rule

2S(b), I.AR., to include only the hearing on appellants' Motion to Compel Production of
Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment held on
February 3, 2010.
6.

Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28(b)(l), I.AR.:
a.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Information Related to

SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment filed December 28,2009;
b.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of

Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment filed
December 28,2009;
c.

Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to

Compel Production of Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's
Reappointment, filed February 9, 2010;
d.

Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of

Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska' s Reappointment, filed
December 28, 2009;
e.

Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Response to

Defendants' Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking
Privileged Peer Review Records, filed January 27,2010.
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f.

Protective Order with a copy of the Stipulation for Entry of Protective

Order attached, filed February 5, 2010; and
g.

Order Re:

Motion to CompeVProtective Order, entered February 11,

2010.
7.

The undersigned hereby certifies:
a.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter;

b.

That appellants have paid the estimated fee of $97.50 to Susan Gambee,

Court Reporter, for preparation of the reporter's transcript;
c.

That the estimated fee for the clerk's record is $100.00 and has been paid

in addition to the filing fee of $101.00 to Ada County Clerk of the Court; and
d.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this

day of June, 2010.
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC

,.

i

I(

Raymond D. Powers - Of the Firm
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

000223
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

'
ii

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEA ,by the method indicated below, and addressed to
each of the following:
Robert B. White
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Fax: 388-1300
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Fax: (206) 757-7700
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy
Electronic Mail

Raymond D. Powers
Portia L. Rauer
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Robert B. White (lSB #4438)
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
PO Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
rbw@givenspursley.com
Robert G. Homchick
Brad Fisher
DA VIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-3045
Telephone: 206-757-8063
Facsimile: 206-757-7063
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE SPINE
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs,
v.

SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN,
M.D.; and DONALD FOX, M.D.,

No. CV OC 0911804

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO
BE INCLUDED IN THE
CLERK'S RECORD ON
APPEAL AND/OR
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

Defendants.

TO:
THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, RAYMOND D. POWERS, COURT REPORTER SUSAN
GAMBEE AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Defendants/Respondents, in the above entitled
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO BE INCLUDED IN TI;IJ!<..
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND/OR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 1
,.., U
893950
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proceeding hereby request, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion
of the following material in the Clerk's Record in addition to that required to be included
by the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal:
A.

Clerk's Record:
1.

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Cross-Motions
for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking Privileged
Peer Review Records filed on 01120110.

2.

Defendants' Reply in Support of Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on
Peer Review and (ii) Order Striking Privileged Peer Review Record filed on
02/01110.

3.

Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal filed on
3110110.

4.
B.

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Permissive Appeal lodged on 3/2411 O.

Reporter's transcript:
1.

Hearing transcript for Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Compel and Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii)
Order Striking Privileged Peer Review Records hearing held on 02/0311 O.

2.

Hearing transcript for Motion for Permissive Appeal hearing held on
03117110.

I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been served on the
court reporter, Susan Gambee at 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho, of who a transcript is
requested and that the estimated number of additional pages being requested is 26 pages.
I further certify that a copy of this request for additional records has been served

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO BE INCLUDED IN TlIJ'A
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND/OR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 2
UU
893950

0226

upon the clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this 18th day of June, 2010.

Rob~It

. Wnite
A}to eys/or Defendants
/

I

/1

/

/

j

/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18 th day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO
BE INCLUDED IN THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND/OR TRANSCRIPT ON
APPEAL, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

Raymond D. Powers
Powers Tolman, PLLC
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150
P.O. Box 9756
Boise, ID 83707
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

_

Hand Delivery

_

Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

\~simile (208) 577-5101

DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO BE INCLUDED IN TIJ1!:O
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND/OR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 3
UI
893950
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TO:

Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
451 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
(208) 334-2616

AUG 1 7 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
x Docket No . 37574-2010
JOSEPH M. VERSKA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs .
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, et aI"
Defendants - Respondents .
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

- x

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 55 PAGES LODGED
Appealed from the District Court of the
FOURTH Judicial District of the State of
Idaho , in and for the County of ADA,
Deborah A . Bail, District Court Judge.
This transcript contains hearing held on:
2/3/10 & 3/17/10

DATE :

June 22, 2010
,. "

Susan G. Gambe'e,
Court Reporter
Official Court Reporter,
Judge Deborah Bail
Ada County Courthouse
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18
Registered Merit Reporter
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 37574
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record:
1. Affidavit of Rayrnond D. Powers in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production
of Inforrnation Releated to SARMC'S Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment,
filed February 9,2010.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 11 th day of August, 2010.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 37574
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

RAYMOND D. POWERS

ROBERT B. WHITE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

Date of Service: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Supreme Court Case No. 37574
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G.
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD
FOX,M.D.,
Defendants-Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
4th day of June, 2010.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

By _______________
Deputy Clerk
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

0023f

